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ABSTRACT
THE SOURCES OF FINANCIAL PROFIT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF BANKING IN THE US
SEPTEMBER 2012
IREN G. LEVINA, B.A., MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David Kotz
The last thirty years in the US have been characterized by rising financial profits
as a share of total profits and the growth of banking activities yielding non-interest
income. These developments pose two questions. First, what are the social relations
enabling and sustaining financial profits and what are their macroeconomic sources?
Second, what do these trends imply for the nature of banking and what kind of theory of
banking can capture them? This study addresses these questions and makes four
contributions.
First, a Marxist theory of banking is developed to capture the transformation of
banking drawing on two characteristics: first, emphasis on liquidity provision through
exchange of promises to pay among credit participants and, second, explicit connection
between bank revenues and macroeconomic aggregates (wages, profits, assets). It is
shown that a Marxist theory of banking can be a more general theory of banking retaining
strengths of other approaches and overcoming their limitations.
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Second, it is shown that the corporate form of business organization and the
attendant capital markets create opportunities to extract a range of profits with similar
characteristics, i.e., capital gain-like revenues. The key features of their simplest form –
founder’s profit – are shown also to hold for securitization revenues and, partly, for profit
from mergers and acquisitions. These revenues hinge on wealth transfers across the
society and, therefore, differ from profits from production.
Third, by bringing together the Marxist theory of banking and the analysis of
capital gain-like revenues, liquidity provision is shown to form the basis for banks’
sharing in capital gain-like income. The core functions of banking can, therefore, co-exist
with, and even form the basis, for a significant transformation of bank revenues.
Examination of the multiplicity of forms of capital gain-like revenues shows that their
extraction is the common driving force behind the apparently heterogeneous activities
associated with the transformation of banking.
Fourth, empirical analysis of the US bank holding companies confirms that capital
gain-like revenues were a significant part of bank revenues in 2001-2010. Given the
rising household vulnerability toward wealth transfers, this trend suggests a reinstatement
of predatory aspects of finance in contemporary capitalism.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The past three decades in the US economy have been characterized by two trends.
First, revenues and profits accruing to financial institutions have been rising as a share of
total profits. Profits accruing to the US financial sector rose from 13 percent of total
domestic profits in the 1950-60s to 32 percent in 2000-11, on average. Commercial banks
profits as a share of the total doubled during the same time period – from 6 to 12 percent.
Financial sector value added increased from 2 percent of GDP after the World War II to 9
percent in 2010. Second, the character of banking activities has changed too. Banks have
been increasingly engaged in underwriting, mergers and acquisitions, securitization, and
trade in financial assets, receiving a rising share of their revenues in the form of noninterest income.
These two developments pose a question: What do these changes mean, with
respect to the nature of financial profits and the character of banking business? First,
what are the sources of the forms of profit that rose to prominence in the course of
financialization? There are two dimensions of this question. What are the social relations
that have made a systematic extraction of these forms of profit possible and sustainable,
on which grounds can they be justified? And what are the macroeconomic sources of
these gains? Second, how do the new banking activities relate to the fundamental nature
of banking business? Do these new activities represent a major departure from what
banking is? And what kind of theory of banking is required to capture the two trends at
hand?
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These questions have attracted attention in the literature. The rise in financial
profits and its significance have been discussed from several perspectives. Epstein and
Jayadev (2005), Krippner (2005), and Reid (2008) documented a rise in financial profits
as a hallmark of financialization. These profits are often seen as rents – zero-sum income
transfers (Bossone 2001a, 2001b, Graziani 2003, Parguez 2004, Turner 2010). Pollin
(1996) and van Treeck (2009) emphasized a necessary connection between financial
profits and value created in production. Others, by contrast, stressed a fictitious character
of some of the financial profits due to either accounting standards (Kerr 2011) or risk
illusion (Crotty 2008, Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010). The fictitious character of
these gains implies the “paper gains” are inevitably offset by subsequent “paper losses”
of the recipients of these gains. It also implies mismeasurement of the financial sector
output and GDP.
The present study contributes to this literature by identifying a range of financial
profits that have similar characteristics – capital gain-like revenues. It is argued that
financial profits in general come from different sources and therefore cannot be treated as
a homogeneous rent, even less so when the composition of bank revenues is changing
suggesting some structural shifts. At the same time, the multiplicity of the concrete forms
of profits can also be misleading, and a number of apparently heterogeneous activities,
such as initial public offerings and underwriting, mergers and acquisitions, securitization,
and trade in financial assets, are driven by similar forms of profit. These capital gain-like
revenues are shown to retain a connection to the output created in the sphere of
production, but this connection is more complex than a simple redivision of the current
output. The capital gain like-revenues are related to components of the expected future
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output (wages or profits), but at the moment of accrual they come from a transfer of
monetary wealth – either immediately (if a financial transaction is performed with the
ultimate asset holder’s own funds, savings), or after some point in time (upon repayment
of debt if the transaction is done with borrowed funds). The capital gain-like revenues
therefore bear no relationship to and under certain conditions can exceed the current
output. Although accounting practices and excessive risk taking have further boosted
these gains and although some of these new banking practices have created favorable
conditions for a crisis and asset devaluation, the existence of the capital gain-like
revenues is not predicated upon future losses of the recipients of these gains. They exist
even in “normal times” due to wealth transfers associated with differences in the required
rates of return.
Second, the spread of new banking practices has brought about literature on the
transformation of banking, at first empirical, subsequently followed by theoretical
contributions. The changes in banking have revealed weaknesses of the informationtheoretic approach that had been a dominant mainstream theory of banking since the late
1970s. A conclusion of this theory that the core banking functions were in decline sat
uncomfortably with a rise in the share of total domestic profits accruing to these
institutions. This suggested that providing a solution to information and agency problems,
as important as they are, might not be the essence of banking, and created a theoretical
vacuum calling for a new theory of banking. As a response to weakness of the dominant
theoretical framework, new mainstream approaches to banking appeared since the 1990s.
Instead of asserting a decline in the banking functions, these new approaches focus on an
emergence of new banking functions (risk management) or new forms of performing old
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functions (liquidity provision on demand on both sides of the balance sheets, asset
transformation, creation of informationally-insensitive debt). As a result, these new
theories are better able to explain how the transformation of banking can co-exist with a
rise in bank revenues and profits, but none of them has taken the place that had belonged
to the information-theoretic approach as a coherent theoretical framework. A contender
among the heterodox theories was the monetary theory of production that defined
banking as money creation ex nihilo and located it in the circuit of capital by focusing on
lending for productive purposes.
The present study contributes to this literature by suggesting an alternative
theoretical framework for understanding the nature of banking business and its
transformation. A proposed framework can be seen as a more general theory, nesting
some of the existing approaches as its particular moments. Grounded in the bills view and
classical political economy, this theory of banking has a dual foundation. A core function
of banking is understood as liquidity provision through an exchange of promises to pay,
and bank revenues are explicitly connected to macroeconomic aggregates (profits, wages,
assets). A relative autonomy of bank functions and bank revenues allows for different
degrees of their transformation. An application of this theory to the ongoing changes in
banking shows the fundamental nature of banking business has remained unchanged. The
current transformation of banking represents a periodically occurring change in the
concrete forms of promises to pay and mechanisms of their exchange. On the other hand,
a rise of the corporate form of business organization and capital markets has resulted in a
much more significant change in banking by raising to prominence profits that have a
distinct macroeconomic source – monetary assets scattered across the society. This aspect
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of the transformation of banking has not been captured by other theories of banking that,
unlike the suggested approach, lack an explicit connection between bank profits and the
key macroeconomic aggregates.
The methodology of this study involves a combination of, first, a history of
economic thought and a critical analysis of theoretical paradigms and, second, an
empirical investigation of the trends in revenues of the US bank holding companies.
From a methodological standpoint, the present study has three stages. The first step
uncovers strengths and limitations of the current mainstream and heterodox approaches to
banking by using them as a lens for understanding the transformation of banking. The
second step involves using insights from earlier economic thought to show strengths of
an alternative (Marxist) theoretical framework to banking and bank profits that would
capture the ongoing transformation of banking and overcome the limitations of other
existing approaches, both mainstream and heterodox. In particular, a discussion of the
bills view and goldsmiths view on banking allows for developing an approach to banking
as an exchange of promises to pay. Steuart’s (1770a, p. 206) concept of “profit upon
alienation” is used to establish a macroeconomic source of profit distinct from profit from
production. The idea of the dual price system of capital goods associated with theories of
investment by Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky are used to develop an analytical tool for an
analysis of capital gain-like revenues. Finally, the third stage empirically examines trends
in revenues of the US bank holding companies since 1986 – first using the accounting
categories as given in the income statements and then applying the concept of the capital
gain-like revenues. An application of this category to an empirical work uncovers a
common driving force behind many faces of the transformation of banking that would
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have been overlooked based on accounting categories and shows the significance of the
capital gain-like revenues in total bank revenues.
The study has the following structure. Chapter 2 overviews the mainstream
empirical and theoretical literature on banking and its transformation, and concludes that
the information-theoretic approach to banking has revealed its weaknesses and a resulting
theoretical vacuum has been only partially filled by the new approaches to banking.
Chapter 3 considers a take on banking within the monetary theory of production as an
alternative to the mainstream theories. It is argued that although this theory explicitly
locates banking among the other sectors and connects it to macroeconomic aggregates, it
has a limited explanatory power due to a too narrow take on the functions of banking and
an unnecessarily oversimplified link between banking and the circuit of capital. Drawing
on a discussion on two takes on banking in the history of thought, the bills view and the
goldsmiths view, Chapter 4 locates a Marxist theory of banking in the history of thought.
A Marxist theory is shown to have a dual foundation – an exchange of promises to pay to
provide liquidity as a core function of banking and a relationship between bank profits
and flows of value. Such theory is argued to be a more general theory of banking locating
other theoretical approaches as its particular instances reflecting realities of banking in a
particular historical period. Chapter 5 shows that a rise in the corporate form of business
organization and capital markets has created an opportunity for extraction of capital gainlike revenues taking a number of forms. Founder’s profit is the simplest form of such
gain which has similarities with profit from securitization and to some extent profit from
mergers and acquisitions. A dual price system for capital goods which typically forms a
basis for theories of investment is shown to be a helpful analytical tool for understanding
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capital gain-like revenues. Due to their function of liquidity provision, banks are well
suited to facilitate these transactions and on these grounds to share in the capital gain-like
revenues. Thus, the transformation of bank revenues is argued to be more pronounced
than the transformation of bank functions. Chapter 6 presents the results of an empirical
examination of revenues accruing to the US bank holding companies. The chapter
establishes that behind an apparent heterogeneity of the new banking activities lies a
fundamental similarity – a turn to extraction of capital gain-like revenues – and
documents that these revenues have been a significant source of bank income in 20012010. Household wealth is shown to be a significant source of the capital gain-like
revenues, with a rise in the household financial assets in the neoliberal era indicating a
rising vulnerability of households to such wealth transfers. A rise in the capital gain-like
revenues in the context of a rising vulnerability of households to wealth transfers
associated with these profits is argued to be a reinstatement of predatory dimensions of
finance on a new foundation.
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CHAPTER 2
TRANSFORMATION OF BANKING: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.
MAINSTREAM LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
The present chapter critically reviews the mainstream literature showing how it
approaches the transformation of banking and bank profits since the 1980s. This
overview will locate the present study in the already existing debate. Three main
conclusions of this chapter are relevant for our analysis in the subsequent chapters. First,
the mainstream empirical literature acknowledges the transformation of banking since the
1980s. Nevertheless, its empirical and theoretical account of this transformation is
limited. Second, the existing debate shows the importance of looking at bank profits and
revenues – for two reasons. It is the dynamics of bank profits that revealed the
transformation of banking behind the apparent decline in banking that was widely
believed to be taking place in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the content of this
transformation can be best captured through the lens of the changing composition of
revenues, and not so much from bank balance sheets. Nevertheless, the mainstream
treatment of profits is limited, and the aim of the subsequent chapters is to discuss the
aspects of bank profit neglected by the mainstream approaches. Third, the transformation
of banking reveals the limits of the mainstream theory of banking in understanding the
nature of this transformation and analyzing bank profits. Thus, the aim of the present
study is to fill this gap by developing an alternative account of both the transformation of
banking and bank profits.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses the empirical literature
on the decline in banking which was the first wave of studies addressing the changes in
banking since the 1980s. It is shown that although there were good reasons to believe that
banks were declining, this early literature showed that the changes should rather be
understood as a transformation of banking, not its decline. This discussion also put the
role of profits to the forefront. The third part reviews the empirical literature on the
transformation of banking, summarizing the changes in banks assets, liabilities, and offbalance-sheet activities as depicted in the mainstream literature. It also discusses
limitations of this literature, with an emphasis on its empiricist bias and absence of
macroeconomic perspective. Section four reviews the mainstream discussion of bank
profits in the course of the transformation of banking. The section summarizes the main
themes in this literature (such as the rise in fee income, bank revenues and diversification
benefits, the link between the structure of revenues and bank size, and the discussions on
particular types of non-interest income), and shows their limitations. The present study
aims at overcoming these limitations by discussing aspects of profit neglected by the
mainstream approaches.
The second half of the chapter addresses the mainstream theoretical literature
showing how this empirically observed transformation of banking fits with the dominant
theory of banking. Section five reviews the mainstream theories of banking – its first
wave associated with the portfolio, or asset transformation theories, its second wave
represented by the information-theoretic approach, and the relationship between the two.
It discusses features of these theories preventing them from being a good foundation for
understanding the transformation of banking. It is also shown that the information-
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theoretic approach, dominant at the time when the transformation of banking is discussed,
provides a limited treatment of this transformation due to focusing on the quantitative
shift in banking and failing to see qualitative changes. In this sense the mainstream
theoretical literature lags behind its empirical stream. Furthermore, the quantitative
decline in banking predicted by the second wave theories of banking cannot be reconciled
with a rising bank profit share, which calls for a new theoretical explanation of banking.
New theoretical conceptualizations of banking that emerged as a response to the
inability of the information-theoretic approach to address the transformation of banking
are discussed in part six of the chapter. Among them are approaches centered on risk
management, liquidity provision on both sides of banks’ balance sheets, creation of
informationally-insensitive debt, and credit intermediation through asset transformation.
The section discusses the core ideas of these theories indicating their strengths compared
to the previous theories of banking. It is argued that, in spite of being more adequate to
understanding the transformation of banking, these new approaches are still based on a
banking view because they do not provide a theoretical foundation for understanding
certain dimensions of the transformation of banking. Furthermore, these theories are
characterized by dichotomous thinking about this transformation, because they either
deny it as a qualitative change or show that the content of banking has undergone a major
change. As a result, there remains a need for a new theory of banking that would
overcome these limitations.
Section seven concludes by summarizing the main points of the chapter, including
the ideas not addressed in the mainstream empirical and theoretical literature, and by
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formulating the requirements for an alternative theory of banking capable of capturing the
transformation of banks since the 1980s.

2.2. Decline in Banking?
In the early 1990s there has emerged vast literature addressing the question
whether banks have been dying out (Edwards 1993, Boyd, Gertler 1994, and an update
on them by Feldman, Lueck 2007, Kaufman, Mote 1994, with a continuation of the
discussion in Schmidt 1999, Herring, Santomero 2000, Samolyk 2004). It was a natural
response to difficulties in the US banking sector in the late 1980s and to an apparent
tendency of banks to lose market share to other financial intermediaries. Banks were
facing severe competition on both sides of their balance sheets.
On the asset side, banks were losing importance in credit provision to nonfinancial corporation that were turning to raising funds directly through markets. This
process was facilitated by emergence of junk bonds, finance companies, and commercial
paper market. Banks were also losing market share in consumer lending which in 19902006 dropped from 50 to 30 percent of total consumer loans outstanding. It was a
consequence of a rise in lending by non-bank financial intermediaries (especially finance
companies and government-sponsored enterprises), by non-financial intermediaries (such
as General Motors, for example), and a spread of securitization, which resulted in 30
percent of consumer loans being securitized in 20061 (Feldman, Lueck 2007, p. 42,
Herring, Santomero 2000, p. 30, Samolyk 2004, p. 48, 51).

1

Feldman and Lueck (2007, p. 42) notice that securitization represents both a competitive threat and a
benefit for banking.
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Banks were losing market share on the liability side of their business, as well. The
usual argument in the literature is that due to prolonged inflation, among the other
reasons, households have become more sensitive to interest rates differentials. A demand
for deposits with higher rates of return was met by proliferation of money market mutual
funds (MMMF).
These processes of banks losing importance in providing what used to be their
traditional services led to emergence of the literature which essentially argues that, in
spite of all this evidence, the conclusion about banks’ dying out is premature. Although
there are some differences among authors, there have been several lines of reasoning
common to all of them.
First, even though banks’ assets have been declining as a share of assets of other
financial intermediaries, they have been rising as a share of GDP. So if banks are losing
importance, it is so only with respect to other financial institutions, but not with respect to
the economy as a whole.
Second, it was noticed that off-balance sheet activities have been playing an
increasingly important role in banking business. Once banks’ assets are adjusted for these
practices through different ways of imputing on-balance-sheet equivalents of the offbalance sheet activities, this new measure of bank assets has not been declining and
remains at an average 45 percent of total financial sector assets since the mid 1980s
(Boyd, Gertler 1994, Feldman, Lueck 2007, p. 43-44)2.
This observation was pushed to its logical limit by arguing, thirdly, that using
assets as a measure of banks market share is not only quantitatively misleading due to the
2

Another adjustment usually made is for foreign banks entry. Once foreign banks’ assets are taken into
account, it further mitigates the apparent decline in banks’ market share.
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need for the above mentioned adjustments, but also conceptually incorrect. Assets are an
inadequate measure of banks’ market share for two reasons (Kaufman, Mote 1994, p. 4).
First, there is no one-to-one correspondence between services provided and value of the
assets, hence, assets do not reflect the importance of banking functions. Second, assets
are a stock category, whereas output, including bank output, should be measured by a
flow category. On these grounds it was concluded that banks’ share in total profits would
be a better measure of their market share. Some authors made it the core argument of
their study (Samolyk 2004). A few empirical analyses that used profit share as a more
adequate reflection of banks market share found that it has been stable or rising, implying
no decline in the relevance of banks, compared to other financial intermediaries
(Feldman, Lueck 2007, p. 47, Kaufman, Mote 1994, p. 4, Samolyk 2004, Mishkin 2001,
p. 272).
Fourthly, a related attempt to use a different measure of banks’ market share was
based on value added. Similar to profit, it was found to fluctuate around 50 percent of
value added by all financial intermediaries, with no secular decline (Feldman, Lueck
2007, p. 46).
Finally, the other indication of banks’ not dying out is new entries into the
banking business, which signifies that the industry is viewed as potentially profitable
(Feldman, Lueck 2007, p. 47).
The relevance of the early 1990s discussion on the decline in banking is in its
drawing attention to the fact that banks have not been dying out, they have rather been
evolving. This shifted the focus of analysis from a decline in to a transformation of
banking. Put differently, it revealed that the actual concern of theoretical and empirical
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studies should be not a decline in banking. For this apparent decline is both a cause of the
transformation of banking and a form in which this transformation appears. It is a cause,
because it is the competitive pressure on banking firms and changing overall
macroeconomic conditions in which they operate that made banks “find other activities
which are profitable and transform themselves into viable entities which compete with
other firms called ‘non-banks’” (Gorton 1994, p. 116). It is a form, because one of the
major constituents of this transformation is proliferation of off-balance-sheet activities
that by their nature do not appear on bank balance sheets, creating an illusion of a decline
in banking, if banks’ market share is measured by assets. In this sense, the literature on
the decline in banking set a context for another stream of the literature that emerged in
the early 1990s – that on the transformation of banking.
In addition to this key insight, there are a few other important contributions of that
discussion to the way banking is understood in empirical and theoretical literature.
First, it put this “decline” in banking in a broader historical context by showing
that, as is often the case with economic processes, there is nothing new either about the
apparent decline in banking, or about the discussions about it. Already since the 1860s,
there has been a secular trend of a decline in bank assets and loans as a share of those of
the financial system as a whole, with this process being put on hold some times and
reversed other times (Edwards 1993, p. 7, 16-17, Edwards, Mishkin 1995). A period
resembling the 1980s the most were the 1920s, when a decline in the bank asset share
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was especially pronounced (Herring, Santomero 2000, p. 27) and investment banking was
on an upsurge (Kaufman, Mote 1994, p. 7, data from Goldsmith)3.
Secondly, the fact that a few studies concluded on inadequacy of measuring banks
market share by assets is an example of the empirical literature catching up with the
theories of financial intermediation as they evolved in the 1980s. As was mentioned
above, Kaufman and Mote observed that assets are an inadequate measure of banks
market share due to their not being related to the volume of services provided and due to
their being a stock category. But this effectively means that empirical studies measuring
the bank market share by assets implicitly correspond to a “productionist” view on bank
services, with banks producing loans. It essentially reflects the empirical literature
lagging behind the mainstream theoretical developments that already by the 1980s went
far beyond the perspective on banks as producers of loans and shifted the focus of
analysis to banks as specialists producing information and creating incentives. Thus,
Kaufman and Mote’s suggestion to use the profit share, which was stressed a decade later
by Samolyk (2004), is an important step in the empirical literature coming to terms with
changes in the mainstream theories.
A corollary to this is that the discussion on a decline in banking effectively put the
question of banking profit to the forefront and set the conditions for its analysis as a key
indicator. Nevertheless, the empirical literature correctly emphasizing the role of the bank
profit as a more adequate measure of the market share does it in a limited way. It relates
bank profit to that of financial intermediaries, and concludes that banks receive a constant

3

The idea of “retrogression” of monetary intermediaries relative to financial intermediaries in general –
what is now called disintermediation – going back to the early 20th century can also be found in theoretical
literature (Gurley, Shaw 1956, p. 260, 269).
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share of profits. But from a macroeconomic and political economy perspective, a more
important indicator of the role of banking in the economy as a whole is a share of bank
profits in total domestic profits. As was shown in the previous chapter, this profit share
has increased over the past several decades. It also seems to move independently of the
total domestic profit. By neglecting this aspect, the mainstream literature cannot pose a
theoretical question of the content of bank profit, as compared to that of non-financial
firms. Thus, the emphasis on the bank profit share is important, but it needs to be pushed
even further. By the same token, the question of profit also arises in the context of the
transformation of banking. As it will be discussed in the third section of the present
chapter, paradoxically, in spite of acknowledging the role of revenues for understanding
banks market share, profit as a lens for an analysis of the transformation of banking was
not widely used, and there are objective reasons why it could not happen.
Finally, although the literature on the decline in banking was an example of a
reconciliation of the mainstream empirical and theoretical studies, at the same time the
transformation of banking which became obvious in the course of the discussion posed
challenges to the theoretical literature threatening the newly emerged reconciliation. We
will come back to this issue in the subsequent parts of the present chapter.

2.3. Transformation of Banking
As was argued above, the major contribution of the discussion on the “decline” in
banking is that it set a general context for shifting the focus of attention away from the
decline per se to the transformation of banking4. This issue was picked up by several
4

This transformation of banking is usually viewed as a part of a broader process – that of a transformation
of credit markets, or financial systems in general.
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empirical studies (Samolyk 2004, Edwards, Mishkin 1995, Boyd, Gertler 1993,
DeYoung, Rice 2004a).
The shift in the focus of analysis from a decline in to a transformation of banking
effectively signified a shift in the conceptual framework underlying the empirical studies
– from an institutional to a functional perspective on banking. This was accompanied by
a shift of the vantage point for empirical work – from an analysis of bank market share in
total assets and its different forms (loans extended to businesses, households, etc) to an
analysis of composition of banks balance sheets and changes thereof. The transformation
of banking analyzed through this lens is usually described along the following lines.
On the asset side, the literature stresses three major changes. First, bank loans as a
share of assets has risen due to a decline in reserve requirements, development of money
markets causing a decline in precautionary holding of securities, and a rise in liquidity of
certain types of loans due to securitization (Boyd, Gertler 1993, p. 324, DeYoung, Rice
2004a, p. 40)5. Second, commercial and industrial lending (C&I lending, from now on)
has declined as a share of total assets due to firms increasingly funding themselves via
commercial paper, junk bonds, and finance companies (Boyd, Gertler 1993, p. 324), as
well as due to a later on rise in hedge funds, venture capital, and private equity funds
providing the same set of functions for non-financial corporations (Feldman, Lueck 2007,
p. 9). This decline in C&I lending has been especially pronounced for large banks
(DeYoung, Rice 2004a, p. 41). Third, mortgage lending, especially commercial mortgage
lending, has been rising as a share of bank assets (Boyd, Gertler 1993, p. 325).
5

From a theoretical perspective it implies a certain degree of substitution between liquidity of the asset side
of the balance sheets and ease of raising liquidity on the liability side. It is similar to Hicks’ point on
substitutability between liquid assets and borrowing power (one’s ability to increase liabilities, or what he
calls “invisible assets”) (Hicks 1989, p. 66).
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On the liability side, the literature on the transformation of banking usually points
out a decline in the role of deposits – the process referred to as disintermediation. The
opposite side of the same coin is banks’ turning to the money market – to purchased
money (large time deposits, federal funds, and repo), which raises their exposure to
liquidity risk. Rising leverage is the other change on the liability side.
In addition to these changes on the asset and liability sides of the balance sheets,
the other aspect of the transformation of banking is a rise in their off-balance-sheet
activities. The three distinct types of these activities emphasized in the literature are loan
sales and securitization, standby letters of credit and loan commitments, and derivatives.
The discussion of the off-balance-sheet activities even in the early literature is usually
accompanied by a caveat that they do not always and not necessarily represent new lines
of business: “In many cases, further, the growth of off-balance sheet activities reflects
only superficial rather than substantive changes in the nature of banking” (Boyd, Gertler
1994, p. 8).
In spite of the major advantage of this literature in shifting the object of concern
away from a decline in banking to its transformation, there are two major limitations of
these empirical studies.
Firstly, and most importantly, an analysis of the transformation on the asset side
of the balance sheets – changing composition of lending – has a strong empiricist bent.
The taxonomy of assets is driven by the empirically given types of loans, and is not
informed by an understanding of conceptual differences among different types of lending.
Most of the studies stress the rise in loans secured by real estate, without a further
distinction between mortgages to households and to nonfinancial corporations. This
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distinction is nevertheless crucial, as the former has a different economic status from the
usual bank loans to businesses, whereas the latter in many cases can be a formal
substitute for these loans. When it comes to the mainstream empirical studies, lending to
households appears as a separate category only when the empirical data make it so, as it
is the case with loans to individuals consisting of consumer loans and credit card loans.
The only exception is a study by Boyd and Gertler (1993) who mention that a rise
in lending secured by real estate comprises heterogeneous loans. But when it comes to an
empirical analysis of those, the authors relate different types of mortgage lending to total
mortgages, instead of total assets or loans, and conclude that commercial mortgage
lending has become more important – a conclusion opposite to the one we reached in the
previous chapter based on an examination of the empirical data. The reasons behind the
difference between our conclusion and that by Boyd and Gertler lies in the fact that in the
period studied by them home mortgages were declining as a share of total mortgages.
Nevertheless, a rapid rise in lending secured by real estate as a share of total loans
overpowers this decline, so that home mortgages were increasing as a share of bank
assets – a conclusion one cannot reach looking at the share of home mortgages in total
mortgages. In spite of overlooking it, Boyd and Gertler deserve a credit for, first, at least
stressing the difference between the two types of mortgages, and second, for also
mentioning that this decline in home mortgages as a share of total mortgages in the
banking sector does not correspond to the general trend in mortgage lending in the
economy as a whole, where home mortgages represent a constant 80 percent fraction of
total mortgages (Boyd, Gertler 1993, p. 325)6. Thus, they treat it as a difference between

6

Appreciation of the role of lending to households, although in a different context, can also be found in
Samolyk who, discussing consumer credit, stresses the difference between funding loans and originating
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banks and other financial intermediaries, instead of seeing that banks are a part of the
general process of rising home mortgage lending.
The lack of appreciation of the conceptual difference among different types of
lending within the mainstream literature is obvious in a study by DeYoung and Rice
(2004). In the summary tables on changes in composition of bank assets, they have data
on the ratio of residential mortgages to loans, showing a rise in the size-weighted
averages of the ratio and a constant ratio for the unweighted average (DeYoung, Rice
2004a, p. 41). It implies a rise in household mortgage lending by large banks (that
dominate the size-weighted averages) and its constant share for “typical” banks.
Commercial mortgages exhibit the opposite tendency being a constant share of total loans
for large banks and rising only for “average” banks. In spite of having these data,
DeYoung and Rice do not discuss these trends and their implications. Instead, in the
discussion of the transformation of banking one finds a usual argument about a rise in
lending secured by real estate, without further specification.
A second limitation of the empirical studies on the transformation of banking
through the lens of the systematic changes in their activities as reflected in the structure
of their balance sheets is that there are no recent studies of this issue, except for those
looking at individual dimensions of this process. There was some interest in the question
in the mid 1990s, and a few updates in the early 2000s. Since then, there have been
studies of individual dimensions of the transformation of banking, not the process as a
whole. But what can one say about the transformation of banking as a systematic
phenomenon since the early 2000s? Did it stop? Is it reduced to a few tendencies with no
them. It allows her to conclude that although the role of banks in the former has been declining, it has been
rising in the latter (Samolyk 2004, p. 48-49, 51).
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unifying principle behind them? Was there a reversal of those tendencies, or a
continuation of the same trends? Has the transformation of banking acquired new
features? Mainstream literature does not give answers to these questions.
Summing up, the mainstream empirical literature does acknowledge a structural
transformation of banking since the 1980s. Nevertheless, it does it in a limited, one-sided
way. For this reason Erturk is not quite correct arguing that “both the mainstream
economics and the political economy literatures on banking do not seem to have noticed
the transformation of the banks’ balance sheets and their revenue sources since the early
1990s. Such data on banking show that banking has become increasingly a business
where their role in providing finance to the productive sector is no longer the dominant
one. Financing households, selling investment products to households and transacting
between themselves through instruments of financial innovation have become the
dominant activity of financial intermediation” (Ertürk 2009, p. 8). The mainstream
empirical literature did notice the transformation of banking. Moreover, what Erturk calls
banks’ “transacting between themselves” has always been an integral part of banking
business in the form of money market transactions. So the real questions are how the
mainstream literature interprets the content and implications of this transformation, and
what the difference (if any) is between the traditional and the new forms of banks
transacting among themselves.
2.4. Transformation of Banking: Where Do Profits from the “Transformed
Banking” Come from?
It was argued above that the literature on a decline in banking put the question of
profit as a proper measure of banks market share and of their role in the economy to the
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forefront. As mentioned by Kaufman and Mote and turned into the key argument of a
study by Samolyk (2004), the conclusion about an evolution – and not a decline – of
banking becomes obvious, once one looks at bank profits, not their assets. In spite of that,
the discussion of the transformation of banking has been mostly centered on the question
of changes in the structure of bank balance sheets, with very little attention given to
sources of bank revenues and changes in their composition. And yet that would have
been the natural development of the empirical literature.
This was also noticed by DeYoung and Rice, who were effectively the first to
pose the question of changes in sources of bank revenues in the course of the
transformation of banking. They argue that the neglect of the income statements and
composition of revenues can partly be explained by the perseverance of the traditional
view of banks as financial intermediaries taking deposits and making loans (DeYoung,
Rice 2004a, p. 36). Given that their traditional function is best reflected on bank balance
sheets, it shapes the focus of empirical studies. Nevertheless, the transformation of
banking consists precisely in changing banks’ relevance as traditional financial
intermediaries, hence, balance sheets become increasingly inadequate for understanding
what banks do. This calls for a closer examination of banks income statements. Put
differently, if one is to capture the content of the transformation of banking, one should
analyze sources of banks’ revenues and profits. This argument by DeYoung and Rice
effectively means that revenues and profits are an adequate measure not only for showing
that banks have not been dying out, but also for a study of their transformation. The
question of bank revenues and profits was addressed by DeYoung and Rice and it will be
the main object of the present study.
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There are several themes discussed in the mainstream empirical literature on bank
revenues and profits. The main argument is usually linked to a rise in non-interest (fee)
income of the US commercial banks, which increased from its record low 7 percent of
total revenue in 1981 to 36 percent in 2003.7 It subsequently declined to 26 percent of
total revenue in 2007, only to bounce back to 32 percent in 2011. Commercial bank noninterest income as a share of net interest income also rose – from the average 22 percent
in the late 1970s to around 75 percent in 1999-2006. There are a few relevant caveats
stressed in the literature. For instance, not all the non-interest income comes from nontraditional activities. A rise in fee income reflects both a rise in non-traditional activities
and a change in the mode of performing traditional banking functions, as is the case with
securitization and payment services (DeYoung, Rice 2004a)8. Moreover, fee income is
not a new phenomenon, nevertheless its trans-historical importance is sometimes
obscured by movements in interest rates. For example, a rise in interest rates after World
War II resulted in a decline in fee income as a share of banks operating revenue over a
few after-war decades (Kaufman, Mote 1994, p. 14), whereas fee income as a share of net
interest revenue remained relatively constant.
The second theme discussed is bank revenues in their relationship to
diversification benefits and risk-adjusted returns. Contrary to the early literature that
anticipated a reduction in volatility of bank income due to a reduction in interest rate risk
and credit risk and due to diversification benefits, later studies usually conclude that the
7

Calculations by author based on data from FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking, Table CB04.

8

The fact that fee income on credit lines is approximately equal to net interest income on a commercial
loan of the same size (Boyd, Gertler 1994) can be seen as a suggestion that fee income is just a new form of
revenues with the same content. Similarly, a large share of fee income comes from payment services,
according to DeYoung and Rice, and Radecki (DeYoung, Rice 2004a, p. 47, Radecki 1999).
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rise in non-interest income is associated with a rise in profits, but also their rising
volatility, which on the net brings about a decline in risk-adjusted profits (DeYoung, Rice
2004a, Stiroh 2004). Thus, in spite of individual banks benefiting from non-interest
income, on average, there are no diversification benefits.
The third issue is the relationship between non-interest income and bank size. It is
argued that the share of fee income in net revenues and specific types of fee income vary
with the bank size. Fee income is predominantly a large bank phenomenon. Larger banks
have larger non-interest income, which comes mostly from investment banking, asset
management, securitization, and insurance activities, contrary to smaller banks generating
smaller non-interest income, mostly through fees on deposits (DeYoung, Rice 2004a, p.
47, Waldrop 2002).
Finally, there is empirical literature focusing on particular types of non-interest
income and their specificities. For instance, it is shown that trading revenue is the most
volatile component of fee income (DeYoung, Rice 2004a) and that payment driven
revenues is a broader category than fees on deposit accounts (Radecki 1999). A relevant
insight is that securitization income has been the main source of non-traditional bank
output and the single largest contributor to the growth of fees and commissions9 – not
even trading revenues that get most of attention (Inklaar, Wang 2007).
In spite of this attention to bank revenues and profits along the lines discussed,
which is a major step forward compared to an analysis based on balance sheets only,
there are several problems with and limitations of the mainstream empirical studies.

9

In 1990-2004, securitization revenue measured as a sum of net servicing fees and net securitization
income rose from 1.2 to 11.4 percent of total bank output (Inklaar, Wang 2007, p. 24, 33, see also p. 40,
47).
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Firstly, they do not use all the analytical pegs provided by the empirical studies of
bank balance sheets. Specifically, there is no examination of interest revenue associated
with different types of loans and there is no analysis of the relationship between the mode
of bank funding and its revenues. In this sense there is some disjuncture within the
mainstream empirical literature, with its different streams not fully utilizing each others
insights.
Secondly, and more important, the mainstream empirical literature does not pose
the question of sources of different types of revenue. Instead, it is concerned with the
issues of their stability, their relationship with bank size, and so on. It is not surprising,
given that the question of the origin of profit is a concern of classical political economy
and Marxism, in particular. The question is usually not posed by neoclassical theories.
The distinct features of those do not allow these theories to recognize the problem, let
alone solve it. For this reason, the present study will fill the gap in the literature by
explicitly addressing the question of the sources of financial profits, and will do it from a
political economy perspective.
A corollary to the neglect of the question of the origin of profit is a misleading
classification of types of banking revenues. The literature often distinguishes between
traditional and non-traditional banking services. It is argued that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between traditional and non-traditional services, on the one hand, and
interest and fee income, on the other hand. Put differently, some fee income comes from
traditional banking services.
This valid argument nevertheless misses the point that the real question is not so
much whether income comes from traditional or non-traditional services, but rather the
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origin of this revenue. Traditional activities are a heterogeneous category, so that
different components of associated revenues can have different sources. For instance, it
will be shown in the subsequent chapters that even traditional interest income can have
different sources, depending on the borrower type, and although securitization is a new
method of traditional lending activity, securitization income has an entirely different
content from simple interest on loans. By the same token, not everything that looks like
traditional payment services is actually payment services, hence, has the same source of
profit. For example, revenues from securities handling, and forgone interest on credit
cards imputed as securitization income from credit card receivables, considered by
Radecki (1999) to be payment driven revenues, should have a separate analytical
treatment. Thus, in an analysis of bank income statements, the distinction should be
drawn not so much between fee vs interest income, and not even between traditional vs
non-traditional banking services, but rather between bank profits in relationship to flows
of value and their constituents. Hence, functional approach to bank revenues should
indeed be at the heart of distinction among different types of activities and corresponding
sources of revenue, but it should not be taken formally to generate envelope categories
encompassing types of revenues having only formal similarities. But to accomplish it, the
functional approach to banking itself needs to be modified.
A third problem with the mainstream empirical literature is its inability to see that
some limitations of the mainstream theories are deeply rooted, so that it is not accidental
that certain types of bank revenues cannot be discussed within the dominant theoretical
framework. For example, Radecki (1999) uses his empirical study of payment driven
revenues to substantiate his theoretical proposition that an emphasis on intermediation

26

characteristic of the mainstream theories of banking makes the theory blind to other
essential functions of banks, specifically, the role of payment services. He calls for a
theory taking an explicit account of it. This is a relevant insight, from our perspective.
Nevertheless, it fails to acknowledge that it is not accidental that payment services are not
given sufficient attention in the mainstream theories. How can a theory having
information asymmetries as its core explain the necessity of payment services? A theory
capable of doing it needs to have an explicit account of needs of circuit of capital and
revenue10.
To conclude, the mainstream empirical literature acknowledges the
transformation of banking since the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the empirical treatment of
this transformation even through the lens of changes on the balance sheets is limited. For
example, there is no treatment of lending to households and to non-financial corporations
as distinct types of lending, even if they are forms of what seems to be a uniform
category of mortgage lending. Even worse, there is a lack of attention to sources of profit
in light of this transformation, which is noticed by DeYoung and Rice (2004) who
initiated a discussion aiming to fill this gap. But even these attempts do not use all the
analytical pegs available from the studies of the transformation of the bank balance
sheets. Moreover, while focusing on a specific subset of important issues related to bank
revenues, these studies neglect the question of the origin of these revenues, which is not
surprising given the nature of the theoretical tradition implicitly underlying these studies.
Thus, the mainstream empirical literature has a one-sided take on the transformation of
10

It will be shown below that a difference between the requirements of the circuit of capital and
requirements of circuit of loanable capital itself determines the difference between revenues from dealing
in money stemming from surplus value and revenues representing founder’s profit having a semblance to
payment services.
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banking through the lens of the bank balance sheets, and a disproportional emphasis on it,
with largely missing analysis of the bank income statements.
In the context of this discussion of the transformation of banking another set of
issues arises. Once the mainstream empirical literature acknowledges the transformation
of banking, this poses a question about the content of this transformation at a theoretical
level. What do these changes mean for the nature of banking and sources of its revenue?
Following Merton and Bodie functional perspective on banking, a question arises: Is it a
change in the function of banking (of what banks are and what they do, hence, of social
grounds for their remuneration), or a new form of the same content of activities? Is it a
change in functions, or in the institutional form? Is “transformed banking” still banking?
For example, Samolyk (2004, p. 50) argues that “new services provided by banks –
whether the selling of mutual-fund shares to investors or the origination, sale, and
servicing of loans funded by securitizations – are merely banking in different forms”. Is
this approach valid? If it is still banking, what makes it so?
Before answering this question and locating the transformation of banking, we
need to understand what the function of banking is, from a mainstream perspective.
Hence, we need to consider mainstream theories of financial intermediation and banking.

2.5. Mainstream Theories of Financial Intermediation and Banking
The mainstream general equilibrium theory with money neutrality used to have no
room for money and financial intermediation. Only in the mid 1950s, the first wave of
mainstream literature emerged posing a question why financial intermediaries exist. The
discussion was initiated by Gurley and Shaw, and subsequently picked up by Tobin and
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Fama. These early theories conceptualize financial intermediaries as portfolio managers
(Fama 1980). Financial intermediaries buy primary securities and substitute them by
indirect securities with a different set of characteristics (Gurley, Shaw 1956, p. 259),
which is the same as Tobin’s argument about financial intermediaries matching portfolio
preferences of lenders and borrowers by transforming the nature of obligations of the
borrowers and assets of the lenders (Tobin 1963, p. 3-4). This service is a foundation for
their receiving profit in the form of interest spread – a sort of portfolio management fee
(Fama 1980, p. 46, Gurley, Shaw 1956, p. 259).
The portfolio management approach to financial intermediation pivots on the idea
that there is no sharp line between money and financial assets. The boundary between the
two changes historically, and in each particular case it is also contingent on specific
circumstances. There is a certain degree of substitutability between money and financial
assets, especially when it comes to the function of money as a store of wealth. Hence, the
fact that banks’ liabilities have a monetary nature cannot be used as a reason for a special
analytical treatment of banks as compared to other types of financial intermediaries. As
Tobin put it, the difference between the two is “of degree, not of kind” (Tobin 1963, p.
10). For this reason, for the portfolio management theorists the difference between banks
and other financial intermediaries lies in the credit creation by the former being restricted
not only by a profit imperative, as in the case of all financial intermediaries, but also by
government regulation in the form of reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings.
These theories of financial intermediation have not been developed any further. A
few decades of a relatively low interest in the issue and Friedman’s shift of focus to
money supply were followed by a second wave of theories of financial intermediation
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that emerged in the late 1970s-early 1980s, under an umbrella of an information-theoretic
approach to financial intermediation. This approach pivots on information asymmetry in
different forms, with different strands within it addressing a particular form of
information problems. The uniform theme is that banks are specialists in handling
information asymmetry, mitigating market imperfections. If markets were perfect and did
not fail, there would have been no need for financial intermediaries. But given that
information is asymmetric and there exist transaction costs, there is a need for financial
intermediaries.11 Broadly speaking, there are two types of information asymmetry –
regarding the borrowers and the lenders. Thus, financial intermediaries address
information asymmetry related to both sides of their balance sheets.
According to the asset side argument, financial intermediaries emerge to produce
information regarding the borrowing entrepreneur and to solve her incentive problems.
There are two types of approaches here. First, there exists ex post information asymmetry
regarding realization of returns under conditions of costly monitoring (Diamond 1984).
Financial intermediaries emerge as an optimal response, helping avoid a free-rider
problem and duplication of monitoring costs. They are delegated monitors that have a net
cost advantage due to diversified lending. This function accounts for financial
intermediaries being highly leveraged, as debt with a fixed return is an optimal contract
giving a bank an incentive to monitor and resolving the problem for the ultimate lender
11

This insight has broader implications for understanding the nature of the neoclassical theory. The
information-theoretic approach effectively implies banks are a real-world violation of one of the
assumptions of the neoclassical theory, namely, a perfectly competitive market system. By contrast, a
Marxist theory, as it will become clear in chapter 4, studies banks as they are, starting with their relation to
the circuit of capital. It can be argued, therefore, a Marxist theory is an aid to understanding capitalist
reality, whereas the neoclassical theory of a competitive market system is an obstacle to such
understanding, with the result that such an important aspect of capitalist reality – banking – can only be
explained in relation to the neoclassical theory by means of violations of the core theory. I am indebted to
David Kotz who has pointed out this broader implication to me.
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whose returns are now guaranteed. The other interpretation of financial intermediaries
handling borrowers-related information asymmetries is based on ex ante asymmetry
between issuers of securities and their potential buyers (Leland, Pyle 1977). Moral hazard
prevents direct transfer of information regarding the quality of an investment project, so
there is a need for an indirect information transfer, in the form of signaling. Financial
intermediaries emerge as specialists in gathering information. They hold corresponding
assets, and by doing that they signal the quality of assets to other potential investors. The
profits they receive in the form of interest spread represent returns to information they
gathered. In both cases, information asymmetries are the primary reason why financial
intermediaries exist.
There is another line of reasoning pivoting on information asymmetries related to
the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. Investors have unexpected liquidity demand,
which is unobservable and non-verifiable. As a result, enforceable contracts cannot be
written and banks emerge as providers of liquidity insurance in the form of demand
deposits (Diamond, Dybvig 1983)12. Thus, the root cause of existence of banks is
information asymmetry regarding characteristics of agents and their liquidity needs. This
idea is further developed by Myers and Rajan who argue that financial intermediaries
remain crucial in liquidity provision even when there are capital markets as an alternative
12

Diamond and Dybvig acknowledge that there is nothing specific to banks that would make them the sole
firm capable of this type of liquidity transformation – it would hold for any firm with maturity mismatch. In
that sense it is not a theory of banking, but of any firm with illiquid assets and liquid liabilities.
Nevertheless, it does not pose an analytical problem for Diamond and Dybvig who retreat to empirical
observations and argue that ultimately this is a theory of banks, for in reality banks bear most of the
liquidity risk in an economy (Diamond, Dybvig 1983, p. 417-418). They do not see that the real question
here is why it is the banks that bear most of the liquidity risk. Thus Diamond and Dybvig use as a proof
what itself needs to be explained. Do banks just happen to bear this risk? Or there is something structural
about this relationship? The question is addressed much later, when Diamond and Rajan show desirability
of a fragile capital structure for a bank (Diamond, Rajan 2001a). It can discipline a bank but cannot
discipline entrepreneurs because the former is not a creator of value, it merely transfers it.
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source of liquidity, because asymmetric information causes limited participation of
agents in the markets, so that banks need to fill liquidity gap and cross-subsidize (Myers,
Rajan 1998). The liquidity gap emerges because not all the agents participate in the
market, pushing demand for liquidity above its supply and raising the price of liquidity.
By diverting a part of the liquidity demand, banks fill the liquidity gap and enhance
liquidity provision by markets by raising asset prices (lowering price of liquidity). By
cross subsidization Myers and Rajan mean a transfer of funds among those who do not
participate in the market – a traditional liquidity insurance function of banks. Notice that
the reason behind the limited participation is again information asymmetry and costs
associated with acquiring information. The liquidity insurance approach is related to the
“transaction accounts” take on banking (Fama 1980, Corrigan 1982, Corrigan 2000,
Miller 1998), based on the idea that given that the asset side does not make financial
intermediaries special, it is their liability side that distinguishes them from other firms.
Their liabilities “are payable on demand at par and… are readily transferrable to third
parties” (Corrigan 1982)13.
13

This primacy of the liability side gives rise to one of the theories of origin of banking and a
corresponding approach to endogeneity of bank balance sheets with respect to its functions. Banks emerge
as money changers. To facilitate payments, they start taking deposits. If they were to hold all the assets in a
liquid form, they would have a high transformation risk – risk of a sudden change in the form of assets –
which would lower their credibility. To be able to attract depositors and to make liquidity provision on
demand credible, they need to hold illiquid assets to lower the transformation risk, which makes them
extend loans. Thus, whereas in general holding more liquid assets makes it easier for institutions and
individuals to raise capital, in the case of banks it is lowering liquidity of assets that makes it easier to
attract deposits. This happens because holding a long term loan signifies a bank commitment and increases
trust in bank operations. This difference between benefits of liquidity of assets for banks and non-banks
constitutes the so-called “paradox of liquidity” (Myers, Rajan 1998, p. 760-761, Rajan 1996). According to
this theory of banking, banks’ money-dealing endogenously turns them into deposit takers, which in turn
determines the structure of the asset side of their balance sheets. Thus, the nature of bank liabilities
determines the nature of its assets. Notice, it is effectively a goldsmiths view of origin of banking.
Incidentally, this approach is related to Marx’s argument in volume 3 of Capital arguing that moneydealing capital becomes subsumed under the credit system. For an opposite approach to banks balance
sheets endogeneity (assets determining liabilities), see Goodhart and various heterodox theories
(Schumpeter, post-Keynesian theories, circuitists, Bossone).
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It is worth discussing the relationship between the two waves of the mainstream
theories of financial intermediation. This relationship is usually described as the
information-theoretic approach incorporating the main insights of the portfolio theories,
so that the new theory is broader and more complete. For example, in his literature
review on real/financial interaction Gertler (1988, p. 574) argues that Gurley and Shaw’s
insights were subsumed under the information-theoretic approach which differs from the
earlier theories in the methodology used. From our perspective, this is an inadequate
characteristic of the relationship between the two waves of the mainstream theories. The
information-theoretic approach incorporates the asset transformation aspect of banking
activities only partially and, what is more important, formally. In spite of both theories
being ahistorical and not being capable of distinguishing between capitalist and noncapitalist banking, the portfolio theories are at least broad enough to be able to
incorporate a variety of explanations why assets are transformed. Even though an implicit
assumption of this theory is differences in subjective preferences of individuals requiring
this transformation, in principle there is no need to explain asset transformation by
subjective differences between borrowers and lenders. Put differently, the general
framework of asset transformation can be filled with different content. By contrast, the
information-theoretic approach reduces all banking activities, including its asset
transformation dimension, to tackling information asymmetries. This is a very specific
explanation which cannot be filled with different content.
In this sense, by shifting the focus of analysis to overcoming market
imperfections, the information-theoretic approach impoverishes the portfolio
management theories, instead of enriching them with a new methodology. This
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impoverishment is twofold. First, the information-theoretic approach reduces the content
of asset transformation to a mere by-product of other banking activities related to
mitigating information asymmetries. Asset transformation ceases to be an activity banks
engage in as an end on its own or for reasons unrelated to information asymmetries.
Secondly, even if there were no information asymmetries, there could still be a need for
asset transformation, hence, for banking14. But the opposite is not true: if there were no
need for asset transformation, there would be no need for financial intermediaries, hence,
the information gathering and processing dimensions of banking activities would have
been undertaken by direct lenders. Hence, the information aspect is not peculiar to banks,
rather, to any lending relationship. In this sense the information-theoretic approach is
concerned with a particular reason of existence of banks and is much narrower in it than
the portfolio theories. Summing up, even though the information-theoretic approach
enriches the portfolio theory by a discussion of concrete banking activities, including
those of screening, monitoring, and liquidity provision, the former offers a limited take
both on asset transformation and on raison d’être of banking, compared to what can be
argued based on the portfolio theory.
There are several features of the portfolio management and information-theoretic
approaches that need to be emphasized in light of the above discussion on the
transformation of banking.

14

A similar criticism of the information-theoretic approach, although in a context of theories of financial
intermediation based on risk management, not early portfolio theories, was suggested by Scholtens and
Wensveen, who argue that even if markets and information were perfect, there would have still existed a
need for qualitative asset transformation (Scholtens, Wensveen 2003, p. 23). Thus, a focus on information
asymmetry can only explain the brokerage function of financial intermediaries, i.e. their function with
respect to uniform, tradable financial services, but not their broader qualitative asset transformation
(Scholtens, Wensveen 2003, p. 33). The conclusion is effectively the same as ours: information
asymmetries cannot explain existence of financial intermediaries.
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A characteristic feature of the early theories treating financial intermediation as
portfolio management is that they are broad enough to describe any banking activity.
Banks are specialists in asset transformation along assets’ liquidity, maturity, and credit
risk dimensions. This transformation is performed in a variety of ways, so that any
banking activity qualifies for this description. For example, even provision of derivatives
can be treated as a form of asset transformation (Boyd, Gertler 1994). Such a theory is
incapable of capturing qualitative changes in what banks do, and all the changes are
inevitably reduced to a mere change in form how an asset transformation is performed.
This theory does not show whether various forms of asset transformation can be
qualitatively distinct and have different grounds and sources of remuneration. For this
reason even if the portfolio theories continued to dominate the mainstream theories of
financial intermediation, it is not clear how they could offer insights relevant for
understanding the nature of the transformation of banking. It will become apparent in the
discussion of some of the new theories of financial intermediation, in particular those by
Gorton (2008, 2009) and Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky (2010), that can be viewed
as a resurrection of the asset transformation approach to banking.
By the same token, the information-theoretic approach to banking treats
information asymmetry in a variety of forms as the root cause of all banking-related
phenomena and all banking functions. It is information asymmetry that is responsible for
screening, monitoring, liquidity insurance, and even for agents’ limited participation in
the capital markets making financial intermediaries important even in a more marketbased financial system. To the extent that information remains asymmetrical, banking
does not change. Given that the changes analyzed by the empirical current of the
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mainstream literature are not associated with elimination of information asymmetry,
banking is still banking. The theory is incapable of capturing other aspects. It is not suited
to analyze not only changes in banking within capitalism – those associated with changes
not related to information asymmetry, but also its ahistoricism would prevent such a
theory from recognizing broader changes, e.g., a difference between capitalist banking
and banking in general. At the same time, the information theoretic approach
acknowledges that, with a rise in markets as liquidity providers the role of banks in
handling information asymmetry on the liability side declines. With the development of
information technologies the need for banks’ screening and monitoring function, i.e.
handling asymmetry on the asset side, is expected to decline, too. Thus, paradoxically,
this theory of banking is inherently a theory of a decline of banking, and the theory of
financial intermediation is inherently a theory of disintermediation.
Putting these two features of the information-theoretic approach together, it
becomes clear that according to these theories, in the course of the empirically observable
transformation of banking banks have become “less of the same”. Banking is still
banking – qualitatively the same type of economic functions, although on a smaller scale
due to a partial substitution by markets. The information-theoretic approach is capable of
capturing only quantitative changes in banking, and possible qualitative changes are
reduced to mere quantitative ones.
And indeed, a look at a few attempts to address the question of the transformation
of banking within the information-theoretic approach proves this conclusion.
Securitization is considered under a rubric of a change in costs due to differences in
monitoring costs with and without securitization (Mester 1992). A broader approach
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towards the transformation of banking treats changes on the liability side and a decline in
the role of core deposits as a driving force behind a decline in traditional relationship
lending (Berlin, Mester 1998). It shows the interconnection between a decline in the two
key dimensions of banking activities. Nevertheless, both aspects are still treated as a
quantitative decline in traditional banking functions on the asset and liability sides.
In general, the transformation of banking is addressed within the informationtheoretic approach in a one-sided way. Changes in the structure of lending are not
considered in the literature at all. And the changes that are addressed show a decline in
the traditional banking functions, as in the case of securitization and a decline in deposits
triggering broader changes. Specificity of banks’ liability side is reduced to a particular
instrument, demand deposits proper, and not a social relationship of liquidity provision
on demand that can take multiple forms. In a sense, it is a return to a preGurley/Shaw/Tobin state of the debate.
Such a limited treatment of the transformation of banking, with a focus on
quantitative changes, is itself problematic. It obviously lags behind the complexities
discussed in the mainstream empirical literature on the transformation of banking.
Nevertheless, it would not have posed a major problem if the transformation of banking
discussed above implying a decline in traditional banking within the informationtheoretic framework did not co-exist with a constant share of banks profit in total profits
of financial intermediaries. This disjuncture becomes even more severe once one takes
into account that banks perform their functions for the economy as a whole, so a more
meaningful comparison would be that with total domestic profits. If the informationtheoretic approach predicts a quantitative decline in banking and in the role of its old
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functions, how can banks receive a rising share of domestic profits? What are the grounds
for their remuneration? A too narrow view on the reasons behind existence of banking
characteristic of the information-theoretic approach makes itself visible in the inability of
this theory to address these questions. Is this rise in profits associated with new functions
not captured by the old theories? Or with new ways of performing old functions, not
recognized by the information-theoretic approach?
To the best of our knowledge, the paradox of a rising bank profit share co-existing
with a decline in traditional banking functions as they are understood within the
mainstream theory has not been explicitly stated in the literature. Nevertheless, a similar
paradox drew attention of Allen and Santomero (1997). They noticed that competition for
brokerage fees since the early 1970s resulting in a decline in trading costs for individuals
did not lead to a decline of mutual funds, and that technological revolution reducing costs
of information and information asymmetries did not lead to a shift to direct market
participation. Thus, a decline in market imperfections that are usually viewed as raison
d’être of financial intermediaries did not make them disappear.15 This obvious evidence
of the information-theoretic approach looking for grounds for financial intermediation in
a wrong place made Allen and Santomero (1997, 2001) call for a new theory of financial
intermediation.

15

This argument by Allen and Santomero resembles Nell’s criticism of a somewhat broader proposition by
Hicks. Hicks suggests that a possible way of looking at monetary history is through the lens of institutions
emerging to lower transaction costs (Hicks 1967, p. 7). Nell argues such an approach is misleading, in light
of the rising share of the financial sector in GDP in the second half of the 20th century (Nell, 2001, p. 188189).
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2.6. Mainstream Theories Reconsidered: Theories of Transformation of Banking, or
A Quest for a New Content of Banking
The inherent limitations of the existing theories making them incapable to address
some of the issues of the transformation of banking and reconcile an apparent decline in
traditional banking with rising importance of financial intermediaries gave rise to a quest
for new theoretical approaches to banking. This search was reinforced by an outbreak of
the crisis that started in 2007 and had some features of a banking crisis, but at the same
time had its specificity making it different from bank runs as we know them from history.
Emerged to explain the change, the new theories are by definition better suited for an
analysis of the transformation of banking.
A reconciliation of co-existence of the transformation of banking with its
remaining importance required an argument about emergence of new functions of
banking or new ways of performing old functions. Otherwise, one could not explain
rising profits accruing to financial intermediaries and rising value added of them. Thus,
there emerged four distinct approaches belonging to new theories of financial
intermediation. Each of these approaches has its own take on what constitutes the essence
of banking and its implications for the transformation of banking. Consider each of these
approaches in detail.
Probably the most widely known new theory of financial intermediation is the one
suggested by Allen and Santomero (1997, 2001). They argue that the informationtheoretic approach focuses on functions of banking that are not relevant any more. Banks
have transformed, and they perform two main functions – risk management and risk
trading, and facilitating participation of others by reducing participation costs through
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creating products with stable distribution of cash flows. These two functions have
become the core of banking due to a rise in the market-based financial system and due to
existence of higher participation costs for entities other than financial intermediaries. Not
only is risk management the major activity of intermediaries, but also financial
intermediaries are the main entity in the economy performing this function. They are
uniquely suited to perform this function, because they are specialists dealing in financial
assets, and any dealing in financial assets – origination, trade, servicing – by definition
involves managing and trading financial risk (Allen, Santomero 1997, p. 1478). As a
result of this transformation of financial intermediaries, a traditional distinction between
those and the markets has broken down, as the markets are now dominated by
intermediaries16.
Incidentally, this approach pivoting on risk was anticipated by Alan Greenspan as
early as in 1994. He defined “traditional banking” as “the measurement, management,
and acceptance of risk” (Greenspan 1994, p. 3), by linking traditional banking functions
to risk. For him, liquidity insurance is based on risk diversification through pooling
assets, and payment services involve accepting and managing risk (Greenspan 1994, p.
3). Contrary to Allen and Santomero (1997, 2001) who stress risk only in light of the
transformation of banking, for Greenspan, the basic functions of banks understood in this
way remain unchanged, although technological characteristics of products, specific
means by which these functions are performed, and precise character of the risks

16

From a theoretical viewpoint it is an interesting statement, as it implies that capital markets are akin to
the money market that is created by and exists for intermediaries, not firms or individuals.
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involved have evolved17. On this basis he concludes that the conventional wisdom that
banking is a declining industry “may reflect too narrow a vision of the role of banks”
(Greenspan 1994, p. 2).
Allen and Santomero’s approach was critically appraised by Scholtens and
Wensveen (2000, 2003) who argue that Allen and Santomero are correct in their
emphasis on risk, but do not go far enough with their argument. For Scholtens and
Wensveen, risk management is what defines banking, its main raison d’être, it is not a
new function of banking due to its transformation. The origin of banking is in its risk
transformation and risk management activities, since banking in the Italian Renaissance18,
– a somewhat similar argument to Greenspan’s. Reducing costs and informational
asymmetries are a part of the banking process, “but it occurs as a by-effect” (Scholtens
2000, p. 1251): financial intermediaries “deal in money and in risk, not in information
per se. Information production predominantly is a means to the end of risk management.
In the real world, borrowers, lenders, savers, investors and financial supervisors look at
them in the same way, i.e. risk managers instead of information producers” (Scholtens,
Wensveen 2003, p. 23, see also p. 21, 27)19. Finally, the other extension of Allen and

17

It is interesting to note that, for Greenspan, within the range of functions related to risk, “risk information
processing” has become increasingly important and “now lies more visibly closer to the core of the banking
business” (Greenspan 1994, p. 4). Thus, although Greenspan’s emphasis on risk in many ways anticipates
Allen and Santomero’s argument, on the other hand, it is a reversal of their approach, with a shift from
handling risk as a generic function of banks to information-related activities linked to handling risk. This
seems to be an attempt by Greenspan to combine his reasoning with the information-theoretic approach
dominant at that time, whereas Allen and Santomero stress precisely the opposite transformation – away
from information-related services to risk management.
18

A problem with Scholtens and Wensveen’s treatment of risk is that they use categories of risk
transformation, absorption, management, and trading, with these four conceptually distinct categories being
mixed together, so it remains unclear what are the exact functions of banks with respect to risk.
19

Sholtens and Wensveen develop this argument into a broader – and quite powerful – criticism of the
information-theoretic approach, arguing that it is good at analyzing specific aspects and a variety of
contingencies of financial decisions, but its power is also its weakness. The theory becomes a set of ad hoc
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Santomero’s approach is in a model of delegated risk management developed by Hakenes
(2004).
The second approach within the new theories of financial intermediation is
represented by Rajan (1996) arguing that the essence of banking is liquidity provision on
both sides of the balance sheet. For him, it is not incidental that banks historically fund
themselves with demand deposits and extend loans, as both activities are effectively
liquidity provision on demand (Rajan 1996, p. 119). Their co-existence can be explained
by economy of scale and co-insurance – a situation when holding illiquid assets is
required to maintain credibility of liquid liabilities, due to the paradox of liquidity
discussed above. In light of this theory, the transformation of banking is merely a change
in “the outward form of banks’ activities – though not their underlying economic
function” (Rajan 1996, p. 114). The transformation consists in banks’ concentrating on
the essentials of their function, ridding of the rest. An example is issuing letters of credit
instead of a direct funding of a loan, reflecting the essential bank function as provision of
“not funding per se, but funding on demand” (Rajan 1996, p. 121-122, italics in the
original).
The other two new theories of financial intermediation emerged largely as a
response to the 2007-2009 crisis. The motivation behind them is to define the essence of
banking in a way that would allow for an analysis of shadow banking as real banking.
The first of these approaches is proposed by Gorton for whom banking is creation
of informationally-insensitive debt – debt, value of which is not sensitive to private

findings having anecdotal value, with no general and coherent explanation of financial intermediation
(Scholtens, Wensveen 2003, p. 21-22).
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information (Gorton 2009, based on Gorton, Pennacchi 1990)20. The relevant
characteristics of this type of debt are that it has no fixed maturity, hence, is redeemable
at par on demand; it can be used in transactions (serves as a means of circulation,
transferrable to other parties); it is senior and backed by a portfolio of diversified assets
(Gorton 2009, p. 14). The first historical form of informationally-insensitive debt is
demand deposits, but repo possesses all the four characteristics of the informationallyinsensitive debt, as well, hence, can be viewed as a wholesale form of deposits
redeemable on call. On these grounds, Gorton concludes that shadow banking is real
banking. Furthermore, shadow banking as “creating a “currency” for firms” (Gorton
2009, p. 41) is grounded in material conditions, for securitization is a necessary
development due to a rise of demand for collateral and for wholesale deposits of large
firms, both financial and non-financial (Gorton 2009, p. 39-40)21. Incidentally, Gorton’s
treatment of the 2007-2009 crisis as a run on repo, i.e. a panic on the wholesale market,
was anticipated by Boyd and Gertler already in 1993, who argued that the rising exposure
to liquidity risk in the course of transformation of banking can lead to a banking panic on
the money market (Boyd, Gertler 1993, p. 328). For them, a first sign of bank panics
hitting the wholesale market was at the time of the collapse of Continental Illinois in
1984 that triggered a panic withdrawal by large CD holders.
20

There are some deeply rooted problems with this approach, as it requires exogenous shocks to explain
how informationally-insensitive debt becomes informationally-sensitive in the time of a bank panic. It
effectively implies – without Gorton’s acknowledging it – that information sensitivity is not a feature of
debt per se, but of social relations, trust, etc, i.e. that it is not a private, but a social phenomenon. But
Gorton’s approach cannot reconcile this feature of bank debt as a social phenomenon with an analysis of
banks as private institutions.
21

As he put it, “Forcing everything back on balance sheet seems like an attempt to return to the Eden of the
Quiet Period without recognizing that the world has changed… [T]he rise of securitization and repo as very
significant parts of the capital markets cannot be explained as a bubble, or as the product of greed, and so
on” (Gorton 2009, p. 40).
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Finally, the other attempt to reconceptualize financial intermediation is made by
Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010), who define the essence of banking as credit
intermediation through credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation. This approach
effectively represents a rebirth of Gurley and Shaw’s asset transformation as the essence
of banking, without its origin being tied to information asymmetry and market
imperfections. Pozsar and his colleagues argue that shadow banking plays an analogous
economic role as traditional banks – that of credit intermediation (Pozsar et al. 2010, p.
13) – in which credit, maturity, and liquidity transformations are unbundled and
performed through steps in a chain of specialized institutions, when the traditional credit
intermediation process is “vertically sliced” (Pozsar et al. 2010, p. 11, 69, 72). It is the
shadow credit intermediation process, which has lengthening of the intermediation chain
as its counterpart22.
There are two important theoretical implications of this approach.
First, the separation of the liquidity, maturity, and credit risk transformations
across steps and institutions within the shadow banking system reveals that these are
inherently different processes, “three independent concepts” that do not need to be
performed simultaneously, although it used to be the case in traditional banking (Pozsar
et al. 2010, p. 18).
Second, it makes the authors conclude that the nature of lending has been
changing (Pozsar et al. 2010, p. 28-29). Lending is no longer reliant on banks only, rather
on a network of institutions funded through wholesale market and capital markets

22

Lengthening of the intermediation chain as one of the key features of the transformation of banking was
also noticed by Samolyk (2004).
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globally23. Although banks’ direct involvement is only at the level of loan origination,
their indirect participation is much broader. Bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies
are effectively lender of last resort to their non-bank subsidiaries24. Finally, lending is
capital efficient but depends on liquid wholesale funding and global capital markets,
hence, can easily become capital deficient.
In their discussion of the origin of shadow banking, Pozsar and his colleagues
treat shadow banking as a unity of “parallel banking” and shadow banking proper (Pozsar
et al. 2010, p. 45, 67-68, 72). The former has arisen due to gains from specialization and
comparative advantage over traditional banks, with most of the institutions of the parallel
banking to be found in the “external” shadow banking segment – diversified brokerdealers (DBD) and independent specialists. The latter has originated in regulatory
arbitrage and has limited economic value25.
There are two main strengths of the new theories of financial intermediation.
First, by showing an emergence of new banking functions (as in the case with Allen and
Santomero’s treatment of risk) or by arguing that old functions (and, hence, old grounds
for remuneration) are preserved and merely take new forms (understood as liquidity
provision, asset transformation, or creation of informationally-insensitive debt), the new
theories of financial intermediation offer an answer to the question how the

23

Although lending hinging on a broader set of institutions than banks proper becomes obvious with
shadow banking, it is inherent in the very nature of lending based on reallocation of idle funds. In this sense
securitization is merely a reaffirmation of the social character of loanable capital, not a qualitative change
in the nature of lending, as Pozsar and his colleagues try to argue (Pozsar et al. 2010, p. 28).
24

It is similar Samolyk’s argument that layering of intermediation makes it harder to quantify the role of
banks (Samolyk 2004, p. 31, 35, 51).
25

It looks like their argument is that these two forms are different in their origin, but both are forms of
credit intermediation, regardless of what caused its genesis.
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transformation of banking can co-exist with a rising bank profit share. Thus, the new
theories resolve the main problem which could not be reconciled by the second wave
theory of financial intermediation.
Secondly, and broader, the new theories of banking break with the limits of the
information-theoretic approach discussed in the previous part of this chapter, where it
was compared to the earlier portfolio theories. Information asymmetry and market
imperfections do not seem to be at the core of existence of financial intermediaries that
rather exist to manage risk, transform assets, or create a specific type of debt –
informationally-insensitive. None of these aspects has an immediate connection to market
imperfections, none of them uses a perfect market as a reference point, hence, the new
theories represent a broader approach to what banking is.
In spite of these obvious advantages of the new theoretical conceptualizations of
banking over the information-theoretic approach, they also have two major limitations.
First, several dimensions of the transformation of banking that were not addressed
by the information-theoretic approach are not discussed by the new theories either.
Among these aspects are implications of lending to different economic sectors and
relationship between bank revenues and profits and those of the rest of the economy. It
reveals that in spite of the major differences among the “old” and the “new” mainstream
theoretical approaches, they share a common feature of not distinguishing across
economic sectors outside of banking. Thus, all of them pivot on what can be called
“banking view” of financial intermediation, not a macroeconomic or a political economy
view of the society as a whole.
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Second, an important aspect of all the theoretical approaches to the transformation
of banking, both within the information-theoretic framework and new theories of
banking, is that all of them either deny the transformation as a qualitative change in
banking, arguing that its functions have remained the same and merely took new forms,
or show that the content of banking has undergone a major change. Examples of the
former are Rajan’s emphasis on liquidity provision, Greenspan’s, Scholtens and
Wensveen’s treatment of risk. The second approach is best represented by Allen and
Santomero’s take on risk management. Thus, the range of approaches to the
transformation of banking manifests prevalence of a “dichotomous thinking”: banking is
either totally different today, or exactly the same, with only a concrete way they perform
their functions having changed. What at first glance appears to be an exception, for
instance, approaches developed by Gorton and Pozsar and his colleagues, at a closer
examination turns out to belong to the first group of theories, stressing new modes of
performing the same set of functions. In the case of Gorton and Pozsar, it is, respectively,
creation of informationally-insetsitive debt and credit intermediation through liquidity,
maturity, and credit risk transformation, merely changing their concrete forms.
From the perspective of this study, contrary to a dichotomous thinking of the
dominant theories pivoting on the “change vs. no change” debate, the question of the
transformation of banking is more complex. Instead of such dichotomous thinking, there
is a need for a theory of banking that would allow for both a trans-historical content of
banking and changes in banking, with these changes being more than just a change in a
concrete form of performing the immutable functions. Chapter 4 suggests a possible
theoretical framework for theorizing banking. A Marxist theory of banking will be shown
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to have a dual foundation – a core function of banking seen as liquidity provision through
exchange of promises to pay and an explicit connection between banks and flows and
stocks of value. Such dual foundation allows for a relatively unchanged core function of
banking to co-exist with and even form a basis for a significant transformation of banks’
relationship to the rest of the economy and, consequently, for a non-trivial change in the
character of bank revenues. It is therefore the very nature of what banking is – which
remains the same – that allows for its changing content through history. Thus, a change in
banking is intrinsic in what banking is.

2.7. Conclusion
The mainstream empirical literature acknowledges the transformation of banking
since the 1980s. Nevertheless, its treatment of this transformation is incomplete, as it
does not consider differences in lending to different economic sectors. It reveals that the
approach is based on a “banking perspective” – for a bank it does not matter who a loan
is extended to. But it does matter from the perspective of the society as a whole, hence,
from a broader political economy perspective.
In spite of this major limitation, the empirical discussion of the transformation of
banking points out two relevant facts that are also important to the present study. First, it
shows that profit is a more adequate measure of banks’ market share, not their assets. It
can be used as an empirical basis for a conclusion that banks are not dying out. On these
grounds, the present study will focus on banks’ profits and revenues as a measure of
banks’ role. Nevertheless, given that banks perform their functions with respect to the
economy as a whole, we will develop this argument further and consider banks profit
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share in total domestic profits, not profits of financial intermediaries, as in the
mainstream literature. Secondly, one of the empirical studies correctly points out that not
only is profit an adequate measure of banks market share, but also it is a more appropriate
lens for an analysis of the ongoing transformation of banking, due to the nature of this
transformation itself. On this basis, we will focus on banks income statements to analyze
the content of the transformation of banking.
The empirically acknowledged transformation of banking poses a challenge to the
dominant mainstream theory of banking. The information-theoretic approach considers
this transformation as a merely quantitative change, with banks becoming “less of the
same”. Not only is it not capable of capturing a qualitative shift, but also the major
conclusion of a quantitative decline cannot be reconciled with a rising bank profit share
in total domestic profits. This, coupled with a limited treatment of the transformation
itself, reveals weaknesses of the existing theory, which turns out to be incapable of
explaining the major structural changes in banking. For this reason, to be able to explain
changes, the theory of financial intermediation itself needs to be changed.
New mainstream theories of banking emerged to fill the gap by redefining the
content of banking along several lines. Among them are liquidity provision on demand on
both sides of the balance sheets, informationally-insensitive debt creation, asset
transformation, and risk management and trading. The disjuncture between the theoretical
and empirical strands of the mainstream literature has been narrowing with an emergence
of these new theoretical takes on banking.
Although the new theories are more adequate to explain the change and pose
banking on a broader foundation than mere market imperfections, changes in the
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structure of lending and broader implications of changes in the mode of banks funding
themselves cannot be addressed by either old or new theories, because of their internal
limitations. The reason behind it is that the mainstream theories of banking fail to locate
it within a broader macroeconomic theory or a theory of capital as a whole.
From a political economy perspective, a theory of banking capable of capturing
these issues needs to have an explicit account of the relationship between banking and the
circuit of capital and revenue with underlying social relations, and an explicit treatment
of the nature and origin of profits in its relationship with flows of value. That is, banking
needs to be put into the context of the capitalist mode of production and specifically
capitalist sources of profit in value creation. It is a distinct feature of a Marxist theory of
finance that locates the credit system within the capitalist mode of production, both in its
genesis and functioning. Such a theoretical framework would have several implications.
An immediate consequence of this approach to banking would be its ability to
address the aspects of the transformation that cannot be captured by the mainstream
theories, but that are relevant from a macroeconomic and political economy perspectives.
As a result, the content of the transformation of banking would be sought not in a
changing mode of performing the same set of core functions, but in a changing place of
banking with respect to value creation and distribution, changing relationship with the
circuit. Thus, it is a relationship of banking to the circuit of capital and revenue that gives
meaning to banking and its transformation. This is missing in the mainstream theories.
A corollary to this is that the transformation of banking understood in this way
could be shown to be connected to changing sources of profit as related to flows of value
– past, present, and future. Hence, we will look into the link between the transformation
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of banking and the transformation of the content of bank profit. Where do profits from
the transformed banking come from? This question becomes even more relevant in light
of the transformation of banking co-existing with a rising bank profit share in total
domestic profits.
A broader implication of this approach to banking is that it would allow for a coexistence of a trans-historical content of banking and changes in banking, going beyond
the dichotomous thinking of the mainstream theories.
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CHAPTER 3
BANKING, TRANSFORMATION OF BANKING, AND BANK PROFIT IN THE
THEORY OF THE MONETARY CIRCUIT
3.1. Introduction
It was argued in the previous chapter that banks have been changing over the past
few decades. This transformation has posed a challenge to the mainstream theories of
banking that proved incapable of fully capturing this transformation. The informationtheoretic approach has encountered its limits, and new theories of banking have emerged
posing banking on a foundation other than information asymmetries and market
imperfections. In spite of being better suited to address the transformation of banking, the
new theories fail to capture some relevant aspects of the transformation of banking.
Specifically, both the old and the new theories do not recognize the differences across the
economic sectors, hence, fail to posit banks in their relationship with these sectors and
account for the related transformation.
Therefore, a need for an alternative theory of banking remains. Such a theory
should pose banking on a foundation other than information asymmetries, like the new
mainstream, approaches, yet explicitly locate banks among the major economic sectors.
The monetary circuit of production theory, also known as the circuitist approach, at a first
glance seems to meet these requirements. The present chapter will focus on this theory
with an aim to establish to what extent it can provide a broad enough theory of banking to
address the ongoing transformation. Special attention will be given to, first, the strengths
of this theory compared to the mainstream approaches and the insights it offers that need
to be retained. Second, in the course of the discussion limitations of the monetary theory
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of production approach will be uncovered. It will be argued that these limitations prevent
the theory from offering a foundation for an alternative theory of banking.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 locates the circuitist theory in the
history of economic thought. It discusses the main cornerstones of the theory of banking
in Schumpeter and Keynes – the immediate predecessors of the theory of the monetary
circuit and, more broadly, of the heterodox theories of banking in general. Section 3
focuses on the key ideas of the circuitist theory of banking and shows how the theory
addresses the question of the transformation of banking. It is argued that in spite of
posing banks on a foundation other than information asymmetry and acknowledging
differences across economic sectors, therefore, being well suited for studying the
transformation of banking, the circuitist theory nevertheless fails to adequately capture
this transformation. It happens due to internal limitations of the theory. Section 4 focuses
on the treatment of bank profits within the monetary theory of production. The circuitist
take on profits is shown to be problematic in general and even more so in the context of
the transformation of banking. Section 5 shows that some insights into bank profits can
be gained from a broader discussion of financial profits in the heterodox literature on
financialization. Section 6 concludes by formulating requirements to an alternative theory
of banking that would retain the insights of the circuitist approach to banking and the
discussion of financial profits in the debate on financialization, but at the same time
overcome the limitations of these approaches.
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3.2. Schumpeter and Keynes: Immediate Origins of the Circuitist Theory of
Banking
The previous chapter has concluded that a theory of banking capable of capturing
its ongoing transformation should pose banks on a foundation other than information
asymmetry and market imperfections, similar to the new mainstream takes on banks. At
the same time, contrary to both the old and the new theories of banking, it should
acknowledge differences across economic sectors and explicitly locate banks among
those sectors. At a first glance the monetary theory of production developed by Graziani
(2003), Parguez (2004, 2001, Parguez, Seccareccia 2000), and Bossone (2001a, 2001b,
2003) seems to posses both characteristics, hence, appears as a good candidate for such a
theory. Before discussing this theory and the way it treats the transformation of banking
in a greater detail, consider its origin. Approaches to banking developed by Schumpeter
and Keynes can be viewed as immediate predecessors of the heterodox theories of
banking, in general, and the circuitist theory, in particular, therefore, they deserve a closer
analysis.26

3.2.1. Schumpeter: Banking for Development and Creation of Purchasing Power
Schumpeter can be viewed as one of the immediate predecessors of the modern
heterodox theories of banking and especially the circuitist theory. His approach is based
on two main pillars – an emphasis on banking as a medium for economic development
and on banks as essentially specialists in money creation (Schumpeter 1961

26

Although one might question whether Schumpeter and Keynes should be considered part of heterodox
economics in general, when it comes to theories of banking, their analysis is distinct enough to make them
stand apart and be a part of the heterodox tradition.
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[1911/1934]). Both aspects have played an important role in the modern theories of
banking, nevertheless, Schumpeter’s originality should not be overstated. An emphasis
on development banking can be traced back to Sir James Steuart (1770b, book IV, part
II), and the focus on money creation by banks can be found in all the monetary theories
existing before Schumpeter, although he was among few who would define banks as
primarily money creators. Elsewhere Schumpeter (1954, p. 317-318) identifies the origin
of this view in the work by Daniel Webster who made note issue the defining trait of a
bank as early as in 1839. Later, this approach was also held by Sidgwick, Fetter, Withers,
and Hahn, among others.
Schumpeter studies credit and banking in their relationship with development.
The primary focus of his analysis is “spontaneous and discontinuous changes in the
channel of the circular flow” (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 65), not so much because
this is the way economic changes have always occurred, but more because of their
“fruitfulness” (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 63). He argues that carrying out new
combinations of existing resources, i.e. the process of development, requires purchasing
power. Thus, for Schumpeter, credit is defined through the requirements of development.
He sees credit as essential for one’s becoming an entrepreneur. At the same time, it is not
fundamental for all the other types of economic activities – consumption, maintenance of
a disturbed business, and running business in the already established circular flow
(Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 102-103). These other activities can be theorized prior
to and independent of credit, whereas development cannot, therefore, Schumpeter focuses
on credit for development and concludes that the two are inseparable.

55

Further, credit for development cannot come from a reallocation of the already
existing purchasing power, because it is committed to the already existing circular flows
(Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 72, 96). Therefore, credit in Schumpeter is based on
creation of new purchasing power. To start a new flow, new liquidity is required. This in
turn serves a basis for Schumpeter’s theory of banking. For him, “creation of means of
payment centres in the banks and constitutes their fundamental function” (Schumpeter
1961 [1911/1934], p. 98, see also p. 185). A bank is a producer of commodity
“purchasing power” (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 74). In Schumpeter’s view, the
emphasis on creation of purchasing power is fundamental both at a theoretical level for
the reasons just discussed, and at an empirical level, because according to his estimates in
his time in some countries three-quarters of deposits were credits created by banks
themselves (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 99). And even if they are not, following
Hahn27, Schumpeter treats the actual deposits as a particular type of bank credit – the one
without a corresponding increase in depositor’s purchasing power.28
An implication of such a take on banking is that for Schumpeter the functions of
banks not related to creating new purchasing power are secondary, derivative
(Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 125, 189, 199-200). For instance, banks also advance
credit for purposes other than development, on the one hand, and assemble the already
existing liquidity scattered across the society, on the other hand. But for Schumpeter
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According to Robertson (1937, p. 430), a similar idea was expressed by Harrod in The Trade Cycle.

28

From a bank’s perspective, lending out funds acquired through collecting deposits and lending out a
claim on itself are obviously equivalent. The same holds for a borrower. Nevertheless, from a political
economy perspective, this cannot be a basis for denying deposit collection as a separate function of banks,
different from issuing claims on itself, because the former puts banks in a position of centralizing idle funds
scattered across the society, whereas the latter does not.
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these functions of banking are secondary with respect to development banking, because it
is development that gives meaning to transactions related to the circular flow. On the one
hand, credit for maintaining the established circular flows becomes important only after
these flows already exist, which happens as a result of development. With no
development, there would be no circular flows. On the other hand, only an established
circular flow can release temporarily idle funds. On these grounds Schumpeter concludes
that forms of credit not related to development and credit based on intermediating
existing, instead of the newly created, liquidity are a consequence of development and
become the secondary function of banks. Banking as creation of new purchasing power
should be theorized before banks as financial intermediaries. “The banker, therefore, is
not so much primarily a middleman in the commodity “purchasing power” as a producer
of this commodity… He is essentially a phenomenon of development” (Schumpeter 1961
[1911/1934], p. 74, italics in the original).
This theory of banking leads Schumpeter to a particular theory of bank profit.
There are two aspects of this theory. According to one, interest accruing to banks is kind
of a tax on entrepreneurial profit (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 175, 210). The other
aspect of interest is its being a premium on present over future purchasing power, or a
premium on newly created purchasing power (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 157,
187-188, 196). In both cases interest comes from the surplus value created in the course
of development, i.e. from profit from carrying out new combinations (Schumpeter 1961
[1911/1934], p. 173-175). Therefore, it involves a price struggle between a borrower and
a lender (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 125, 192-193).
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Schumpeter’s emphasis on the role of banks for economic development is
important, as it shows that banks can be a powerful medium in this process. Nevertheless,
by linking banking and development, Schumpeter ends up developing a partial theory of
banking, which, contrary to his belief, is a poor basis for generalizations to capture other
aspects of banking activities. And indeed, how can banking for development serve a basis
for understanding the ongoing transformation of banking as described in the previous
chapters? How could it nest rising lending to households? How could it explain
securitization and other non-lending bank activities? In this sense, Steuart’s approach to
banking is more powerful, because although he also stressed a special role of
development banking, he was clear from the outset that there are different generic types
of banks, with each having its own principles of operation that cannot be deduced from
any particular type of banking (Steuart 1770b, book IV, part II, chap. III).
From the perspective of the present study, even though banks do have a capacity
to create money ex nihilo, and even though this process is relevant for development,
nevertheless, neither development, nor money ex nihilo can be a starting point of an
analysis of banking. Consider this argument in a greater detail.
First, although Schumpeter is right that under certain conditions banking might be
a necessary condition for development, the converse is not true29. Development is neither
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Here we are not discussing a broader problem with Schumpeter’s approach – to what extent development
is a good organizing principle for an analysis of capitalism. It creates an illusion that the fundamental
driving force of capitalism is the pursuit of development. Schumpeter validates his entry point emphasizing
“fruitfulness” of development (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 63) but it does not resolve the problem.
His approach is misleading, because, first, it pivots on an abstract process of economic development,
without studying social relations involved. There can be different types of development, but all of them are
subsumed by Schumpeter under an abstract process of development. As a result, the industrial revolution in
England and economic development in the Soviet Union in the 1920s might appear not that different.
Second, without being explicit about it, Schumpeter focuses mainly on the capitalist type of development,
but even that alone cannot be studied as an abstract process of changes in the circular flow. It itself should
rather be viewed as a consequence of the drive for profit, i.e. for self-expansion of value as a fundamental
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a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for banking, therefore although looking at banks in
the context of development might offer insights into the specificity of banks providing
credit for development, and can explain why and how banks can be a powerful medium
for this process, it cannot be a starting point for developing a general theory of banking,
contrary to Schumpeter’s view.
His vision that a general theory of banking can start with banking for
development reveals a deeper methodological problem in Schumpeter – a problematic
take on what is abstraction. His abstraction is “mechanical”, formal. He isolates a new
circular flow from both other circular flows co-existing with it and from the preceding
process of accumulation. But this is not a fruitful approach, as, first, the current circular
flows can release temporarily idle purchasing power that can be channeled into
development. That is, although Schumpeter is right that the existing purchasing power is
already absorbed by the established circuits, it does not prevent these circuits themselves
from releasing monetary funds. Second, for historical reasons it is also misleading to
assume away the purchasing power accumulated in the past, as in many cases
development has been carried out by means of monetary wealth concentrated in the hands
of a specific group of people. Not only new combinations in the already developed
capitalism, but even the very beginning of the capitalist development is usually based on
the previous economic systems, domestic or foreign, so assuming away the results of the
past accumulation is misleading both historically and logically. One example would be
capitalist process. It is not development, but value expansion, that constitutes the fundamental capitalist
phenomenon. Put differently, new enterprises are established not because capitalists seek to carry out new
combinations, but because carrying out new combinations is a necessary condition for profit extraction.
And in this sense development is only a means for and a consequence of profit extraction. Thus, starting
with development is in many ways analogous to starting an analysis of capitalism with use values, which
obscures the driving force of capitalist production – an approach criticised by Marx.

59

the monetary wealth accumulated by merchants and money-dealers from their previous
operations that was channeled into production during the industrial revolution. In this
sense an attempt to establish an abstract first circuit that would be a basis for all the other
circuits is deeply problematic. Therefore, it is misleading to cut a new circuit off from
other existing circuits and from the results of the previous accumulation.
This is not to deny that Schumpeter is right that to study banks systematically one
needs an abstraction. Nevertheless, this abstraction should not be formal. A better
abstraction would be the simplest form of the banking relations that contains a possibility
to be developed into other forms of banking activities.30 As it will be argued in chapter 4,
such an abstraction could be a credit relationship in general and the bank business of
discounting, not the process of development.
Schumpeter’s mode of abstraction is interwoven with other aspects of his theory.
Development banking and money ex nihilo are not two independent characteristics of
banking – both of them rather stem from the nature of his abstraction. Starting his
analysis with development makes Schumpeter not only treat current credit as secondary,
but also focus on money creation ex nihilo necessary. Therefore, once the problematic
nature of his abstraction is uncovered, it becomes clear that development banking cannot
be a starting point for a theory of banking. By the same token, money ex nihilo – the
other pivotal concept in Schumpeter’s theory of banking – is also a problematic starting
point for an analysis of banking, for a number of reasons.

30

This take on abstraction is based on the work of the Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov for whom an
abstraction, or what he called “the concretely universal”, is “the genuinely universal foundation of the
whole system, its ‘elementary cell’” (Ilyenkov 2008 [1960], p. 80). An abstraction should contain, “like a
‘cell’ or embryo, the wealth of more complex, more developed forms of… relations” (Ilyenkov 2008
[1960], p. 85).
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If development were not to be used as the entry point, therefore, if there were
room for other sources of funds, demand for liquidity could be equally met by
intermediating existing liquidity or creating new liquidity. It was Keynes’ argument who,
acknowledging the role of initial finance in starting a circuit, insisted that demand for
finance can be satisfied by either creating new liquidity or intermediating existing
liquidity (Keynes 1937a, p. 664-665, 1937b, p. 245-246, 1938, p. 319). Trying to
preserve Schumpeter’s emphasis, Graziani explains Keynes’ focus on both forms of
liquidity provision by his attempt “to modify as little as possible the approach followed in
the General Theory, where the stock market occupies the main position, and the banking
system seems to be entirely absent” (Graziani 1987, p. 36). From our perspective,
Graziani’s explanation is misleading, because a casual observation alone shows that
banks extend credit based on both deposits they collect and by creating bank money. And
the fact that all modern money is credit money does not alter the principles of functioning
of banks.
Furthermore, not only can liquidity indeed be provided through these two
channels, as argued by Keynes, but also the very question of whether banks provide
liquidity based on deposits or issuing notes can be posed only after a discussion of
general principles of bank credit. Put differently, the questions of bank credit and its
concrete mechanisms emerge at different levels of abstraction. There are two approaches
to this. According to a Marxist theory of banking as developed by Itoh and Lapavitsas
(1999, p. 94-95) and Lapavitsas (2003, p. 79), banks develop functions of collecting
deposits and issuing notes as means of increasing their lending capacity, therefore, of
raising profits. In this theory, banks are both intermediaries and money creators, and there
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is no hierarchy between these two functions, although both of them are viewed as
concrete forms of doing banking business, not the content of this business in general.
Another approach was suggested by Hicks. For him banks in general are dealers
in securities, both marketable and unmarketable (Hicks 1967, p. 48), or dealers in money
(Hicks 1989, p. 67). Similar to Itoh and Lapavitsas, deposit taking and issuing notes are
more concrete forms of doing the banking business. Nevertheless, Hicks also
acknowledges hierarchy between these two functions, and for him issuing bank notes
develops out of deposit taking. He shows that a theorization of banks as liquidity creators
requires a prior theorization of demand deposits withdrawable at sight (Hicks 1989, p.
55-58). 31 For Hicks, banking spontaneously arises from discounting promissory notes
which in turn serves a foundation for attracting deposits. A need to expand banking
business of discounting and lending in general makes banks actively encourage deposits
through paying interest on demand deposits and making them transferrable, i.e.
facilitating payments. As a result of deposits being withdrawable at sight, both by
depositors and their creditors, demand deposits become money. It is this moneyness that
becomes a foundation on which lending out claims on bank’s own debt becomes possible.
Hicks stresses that the act of bank lending by creating a deposit appears differently to
different participants of this transaction (Hicks 1989, p. 58). For a borrower, this type of
borrowing is not any different from borrowing cash. This is why moneyness of bank
deposits is crucial. For a bank, this corresponds to a simultaneous increase in its assets
and liabilities. And only from the perspective of the society as a whole, bank creates
31

Incidentally, a similar argument was implicitly suggested by Keynes when he talks about bookkeeping
nature of liquidity provision (Keynes 1937a, p. 666, 1937b, p. 247). It was later also advocated by Chick
(1992, p. 194-195) in her theory of evolution of banking, according to which at an early stage banks were
pure intermediaries and later evolved into entities issuing debts on themselves.

62

money. Thus, for Hicks, lending by creating deposits is not only a particular form of
lending, but also a derivative form that can be theorized only after demand deposits have
become money. Put differently, creation of purchasing power ex nihilo cannot be viewed
as the simplest abstraction containing more developed forms of lending in an embryo
form. Banks’ deposits being redeemable on demand forms a foundation for banks’ ability
to lend out own debt. Thus, banks do not emerge as entities creating money, hence,
cannot be defined on these grounds. Rather, as Nell put it in his account of the evolution
of Hicks’ monetary thought, banks “deposits can be used as means of payment; then
banks come to create money” (Nell 2001, p. 187).
This has important implications for Schumpeter’s theory of banking. Regardless
of a hierarchy between deposit taking and money creation, the approaches discussed
above suggest that these two functions accrue to banks at a later stage of their
development and constitute concrete ways of doing the banking business. Therefore, an
attempt to develop a theory of banking based on money creation could not possibly lead
to a general theory of banking. Schumpeter’s emphasis on money creation would not
have been a problem, if it did not involve relevant implications for heterodox theories of
banking. But it does, as the emphasis on money creation ex nihilo does not allow one to
pose, let alone resolve, a fundamental question of the social relations behind acceptability
of bank liabilities as money, hence, of the social relations behind banking in general.
Money creation becomes an abstract process without any content.
To recap, Schumpeter shows that banks are relevant for development and
discusses one of the possible ways they can provide liquidity, but it does not answer a
question what a bank is and why banks exist. Hence, his theory of banking would
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necessarily be one-sided, therefore, it is not surprising that it does not seem to be of direct
value for understanding the ongoing transformation of banking and bank profits since the
1980s.

3.2.2. Keynes: Banks and Liquidity Provision
Keynes can be viewed as another immediate predecessor of the modern heterodox
theories of banking. He has not developed a theory of banking per se, nevertheless, his
writings on monetary issues offer some insights relevant for understanding the nature of
the banking business.
For Keynes, banks are essentially liquidity providers.32 They specialize in
organizing and managing “a revolving fund of liquid finance” (Keynes 1937a, p. 666).
For the purposes of the present study it is important that banking is a monetary
phenomenon, which implies that information and risk cannot be a starting point for
studying banks. Therefore, Keynes’ emphasis on liquidity provides a foundation for an
analysis of banking other than information asymmetries and market imperfections.
The emphasis on liquidity is one of the main contributions by Keynes to the
history of economic thought. For him, liquidity is paramount for a smooth functioning of
an economy, with its absence being able to trigger an economic slowdown or even a
crisis. He summarized this insight in his famous conclusion that “the investment market
can become congested through shortage of cash. It can never become congested through
shortage of saving” (Keynes 1937a, p.669). Given that banks specialize in liquidity
provision, hence, can to some extent control it, it places them in a strategically important
32

He considers an establishment of social habits of transferring debt as equivalent to transferring money as
a necessary historical foundation for development of banking (Keynes 1971 [1930], p. 20).
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economic position and gives them power with respect to the rest of the economy (Keynes
1937a, p. 666, 1937b, p. 248). In a sense, control over liquidity is equivalent to control
over investment and, more broadly, economic activity.
According to Keynes, the pool of liquid resources is constituted by existing cash
and the new cash created by banks (Keynes 1937a, p. 665). Put differently, banks
perform their pivotal function of liquidity provision by issuing claims against themselves.
They do it in two ways – by intermediating existing liquidity and by creating new
(Keynes 1971 [1930], p. 21-22). The former corresponds to their passively collecting
deposits, the latter – to their actively lending out claims on themselves.33 34 On these
grounds Keynes treats banking business as a business of creating and cancelling deposits
and balancing active and passive deposits. He also stresses that the two types of liquidity
are equivalent not only from the banks’ perspective, but also from the borrower’s
perspective (Keynes 1937a, p. 664-5, 1937b, p. 245-6, 1938, p. 319). 35
This take on banks as both active and passive has important implications. First,
banks for Keynes are both intermediaries and money creators, and there is no dichotomy
between the two aspects of the banking business. Banks do perform an intermediation
33

Keynes draws on a similar argument by Phillips (1920, p. 40) who distinguished between a primary and a
derivative deposit. The former “arises from the actual lodgment in a bank of cash or its readily convertible
equivalent”, whereas the latter “arises directly from a loan” in anticipation of its repayment.
34

Although Keynes is right in distinguishing between these two functions, it is not quite correct to associate
deposit collection with a passive function. Both deposit taking and issuing claims against itself in favor of a
borrower involve active banking aiming at increasing the lending capacity of banks. The active principle
behind deposit collection by means of offering interest on deposits and making them means of circulation
was rightly stressed by Hicks (1989, p. 56-57).
35

This is further developed by Fischer and Rossi. The latter emphasizes the co-existence of two functions
of banking: “money-purveying”, i.e. creation of new liquidity, and “credit-purveying”, i.e. intermediation
of existing liquidity (Rossi 2003, p. 340, 347-348, based on Rossi 1998). Therefore, banks for Rossi are
both monetary and financial intermediaries, hence, there exists a two way causality: loans make deposits,
and deposits make loans (Rossi 2003, p. 350-351).
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function, but it is only one aspect of their business, therefore they cannot be theorized as
primarily intermediaries. By the same token, banks cannot be viewed as essentially
money creators, although they do create money, henceforth it is misleading to argue that
they are not intermediaries. Keynes’ focus on liquidity provision gives a framework to
nest both elements. As a result, Keynes goes beyond Schumpeter whose theory
emphasizing money creation ex nihilo can be viewed as a particular case of Keynes’
liquidity provision. It is not surprising, because, as was argued above, Schumpeter’s
emphasis was largely driven by his focus on development, which can shed light only on a
particular type of banking.
Second, Keynes’ emphasis on these two modes of performing banking business is
important for locating his insight that loans create deposits and that liquidity is distinct
from saving. Keynes clearly distinguishes between two questions concerning deposits –
their being a limit on liquidity and their role in banking activities. Although deposits
indeed do not set a limit on the bank lending capacity, and saving – on liquidity, it does
not make deposit collection irrelevant for the banking business. This is wholly in line
with a casual observation that even modern banks engaging in a vast array of activities
ranging from asset sales to trading securities do not cease to collect deposits. Therefore,
Keynes’ distinction between the question of limits on loans and liquidity and relevance of
particular ways in which loans are funded needs to be retained.
Third, Keynes centres his discussion of liquidity provision around the finance
motive for holding money, i.e. around the investment needs of enterprises (Keynes
1937b, p. 246, 1939, p. 574). Thus, contrary to Schumpeter, Keynes does not reduce
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banking activities to financing development, but treats them broader as providing finance
to enterprise in general.
Finally, although Keynes does acknowledge the money creation function of
banks, he also stresses that this process has its limits:
I have endeavoured to say enough to show that the familiar controversy as to how
and by whom bank deposits are ‘created’ is a somewhat unreal one. There can be
no doubt that, in the most convenient use of language, all deposits are ‘created’ by
the bank holding them. It is certainly not the case that the banks are limited to that
kind of deposit, for the creation of which it is necessary that depositors should
come on their own initiative bringing cash or cheques. But it is equally clear that
the rate at which an individual bank creates deposits on its own initiative is
subject to certain rules and limitations. (Keynes 1971 [1930], p. 26)
Some of the bank obligations, including inter-bank liabilities, are settled in cash,
calling for bank reserves. This holds prior to and regardless of the government
regulations requiring banks to keep a certain amount of reserves. Therefore, even if banks
were to “move forward in step” (Keynes 1971 [1930], p. 23) – lend out claims on
themselves in favor of the borrowers at the same pace as other banks – there would still
be a limit to credit. This insight is important, because it reveals that Schumpeter’s
abstract process of money creation has its limits. What is more important, it shows that
the existence of many banks places constraints on the credit creation, therefore,
paraphrasing Marx (1977 [1894], p. 250), the real barrier of the banking credit becomes
capitalist banking itself. The banking system spontaneously emerges as a means to
overcome the limits of commercial credit, yet the capitalist form of banking can never
achieve the goal or removing limits of credit expansion.36

36

This has two implications. First, the benefits of credit expansion could be more easily realized if banking
were placed on a non-capitalist basis. It could have eliminated the limits to credit associated with the
functioning of the capitalist credit system itself, and would have shifted the limits to where they actually
belong – the sphere of conscious planning of economic activity. Second, it gives an insight into the
tendency towards the rising concentration in banking. Individual banks strive to overcome the limits
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Keynes’ insights are important for the purposes of the present study for a number
of reasons. First, liquidity provision can be viewed as a trans-historical function of
banking that has not been challenged by its ongoing transformation. The concrete ways in
which banks provide liquidity have evolved, for instance, commercial and industrial
loans have often been replaced by contingent liabilities – banks promises to provide
liquidity on demand, but the underlying activity of liquidity provision has remained
intact. As was argued in chapter 2, this cannot be said of the information collection
function, as in many cases it has been reduced to credit scoring, outsourced to rating
agencies, and mitigated by rising availability of financial information with a development
of the information-telecommunication technologies. If a constant bank profit share (and a
rising profit share of all financial institutions) does not sit comfortably with the decline in
the information function, it can be partly explained by the liquidity provision function
that has not gone away. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the new approaches to
banking in the mainstream literature pivots on banks as essentially liquidity providers. In
a sense, Rajan’s (1996) theorization of banks as essentially liquidity providers on
demand, both on the asset and the liability sides of their balance sheets, is rooted in
Keynes’ insight, although it is not acknowledged by Rajan.
Second, Keynes’ emphasis on banking as liquidity provision clearly shows why
banking should not be conflated with the intermediation function as its particular type.
This in turn implies that a decline in the relative importance of the traditional banking

associated with reserves, and accomplish it to the extent that their market share increases. A similar
argument was advanced by Bossone (2001a, p. 872, 2001b, p. 2254, 2264) and Graziani (2003, p. 91). It is
important to stress that contrary to the possibility of socialization of benefits associated with credit
expansion on a non-capitalist basis, the capitalist solution involves banks privately appropriating these
benefits.
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represents a transformation, but not a decline in banking. Within Keynes’ framework, it is
not surprising that the mainstream empirical literature discussed in chapter 2 has evolved
from a discussion on the decline in to the transformation of banking.
In spite of these two major insights relevant for understanding banking and its
transformation, there is an important limitation of Keynes’ treatment of banks. The
emphasis on liquidity provision is not a sufficient foundation for theorizing banks.
Keynes is right that banks are a monetary phenomenon, nevertheless, they are more than
that – they are a phenomenon of credit. The latter is more complex and has more
determinants. A credit relationship can be understood as an exchange of money for a
promise to pay – an act involving two moments. One moment of this transaction is indeed
liquidity provision. Nevertheless, the other aspect is an extension of a promise to pay.
Even though these are two sides of the same coin, Keynes’ emphasis on liquidity
provision needs to be shifted to that on the promise to pay, as the latter involves more
determinants. This is clear from Marx’s analysis of functions of money, in particular,
money as a universal equivalent (Marx 2003 [1867], p. 74-75) and money as a means of
payment (Marx 2003 [1867], p. 134-141). At the most elementary level, liquidity
provision is grounded in the function of money as coin – universal equivalent. A need for
liquidity arises because money is in a monopolist position of exchangeability with all the
other commodities. Therefore, liquidity provision is a provision of universal equivalent.
By contrast, issuing promises to pay is based on the function of money as money – means
of payment. It subsumes the function of universal equivalent as one of its aspects, but
money as a means of payment also implies further social relations that cannot be
analyzed at the level of money as universal equivalent. Among them are economic factors
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related to a separation of purchase and sale, and non-economic determinants, especially,
trust between the counterparties involved in a credit relation. Therefore, a shift in
emphasis from liquidity provision to credit essentially implies broadening the scope of
analysis and creating a room for a discussion of aspects that cannot be captured merely
on the basis of liquidity. A possible way of doing this will be discussed in chapter 4.
To recap, Keynes stays at the roots of the modern heterodox theories of banking,
in particular, of the circuitist and post-Keynesian approaches. Liquidity provision can be
viewed as a trans-historical function of banking not challenged by its ongoing
transformation, therefore, can serve as a broad foundation for theorizing banking. In spite
of this strength, Keynes’ focus on liquidity should be supplemented by an accent on an
exchange of promises to pay, as it could give more mileage for uncovering social
relations underlying banking activities.

3.3. Theory of the Monetary Circuit: An Approach to Banking and Its
Transformation
An approach to banking within the monetary theory of production has emerged as
a synthesis of Schumpeter’s and Keynes’ views on banking. The proponents of the theory
of the monetary circuit, also known as the circulation approach, adopt the general
Schumpeterian framework by considering creation of purchasing power as the
fundamental function of banking. But they also alter Schumpeter’s approach by shifting
the emphasis away from credit for development to credit to start any circular flow, be it a
new flow related to innovation or a new circular flow within the already established
enterprise (what Schumpeter calls “current credit”). They consequently broaden the scope
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of the analysis of banking. In this shift of the focus the circuitists follow Keynes’ (1937a,
1937b, 1938, 1939) discussion of the “finance motive for holding money”.
Therefore, contrary to the dominant mainstream theories discussed in the previous
chapter, the circuitist theory places banks on a foundation other than information
asymmetries and market imperfections. At the same time, by acknowledging differences
across economic sectors and explicitly positing banks in their relationship with these
sectors, the monetary theory of production overcomes the limits of both the old and the
new mainstream theories of banking. On these grounds, this theory appears well suited
for understanding the ongoing transformation of banking and bank profits. Consider the
core of the theory in a greater detail to show to what extent it is indeed a good framework
for studying this transformation.

3.3.1. Banking in the Theory of the Monetary Circuit
The starting point of analysis of the circulation approach is an observation that the
process of production requires initial finance to pay the wage bill in advance.
Aggregation of all the firms into one sector allows the circuitists to abstract from
payments for means of production, as they cancel out within the firm sector. In the
absence of government, and a past stock of wealth in a money form, the only source of
purchasing power can be banks that create money ex nihilo.
Banks are thus derived as specialized institutions with two main characteristics.
First, they provide initial finance to start a circuit (Graziani 2003, p. 27, Bossone 2003, p.
154, Bossone 2000, p. 25, 34). Sometimes the state is also included in the analysis as the
other agent “whose expenditures are creating present and future real wealth” (see also
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Parguez 2004, p. 20, Parguez 2001, p. 72, Parguez, Seccareccia 2000, p. 105). The
relevant emphasis here is that from the outset lending is considered only for the purposes
of wealth creation, therefore, other types of lending are left out. Parguez and Seccareccia
(2000, p. 107) justify this by saying that issuing liabilities to finance non-wealth
generating activities would make these debts “deprived of value and no one would accept
them”37. Second, banks provide initial finance by creating money ex nihilo, or lending
out debts on themselves (Bossone 2001b, p. 2240, 2247, 2252, 2266, Graziani 2003, p.
25, 2004, p. 26, Parguez 2001, p. 73). This is grounded in an approach to money as
necessarily credit money. Parguez (2002, p. 46) summarizes this idea by saying that a
specialized institution becomes a bank when it is viewed as “so credit worthy that their
debts are universally accepted as means of acquisition” and they start specializing in
issuing debts on themselves.
This take on banking has three important implications. First, money creation is
independent of the multiplier process which is merely a multiplication mechanism, but
not the origin and the simplest form of money creation (Bossone 2001b, p. 2250).
Second, for the circuitists, there is no pool of pre-existing deposits for the banking sector
as a whole, therefore, banks as a group are not intermediaries (Parguez 2001, p. 79,
Bossone 2003, p. 154). Parguez and Seccareccia (2000, p. 107) summarize it arguing that
“loans can never be financed by some pre-existing deposits”. Third, this ability to create
money is a source of banks’ power (Bossone 2001a, p. 858, Graziani 2003, p. 150). On
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This justification is obviously problematic for both historical and logical reasons. Lending for a variety
of purposes has always been a really existing phenomenon. By the same token, borrowing for purposes
other than wealth generation can co-exist with these debts being credible, when the debt is expected to be
repaid from other sources of revenue accruing to the debtor.
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these grounds Parguez (2004, p. 32) views banks as being able to set interest rates at their
discretion38.
The circuitist approach to banking contains several relevant insights that give this
theory an advantage over the mainstream formulations. The proponents of the monetary
theory of production distinguish among economic sectors and locate banks among them
at the outset. By the same token, they rightly treat banks as a monetary and not an
information-collection or a risk-related phenomenon. Finally, they correctly emphasize
that banks cannot be viewed as passive intermediaries. Nevertheless, the exact way in
which the circuitists develop these relevant points is often problematic.
First, banks are indeed in a unique position to create money by lending out claims
against themselves. But this is not a good starting point for an analysis of banking, as it
cannot serve a basis for a discussion of other bank activities. The circuitists are right in
modifying Schumpeter’s perspective by shifting the emphasis from development to initial
finance. Nevertheless, they have not realized that the two aspects of Schumpeter’s theory
of banking – the development lens and money ex nihilo – are intertwined. As was argued
above, in Schumpeter money needs to be created ex nihilo because before the process of
development starts there can be no savings from the past and because the already existing
liquidity is assumed to be channeled into the established circuits. This take was shown to
be problematic, as there is no need to assume away existing monetary wealth even in the
context of development. Nevertheless, acknowledging that development is not a
necessary condition for banking only reinforces the fact that there is no need and, in fact,
no theoretical basis to consider credit as necessarily based on new purchasing power.
38

The same emphasis on banks as price setters, i.e. interest rate-setters, can be found in some postKeynesians, for instance, Moore (1988, p. 57).
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That is why Keynes (1937a, p. 664-665, 1937b, p. 245-246, 1938, p. 319) is right arguing
that the “finance motive” can be satisfied by either existing or new liquidity, therefore,
the need to view the latter as the only source of liquidity disappears. This, in turn,
discards the notion of banking as fundamentally a creation of new purchasing power,
advocated by Schumpeter and later by the circuitists.
The circuitists’ emphasis on banking as money creation reveals a conflation of
two separate questions – that of the content of banking activities and of the character of
modern money. The fact that money nowadays is credit money created by banks – a point
rightly stressed by the circuitists – does not imply that banking is essentially an activity
of money creation. This conflation occurs because banks are derived by the circuitists at a
wrong level of abstraction – that of money, instead of a specific capitalist enterprise
corresponding to a particular circuit of capital. Not only the logic, but also the concrete
reality of banks performing the intermediation function requires this element of banking
to be retained.
When it comes to the question of how banks operate, and not how money is
created, following Keynes, it is important to distinguish between two questions
concerning deposits. The one is whether deposits constitute a limiting factor in liquidity
provision, the other – whether they are essential for the content of banking. While Keynes
has indeed argued that deposits do not represent a limit on liquidity provision, it does not
imply that they are irrelevant for the banking business. Hicks holds a similar perspective,
but he strengthens it by effectively shifting the focus away from the question of what is
prior – deposits or loans – to the logic of development of the functions of banking. He
aims at establishing the simplest form of banking activities, from which all the others can
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be derived as its particular forms. This approach is in line with the take on abstraction
suggested above. Graziani is aware of Hicks’ work, but he seems to fail to understand
that Hicks deliberately shifted the focus, as he argues that “it would be hard to say on
which side he [Hicks] stands and whether he assigns a priority to loans or to deposits”
(Graziani 2003, p. 82). 39 By the same token, Graziani fails to understand the importance
of Hicks’ perspective.40
Thus, banks indeed can create purchasing power, but it is one of the forms of
liquidity provision by banks, therefore, the circuitist theory of banking should be viewed
as a partial case of a broader theory of banks as liquidity providers. This take on banking
was originally suggested by Keynes (1971 [1930]) and has recently reemerged in the
mainstream literature in the context of the transformation of banking (Rajan 1996).
Second, the circuitists are right in their emphasis on the need to posit banks in
their relationship to other sectors of the economy, nevertheless, the specific way they do
it is limited. Their theory of banking fits the realities of traditional banking as it existed in
the 20th century, when banks were the major liquidity provider to firms. However, this
cannot be a basis for an analysis of banking in general, as this take on the content of
banking is too narrow: credit can be extended for purposes other than starting a circuit, on
the one hand, and a circuit can be started without credit, on the other hand. The fact that
in a certain historical period banks’ primary business was lending to non-financial
39

Other circuitists are also aware of Hicks’ emphasis on discounting as the origin of banking and deposit
taking as a prerequisite of money creation (Bossone 2001b, p. 2244), but do not see what it implies for their
theory.
40

Circuitists usually deny the logical priority of demand deposits over issuing notes stressed by Hicks.
Parguez goes further by denying even moneyness of demand deposits: “Hoarded deposits are not money
but mere financial assets. Money cannot be hoarded in the modern capitalist economy where it is banks
money” (Parguez 2004, p. 32).
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businesses does not mean that this should be a foundation of a general theory of banking.
This in turn implies that the circuitists’ theory of banking is a partial theory of banking,
stressing relevant activities and rightly emphasizing the difference between firms and
workers, yet failing to provide a foundation for a broader theory of banking. It is not
surprising, given that they do not seem to aim at doing it, in the first place, and their
primary concern is the theory of production and its monetary aspects, but not a theory of
banking per se.

3.3.2. The Circuitist Theory of Banking in the Context of the Transformation of
Banking
The problematic character of the circuitist theory of banking becomes apparent in
the course of the transformation of banking41. It involves both constituents of this take on
banks.
First, money creation ex nihilo does not sit comfortable with the ongoing
transformation of banking, for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the deposit taking
function of banks has not disappeared, and a general theory of banking should allow for
this. A casual observation shows that collecting deposits is one of the really existing
banking activities, which can be understood as centralization of funds scattered across the
society that gives money capital banks deal in a truly social foundation. Incidentally,
looking at deposits collection from this angle gives a deeper meaning to this seemingly
simple activity, which makes retaining the aspect of intermediation even more important.

41

This does not concern all the aspects of their take on the transformation of banking, as the circuitists have
some interesting insights into e-money and, to some extent, a rise in bank concentration (see, for instance,
Bossone 2001b).
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On the other hand, banks have been increasingly involved in asset sales and
securitization. If banks can create money ex nihilo, it is difficult to explain why loans
would evolve into marketable securities, i.e. why the process of securitization would take
place. Within the circuitist approach, banks could have just issued money ex nihilo to
further expand their lending business. By the same token, institutions within the shadow
banking system – say, special purpose vehicles or government sponsored enterprises – do
not create money. Therefore, the circuitist theory cannot help explain their business. This
naturally leads to treating it as speculation – a widely deployed approach, which
nevertheless does not give much mileage. Finally, an emphasis on money creation ex
nihilo makes the question of how banks fund themselves appear irrelevant. Nevertheless,
as the actual banking practices show it is a relevant matter for banks. Moreover, the mode
of funding can have important implications for the nature of bank revenues, as it will be
shown in chapter 5. Therefore, Keynes’ emphasis on liquidity, both existing and new,
discussed in the previous section can offer more insights and needs to be retained.
The other constituent of the circuitist theory of banking – lending to provide
initial finance – also does not stand the test of the transformation of banking. A rise in
lending to households and non-lending bank activities has made it clear that if the essence
of banking business is defined through lending for productive purposes, modern financial
institutions are not banks. In this sense, this take on banking would be another theory of
disintermediation, which cannot be reconciled with a rise in the profit share accruing to
banks, as was discussed above in the context of the mainstream theories. To consider
lending to agents other than firms as banking, one would need to either step back from
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the idea of starting the circuit as an essence of banking, or try to redefine what starting a
circuit means. It is the latter approach that has been adopted by the circuitists.
Trying to preserve the conceptual core of the theory, Graziani suggests treating
lending to households as indirect lending to firms that allows consumers to buy finished
products from these firms (Graziani 2003, p. 21). Bossone has a similar argument with
respect to rising bank lending to other non-bank financial institutions (Bossone 2001b, p.
2261). They do not seem to recognize that although by interpreting lending to households
and other financial institutions as an indirect lending to firms they can shift the emphasis
back to bank lending for production, it nevertheless does not preserve the core of the
theory. It happens because this attempt also involves shifting the focus away from
starting a circuit of production to completing the circuit, which is still different from the
way the circuitists define the key function of banks. In addition, it is not clear what are
the insights offered by this interpretation.42
Parguez has a more sophisticated take on lending to households. It starts very
similarly to the argument proposed by Graziani and Bossone when this type of lending is
interpreted as “an increase in the roundaboutness of the monetary structure” (Parguez
2004, p. 46), when instead of directly creating money for firms, banks channel money to
them indirectly. There are two types of intermediations for Parguez – loans to wageearners for consumption and acquisition of stocks. The former generates “excess profits”
for firms (over and above investment), either through increased spending by households
or through their buying stocks resulting in increased investment by firms. The argument
42

In general, this attempt to interpret lending to households as an indirect lending to firms resembles other
similar instances in the history of thought when additional ad hoc assumptions would be introduced into a
theory failing to account for new evidence or changing circumstances. Ptolemaic astronomy and Newtonian
mechanics challenged, respectively, by Copernicus and Einstein, are classical examples of it.
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about rising roundaboutness is further used by Parguez to point out its unsustainability,
thus, he concludes a crisis would restore a monetary structure with a lower
roundaboutness. The argument by Parguez gains a substantial analytical advantage over
Graziani’s and Bossone’s, when the former also explicitly connects these developments
with bank profit. He is clear that rising lending to households has become the main
source of accumulation by banks (Parguez 2004, p. 47) that in addition shifts the interest
burden from firms to wage-earners. This develops his earlier argument that households’
net new debt “reflects the net contribution of households to profits” (Parguez 2002, p. 50)
– a point that was left unelaborated in his earlier work.
As a result, with a partial exception of Parguez who at least acknowledges the
different content of bank profit coming from lending households, the way the circuitists
conceptualize the link between the circuit and the banks becomes self-defeating. The
proponents of the theory of the monetary circuit start by acknowledging the difference
across economic sectors, which is one of the main strengths of their take on banking over
the mainstream theories. But in their treatment of the transformation of banking they end
up abandoning this difference across the sectors, therefore, they lose their own advantage
over the mainstream theories of banking and do not realize the potential of the theory
embedded in its original set up.
From the perspective of the present study, the general framework of the monetary
theory of production, with its emphasis on differences across economic sectors, puts the
theory in a good position to analyze the transformation of banking, if it were not to limit
itself to only lending for production as the content of banking activities. This is where the
circuitists could have used another insight of Schumpeter on whom they draw heavily. In

79

his criticism of Aristotle, Schumpeter was very clear that interest from lending for
production and for consumption has a qualitatively different nature. He was critical of
Aristotle who “did not even classify loans according to the various purposes they are
capable of serving and does not seem to have noticed that a loan that financed
consumption is something very different from a loan that financed maritime trade”
(Schumpeter 1954, p. 65)43. Therefore, insights into the nature of interest from lending
for production cannot be directly applied to interest from consumer borrowing. This idea
is in general neglected by the circuitists who try to reinterpret lending to households in a
way to fit it into their core idea of productive lending as the main business of banking.
The only exception is Parguez who to some extent goes beyond this view, but does not
elaborate on it.
Incidentally, the rising household indebtedness has revealed not only limits of the
theoretical framework of the circulation approach, but also a fundamentally problematic
nature of Graziani’s class analysis. For him, only firms have an access to credit, hence,
unlimited purchasing power, whereas wage earners are excluded from credit and can
spend only the already earned income (Graziani 2003, p. 19-26, 98, 145-146). This
approach has not stood the test of time, and the ongoing changes in banking have shown
that an access to credit cannot be a basis for class distinction, a criterion of one’s class
position. On the contrary, it is the class position that affects the terms and the content of
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An idea that interest can have a different content depending on the purposes of borrowing can be found
elsewhere in Schumpeter (1954, p. 327, 647), although he never elaborates on it. For a more recent
appreciation of the differences between types of credit see Turner (2010, p. 42) who argues that “whether
this increase [of bank balance sheets and leverage in the real economy] was value added depends crucially
on the economic and social functions which credit performs, that these functions vary by category of
credit”.
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the credit relations one is involved in. Thus, the causality runs from the class position to
the specificity of credit relations, not from access of credit defining one’s class position.
Finally, the transformation of banking reveals weaknesses of the monetary theory
of the circuitists. Parguez argues that “if new money were not instantaneously spent to
generate real value, it would be deprived of any extrinsic value” and that the nature of
money lies is its being “a means of acquisition of real resources in order to generate more
future real wealth” (Parguez 2001, p. 80). This approach is obviously problematic, and
Parguez immediately tries to reverse the argument by arguing that in the case of banks
extending credit to finance acquisitions of financial assets “money is still created”
(Parguez 2001, p. 80). It is obviously hard to reconcile these two statements.
To recap, the circuitist theory of banking offers relevant insights that need to be
retained, namely, an emphasis on differences among economic sectors and a monetary
nature of banking activities. Nevertheless, the exact way these two features are developed
in the monetary theory of production encounters its limits in the course of the
transformation of banking and calls for a broader foundation for theorizing banks. To
some extent, it is not surprising that the theory of the monetary circuit fails to provide a
self-standing theory of banking, because in this theory banks appear at a wrong level of
abstraction. They emerge in the context of money, derived through money (Graziani
2003, p. 17, 152). Instead, they should be analyzed in the first place as specific capitalist
institutions performing a certain set of functions and driven by a profit motive.
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3.4. Bank Profit in the Theory of the Monetary Circuit: Interest as Rent
The approach to banking within the monetary theory of production gives a rise to
a peculiar theory of bank profit as rent. This in turn serves a basis for treating banks as
rentiers (Parguez 2004, p. 26-44, 2006, p. 140) or even the leading arm of the rentiers
class (Parguez 2004, p. 32, 41), because their sole source of income is interest (Parguez
2004, p. 33).
The circuitists usually treat interest accruing to banks as rent, or seigniorage, on
one of the two grounds (or some combination of the two). Bank profit is either rent in the
sense of coming from a pure redistribution of a given amount of surplus based on a
conflict of interest between a lender and a borrower, or a quasi-monopoly rent accruing to
banks due to their exclusive power as money creators that do not bear opportunity costs
of postponed consumption. Consider both lines of reasoning in a greater detail.
The first approach to interest accruing to banks as rent pivots on the redistributive
character of this form of revenue. Banks do not create value, but participate in
distribution of value created by the firm sector (Graziani 2003, p. 150, Parguez 2004, p.
39, Graziani 1987, p. 31, Parguez 1987, p. 112-113). A similar line of reasoning can be
found in Marx’s (1977 [1894], p. 372-379) discussion of the division of surplus value
into interest and profit of enterprise44. A formally similar take is also advanced by
Schumpeter for whom, as discussed above, interest is a kind of tax on entrepreneurial
profit (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 175, 210) that involves a “price struggle”
between the bank and the entrepreneur (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934], p. 125, 192-193).
The proponents of the monetary theory of production accept the idea of the redistributive
44

The direct relation to Marx’s argument is explicitly acknowledged by Lunghini and Bianchi (2004, p.
158).
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character of bank profit, and interpret this redistribution as rent extraction. An approach
to interest as rent is most clearly stated in Parguez, for whom interest is “a pure
exogenous constraint on firms” (Parguez 2004, p. 27, see also p. 40) that controls the
distribution of net wealth between firms and rentiers. He views this redistribution as an
“income drain” (Parguez 2004, p. 33)45. This argument takes a particular form in
Lunghini and Bianchi, for whom in the processes of production, income distribution, and
capital accumulation (and class conflict), interest plays the same role as rent, and banks
as landlords in Ricardo’s theory of distribution (Lunghini, Bianchi 2004, p. 153, 157158). This happens because the rate of interest does not participate in relative price
determination, so that the division of surplus value is a transformation of “unpaid labor
into profit and financial rent” (Lunghini, Bianchi 2004, p. 159). This is equivalent to
arguing that interest is a pure parameter of redistribution, and any redistribution of a
given amount of surplus is equivalent to rent extraction.
Although the circuitists are right in their emphasis that no value is created in the
sphere of circulation, hence, that interest originates in redistribution, it is misleading to
view interest as rent on these grounds. It is important to bear in mind that there is a
variety of forms of income based on redistribution of the already created value, with each
of them having different underlying social relations and concrete mechanisms of profit
extraction. Put differently, not every form of income coming from redistribution of flows
of value is rent. Marx was clear about it emphasizing that in general profit of enterprise,
commercial profit, interest, and rent all stem from redistribution of the already created
45

For Parguez “interest payments are part of production costs, they are financed by money creation. Banks
can play freely their part of rentiers because they have the power to advance to firms the amount of their
interest income” (Parguez 2004, p. 26-27). This emphasis on money creation by banks in relationship to
their profits is connected to the second take on bank profit as rent that will be discussed below.
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surplus value (Marx 1977 [1894], chap. 17, 19, 22-23, 37, 48). Yet, in each of the cases
redistribution is grounded in different social relations. For him, an object of analysis
should be the content of these relations that give a stream of income a specific economic
character and justify its existence, and not an attempt to establish formal similarities
among the forms of revenue originating in the sphere of circulation. There are two
important aspects of it.
First, among the other reasons, the emphasis on the social relations attached to
certain redistributive outcomes is important because it shows that they often attain
rationalization and some sort of social justification. This is the main difference between
Ricardo and Marx. Harvey (2006, p. 331-332) stresses that, contrary to Ricardo who
considered rent as a parasitic form of income, Marx’s goal was to show how and why
rent extraction obtains social justification and, therefore, its analysis cannot start with an
argument about its parasitism. Put differently, for Marx, the real problem is not that
landlords are parasites, but why and how they become a necessary element of the
capitalist mode of production. To rephrase it, the real problem is not that banks are
parasites, but how and why their activities – even the most destructive ones – become
necessary in capitalism.
Second, an important implication of this emphasis on the differences across forms
of redistribution is that interest is not rent. On the capitalist basis, interest develops as a
price of a sum of value loaned out as capital (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 345).46 By contrast,
rent is “the specific economic expression of landed property” (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 622,

46

Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999, p. 65) argue that Marx is wrong in his understanding of interest that should
rather be seen as a reward for parting with a sum of value that should not necessarily be loaned as capital –
it should simply be loaned.
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see also p. 618, 624)47. Therefore, the origin of interest can be traced back to the special
social status of money as universal equivalent, whereas the origin of rent is rather linked
to property rights. Incidentally, the circuitist’ confusion between interest and rent is not
unprecedented in the history of economic thought (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 622-624). Marx
was critical of Carey who treating ground-rent as identical with interest has overlooked
the specific character of rent. The opposite mistake was made by Dudley North, Locke,
and Turgot when they viewed interest on capital as a form analogous to rent, thus,
overlooking specific social relations underling interest payments.
Incidentally, the conflation between interest accruing to banks and rent might
involve further misunderstandings. For Marx, property rights allow a rentier to exclude
someone from an access to a resource (say, land), hence, determine the economic content
of rent as a form of revenue. Although banks do have a power to constrain liquidity,
clearly, this power does not hinge on property rights, as banks do not own loanable
capital they operate with – they are rather general managers of loanable capital of the
society as a whole (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 368, 402). Therefore, considering interest
accruing to them as rent would be even more misleading than in the case of interest
accruing to the owners of the temporarily idle money. Nevertheless, a specific take on
banking within the monetary theory of production might provide a parallel between
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Another interpretation of the social relations underlying rent extraction was developed by Teixeira and
Rotta (2010). For them, the economic character of rent in Marx’s theory is determined by lending out usevalues, as opposed to lending out a sum of values corresponding to interest-bearing relations (Teixeira,
Rotta 2010, p. 23). This is grounded in Marx’s argument that “the price of things which have in themselves
no value… may be determined by many fortuitous combinations” (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 633, see also p.
817). Therefore, a monopolized access to this type of things opens a room for rent extraction. Although
monopoly rights play an important role in the argument by Teixeira and Rotta, nevertheless, it is primarily
driven by what is being lent out – use value or exchange value. Bearing that in mind, clearly, bank lending
is obviously lending of a sum of value, hence, cannot be theorized as rent extraction, in spite of their
monopoly over money creation.
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interest and rent precisely for the reason that banks are treated as creators of money ex
nihilo. The circuitists cannot recognize the difference between rent as an economic form
of property rights and interest as an economic form of the special status of money as
universal equivalent, because for the circuitists banks lend out what they create, and in
this sense can be viewed as owners of money. This might be used as a justification to
treat interest as rent, which brings us to the other approach to interest as rent within the
monetary theory of production.
The second take on interest accruing to banks as rent can be found in Graziani,
Parguez, and Bossone. For them, interest is a quasi-monopoly rent accruing to banks due
to their privileged position in money creation. This privileged position gives them
power48 in their relationship with firms, which in turn serves a basis for “a transfer of real
wealth from industry to finance” (Graziani 2003, p. 103). He makes an even stronger
statement that interest on bank loans is “the only real costs” to firms, while “monetary
payments made to wage earners are never a real cost to firms” (Graziani 2003, p. 116).
Bossone further develops this argument . For him, given that banks are the only capitalist
institutions capable of money creation ex nihilo and given that they have no opportunity
costs in the form of forgone consumption and do not provide intermediation services,
their profit is quasi-monopoly rent (Bossone 2001a, p. 871, 880-881, 884, Bossone
2001b, p. 2243, 2253, 2266, Bossone 2003, p. 155-158, Bossone 2000, p. 25-26). 49
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The emphasis on power can be traced back to Keynes, for whom the source of banks’ power is their
control over liquidity, as was argued above. The difference between Keynes and the circuitists is in the fact
that banks’ power has a broader foundation in Keynes. It is control over liquidity, with creation of new
liquidity being its particular form.
49

This approach is directly related to an argument that banks are quantity-takers and price-setters that have
a power to set an interest rate to accommodate their desired rate of accumulation, allowing them to achieve
“the forced redistribution of wealth between firms (productive capitalist class) and banks (impersonating
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From the discussion above it is clear that this approach to bank profit is
misleading because it is an immediate consequence of the circuitist theory of banks as
essentially money creators. If banks are considered as primarily creators of purchasing
power ex nihilo, it trivially follows that there are no opportunity costs involved, hence,
that interest they receive is a pure rent. In this sense it is not surprising that the circuitists
reach a conclusion that interest is rent. Nevertheless, as was argued before, this is a
limited take on banking because although banks do have a capacity of lending out their
own debt, they also intermediate existing liquidity. Therefore, the general character of
bank profit as rent cannot be derived from a partial take on banking focusing on its
particular activity. Furthermore, the economic character of bank profit cannot come from
the concrete mechanism of generating this liquidity. Whether banks create own money or
use deposits is a matter of secondary importance for the content of bank profit that rather
stems from bank activities and their relationship to the circuit of capital and revenues.
Incidentally, this becomes apparent in Bossone’s own treatment of bank profit
(Bossone 2001a, p. 871, 2001b, p. 2253, 2264, 2003, p. 156). He starts his analysis with
identifying interest accruing to banks with quasi-monopoly rent and interest received by
non-bank financial intermediaries not with rent, but profit for their intermediations
services, given that there is no process of liquidity creation involved. The problem is that
the same holds for banks as well – to the extent that they also intermediate liquidity.
Therefore a line between returns on new liquidity and on existing liquidity cannot be
drawn between banks and non-bank financial institutions, respectively, and another
approach to bank profit should be adopted.
the rentiers class)” (Parguez 2004, p. 27). By raising interest rates, “rentiers increase squeeze on firms”
(Parguez 2004, p. 39). An argument about banks as price setters was also advanced by Moore (1988, p. 57).
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A corollary to this proposition is that interest cannot be treated as rent, because
there exist costs of bank lending associated with, first, interest on deposits, second, costs
of fixed and variable capital and, third, costs of reserves. If the first form of expenses is
related to the intermediation business of banks, the last two are incurred even in the case
of banks’ lending out claims on themselves.
This is not to deny that there is a grain of truth to the argument about the
monopolistic position of banks in their ability to create money. It is used by the
proponents of the circulation approach as an argument that all bank profit is quasimonopoly rent, but a more interesting question from the perspective of the present study
is why banks come to hold the monopolist position of money creation and how this
monopolist position is sustained by the social relations of trust that is created and
generalized through functioning of the financial system itself (Lapavitsas 2003). Put
differently, banks monopolistic control over liquidity is not accidental and is rather a
form taken by the necessarily social content of the business of liquidity provision.
To recap, first, the monetary theory of production approach to bank profit rightly
stresses that this profit originates in the sphere of circulation and has a redistributive
character. Banks do not create value, but receive a part of value created elsewhere.
Nevertheless, it is misleading to conclude on these grounds that bank profit is rent. This
kind of generalizations based on formal similarities among different forms of income
redistribution should be avoided. The concern should be shifted to uncovering social
relations underlying different forms of income distribution, and these relations in the case
of interest payments are different from those in the case of rent. Therefore, bank profit is,
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first, not rent which is an economic form of property relations and, second, far from being
homogeneous.
Moreover, second, conflating rent with interest runs a risk of further confusions.
Contrary to rent, interest received by banks is not based on property relations, as banks
do not own loanable capital they operate with. This problem obviously does not arise for
the circuitists because in their theory banks produce money and in that sense can be said
to own what they lend out. By the same token, the concept of rent carries over a
connotation of an idle, parasitic rentier. References to Ricardo reinforce this, as he treated
landlords as a parasitic stratum. When it comes to banks, they cannot be theorized along
these lines, although there might be an element of parasitism in their activities.
Finally, the economic character of bank profit comes not from the general
function of banks as liquidity provides, and even less from a particular form of liquidity
provision based on creation of new purchasing power, but from activities banks engage in
and from resulting links to flows of value.
These three sets of conclusions become even more important in the context of the
developments over the past several decades. The take on bank profit as rent becomes
increasingly problematic, because it mistakenly associates the rise in the bank profit share
with a quantitative, instead of a qualitative change. For example, some proponents of the
monetary theory of production interpret the rise as a rise of “a pure rentiers economy”
which is the late stage of the capitalist economy (Parguez 2004, p. 41, Parguez 1987, p.
115). Others look at it as a “revenge of the rentier” associated with a rise in rentier
income to the detriment of non-rentier profit (Rochon, Rossi 2010, p. 7-8). Yet others
understand it as a rise in the seigniorage power of banks (Bossone 2001a, p. 884).

89

From the perspective of the present study these approaches, instead of shedding
the light on the transformation of banking, divert the attention from and become an
obstacle for posing an important question – that of the changing composition of bank
profits. When bank profit is viewed as rent, neither new sources of bank profit, nor
changes in the balance between the established sources of profit can be recognized.
Therefore, this approach does not allow one to recognize that the ongoing rise in bank
profits is not a quantitative increase in bank profits coming from a rise in their monopoly
power over liquidity creation, but rather a qualitative change associated with a changing
nature of their activities reflected in an altered composition of bank profits. Put
differently, the rise in the bank profit share should be associated with a structural change
in banking, and the argument by DeYoung and Rice (2004a) that the changing
composition of bank revenues is a useful lens for studying the transformation of banking
should be retained.

3.5. Financial Profit in the Literature on Financialization
It was argued in the previous section that in spite of some strengths of the
approach to banking within the monetary theory of production, this theory does not give
much mileage for an analysis of bank profits. Bank profit is identified with homogeneous
rent – a misleading approach which becomes even more problematic in the context of the
ongoing transformation of banking. This section will argue that some interesting insights
into bank profit can be gained from the discussion on financial profit in the literature on
financialization. This chapter does not aim at reviewing the vast literature on
financialization which comprises a variety of issues, including changes in non-financial
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corporations, households, and financial system itself. A review of the broader debate can
be found in Krippner (2005), Orhangazi (2007), van Treeck (2009) and Stockhammer
(2010). This section will focus only on the question of financial profit as it is discussed in
the context of the financialization debate.
Contrary to the mainstream literature, the question of financial profit occupies a
central position in the heterodox literature on financialization. It can probably be
explained by its closeness to the political economy tradition a major concern of which has
always been the source of surplus. As a result, a systematic rise in financial profits has
become one of the main themes in the literature on financialization. Krippner was the
first to define financialization as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue
primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity
production” (Krippner 2005, p. 174). Epstein and Jayadev (2005) have also documented a
systematic increase in the financial profit in the major OECD countries since the 1980s.
More recently, a Marxist approach to financialization as a rise in financial profits was
developed by Lapavitsas (2009) and dos Santos (2009).
In the financialization literature financial profit is often identified with rentier
income, which resembles the treatment of bank profit within the monetary theory of
production approach discussed above. This strand of the debate can be traced back to
Epstein and Power (2003) and Epstein and Jayadev (2005) who adopt Kalecki’s vision of
rentier income as that received by owners of financial firms and returns to financial assets
in general (Kalecki 1990 [1943]). Epstein and Jayadev measure rentier income as a sum
of profits of the financial system firms and interest income of non-financial private units.
They study rentier income in the OECD countries in 1960-90s and conclude that the
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share of rentier income in GDP is higher in 1980-90s than in 1960-70s. In general, the
take on financial profit as rentier income is typical in the post-Keynesian literature (2010,
Stockhammer 2004).
The origin of identifying financial profit with rent by these authors can be
probably traced back to Keynes who considered a depression of interest rates to be the
main mechanism of “the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor” (Keynes
1964 [1936], p. 376). Given that the early 1980s – the starting point of the dramatic rise
in financial profits – were characterized by a drastic rise in the interest rates, that is, the
opposite of Keynes’ dream, it is not surprising that the rise in financial profit came to be
identified with a “resurrection of the renter” (Pollin 2007) and the financial profit – with
rent.
This approach to financial profit is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it
does not distinguish between different types of financial profit indiscriminately
identifying it with homogeneous rent. Second, although it correctly notices that financial
profit has been accruing to different sectors of the economy, it conflates these forms of
profit by turning them all into a homogeneous category. It is misleading, as bank profit is
conceptually distinct from interest and dividends accruing to, say, households. Third,
after having peaked in 1982, the interest rates have been falling in the US, whereas
profits of the financial sector have been rising, both absolutely and as a share of total
domestic profits. It implies that it is probably misleading to seek the key to understanding
the financial profits in the dynamics of interest rates. With this, a possible link to Keynes’
argument about rentier disappears, and another set of analytical tools becomes necessary
for an analysis of financial profit.
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In addition to the discussion of financial profit as rentier income, there has been
another strand in the financialization literature that can offer other insights relevant for
the purposes of the present study. It concerns the macroeconomic sources of the financial
profit.
The origin of this literature can be identified with The Long Twentieth Century by
Arrighi (1994). Following Braudel’s Capitalism and Civilization, Arrighi looks at
financialization not as a particular stage of the capitalist development, even less its final
stage as in Hilferding’s Finance Capital, bur rather as a recurrent phenomenon of
financial expansions signaling a change in the regime of accumulation of a particular
country where it takes place and a change in the hegemonic power in the world economy
as a whole. Arrighi (1994, p. 221-238) argues that a phase of material expansion is
necessarily followed by intensified competition which in turn, according to Adam Smith,
leads to a decline in the profit rate. Given the nature of capitalist agencies that seek profit
maximization regardless of a particular source where these profits come from, they
compare profit from different types of activities (specifically, Marx’s M-C-M’ and MM’). Therefore, the decline in profitability of productive activities causes capital to
“switch from trade and production to financial speculation and intermediation” (Arrighi
1994, p. 221)50. This leads to a financial expansion with profits coming from “financial
deals” (Arrighi 1994, p. 229), or “speculative profits” (Arrighi 1994, p. 235). Arrighi
illustrates how this pattern was followed by Genoese, Dutch, British and the US capital

50

In spite of his insight into the financial profit being qualitatively different from profit in the sphere of
production, throughout his work Arrighi mistakenly conflates the spheres of production and circulation of
commodities, hence, profit from production and trade.
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resulting in four regimes of capital accumulation with a hegemonic power corresponding
to each of them.
Arrighi is right in his emphasis on the qualitative difference between financial
transactions and production, therefore, between the two associated forms of profit.
Nevertheless, his approach is deeply problematic. First, he uses the terms financial deals,
lending, and speculations interchangeably. He does not seem to recognize a qualitative
difference between lending and capital investment, on the one hand, and other forms of
financial activities, such as trade in securities, for instance, on the other hand. The
switches in the regime of accumulation he discusses are often associated with the former,
but not the latter. Second, Arrighi’s approach can explain a change in activities of a given
group of capitalists and related changes in the spatial configuration of the hegemonic
powers, but it cannot apply to the world economy as a whole. The fact that a sub-section
of the capitalist class comes to “profit from enterprises organized by others” (Arrighi
1994, p. 140, 150) does not say anything about the ultimate source of their profit.
Therefore, Arrighi does not explain the macroeconomic source of the rising financial
profits associated with the financial expansions. This has become the main object of
criticism of Arrighi by Pollin (1996).
An approach related to Arrighi was developed by Krippner (2005). She puts the
question of financial profits at the heart of her study by defining financialization as “a
pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels
rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005, p. 174, see also p.
181-182).51 Her “accumulation-centered approach” rightly notices a fundamental change
51

By financial channels Krippner means activities related to provision of liquid capital in expectation of
future dividends, interest, or capital gains.
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in the channels of profit extraction and an expansion of financial profits associated with
financialization. She was one of the first to document empirically that this expansion is
driven by, first, the rising profit share accruing to financial institutions and, second, a
changing behavior of non-financial corporations that have come to increasingly rely on
portfolio income – dividends, interest payments, and capital gains – as the source of
profit. Nevertheless, Krippner does not distinguish between different forms of financial
profit. Specifically, she does not discuss the conceptual differences between profit from
holding financial assets (dividends and interest) and profit from provision of specific
financial services. This is especially important in the light of the other limitation of her
approach.
Krippner, similar to Arrighi, does not address the question of the macroeconomic
sources of financial profits. Although she argues that her concern is “where profits are
generated” (Krippner 2005, p. 175), which creates an impression that her focus is
precisely on their macroeconomic source, her actual analysis deals not with the ultimate
origin of these profits and not even mechanisms of their extraction, but with documenting
their rising share in the US economy. Therefore, after having posed a right question of
the sources and origin of profits, Krippner seems to confuse the process of value
production and its redistribution. Put differently, when she argues that profits
increasingly accrue through financial channels, it is unclear whether it implies that
financial transactions increasingly contribute to value creation, i.e. generate this value, or
they have become an increasingly important mechanism of redistribution of the already
existing value. The difference between different forms of financial profits – portfolio
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income and profit from providing financial services – would be decisive here, as these
forms of profit might have different underlying macroeconomic sources.
Pollin was the first to challenge the recent discussion about the so-called profits
from pure financial deals and profits accruing through financial channels by posing the
question of the macroeconomic sources of these profits. His insights constitute one of the
main foundations of the present study that will attempt to answer Pollin’s question to
Arrighi in the context of the transformation of banking: Where do financial profits from
the “transformed banking” come from?
Pollin challenges the meaning of Arrighi’s “financial expansions” and “pure
financial deals” and argues that “Arrighi never explicitly poses the most basic question
about the M  M’ circuit, which is, where do the profits come from if not from the
production and exchange of commodities?” (Pollin 1996, p. 115). In his own response to
this question, Pollin singles out three possible sources of sustainable financial revenues.
The first one is redistribution within the capitalist class – a zero-sum game resulting in no
profit from financial transactions for the economy as a whole. The second case takes
place when financial transactions are accompanied by a change in the balance of power in
favor of the capitalist class as a whole, with corporate takeovers followed by forcing
down wages and taxes being an example of that. This results in redistribution of income
in favor of the capitalist class as a whole. Finally, financial mechanisms can allow for
channeling funds into more profitable investment opportunities, thus, can help raise the
surplus produced in the sphere of material production and exchange52. Put differently, in
this case the M  M’ circuit operates successfully only because there is an underlying M
52

Pollin argues that this is the actual object of Arrighi’s analysis.
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 C  M’ circuit. Pollin concludes that one needs carefully to distinguish between these
three distinct sources of financial profit – profit from M  M’ transactions.
In his response to Pollin, Arrighi defines the periods of financial expansion as
those “in which profits come, not from the further expansion of trade and production, but
from borrowing, lending and speculating (as encapsulated in Marx’s abridged formula of
capital M M')” (Arrighi 1997, p. 154). He insists that
not only does the account of historical capitalism proposed in The Long Twentieth
Century identify the three different sources of financial profit that Pollin claims I
failed to distinguish, in addition, it assigns to each source a distinct role in the
dynamics of financial expansions. (Arrighi 1997, p. 157)
Specifically, Arrighi identifies the first type of profit in Pollin’s taxonomy with
the cut-throat competition characteristic of the period of capital over-accumulation.
Capitalists come to invade each other’s sphere of operation, so that losses of one become
a condition of profit for others, resulting is the zero-sum game among them. These
developments create the supply conditions for a financial expansion – tendency to keep
profits in a liquid form, instead of reinvesting them in the process of production. These
supply conditions are then matched by the demand conditions operating on the site of
inter-state competition for liquid funds, with the two coupled together generating the
financial expansion and a specific type of profit associated with it. This profit can be
thought of as the second form mentioned by Pollin and it comes from redistribution
“from all kinds of communities to capitalist agencies” (Arrighi 1997, p. 156). For
Arrighi, these communities include both the state and working-class communities.
Finally, he argues that the third type of profit named by Pollin – that from shifting uses of
funds to more profitable investment opportunities – emerges only at the stage of
supersession of the financial expansion by another stage of material production. Thus,
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Arrighi claims that material production is not an underlying source of the financial
revenue at the stage of financial expansion, but rather a consequence of an end of this
expansion.53
The Pollin-Arrighi debate is relevant for the purposes of the present study. Pollin
is right in explicitly posing the question of the macroeconomic sources of financial
profits. His linking all forms of financial profit to flows of value in one way or another is
also paramount. At the same time, Arrighi’s emphasis that during financial expansions
profits primarily come from redistribution of the already created income needs to be
retained. Finally, in spite of these insights, both Pollin and Arrighi while trying to
establish the ultimate sources of profit overlook mediations and intermediate steps that
are important in the case of some types of financial profit. The relevance of these
mediations will become apparent in chapters 4 and 5.
A line of reasoning similar to Pollin’s was advanced by van Treeck (2009) with
respect to Krippner. He is critical of her definition of financialization on the grounds that
in a descriptive sense, it is undoubtedly true that many profits are nowadays
linked to financial activities. Yet, given the macroeconomic definition of profits…
it may be helpful to recall that firms in the aggregate can by no means
autonomously choose either between real investment (production) and profits at
large or even between non-financial and financial profits. (van Treeck 2009, p.
911)
On these grounds van Treeck concludes that it is “at least semantically, if not
conceptually, problematic to consider ‘the financial sector as a source of profits for the
economy’” (van Treeck 2009, p. 911). Thus, he emphasizes that the financial sector
cannot generate any profits without the process of production and exchange. For him, it is
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Here Arrighi fails to see that material production can be a cause of both – sustained profitability of
financial transactions and a shift to a new phase of material production.
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more adequate to talk about the financial system becoming more successful at extracting
profits from the real economy, rather than being their source.
The emphasis by Pollin and van Treeck on the macroeconomic sources of
financial profits is important, because it fills a gap in the discussion on bank profit within
the monetary theory of production. They are right criticizing Arrighi and Krippner,
respectively, for not having addressed the question of the sources of profit from the
purely financial transactions. For Pollin and van Treeck, all the profits originate in the
sphere of production and exchange, and financial transactions merely redistribute the
currently produced national income. This approach is obviously correct when it comes to
interest and dividend payments, and these are the only forms of revenue van Treeck has
on his mind. Nevertheless, financial transactions, including financial services provided by
banks and other financial institutions, include a vast variety of non-lending activities. To
name a few, there are trading gains, securitization revenues, fees from mergers and
acquisitions, and asset management fees. What is the macroeconomic source of these
revenues?
Van Treeck does not address this question, as he does not seem to be concerned
with the macroeconomic sources of bank profits. Although he does not define what he
means by the financial profits, it appears that for him these are revenues associated with
holding financial assets54 – dividends and interest payments – that can accrue to all
sectors of the economy. Pollin has a broader concern, as he does not narrow his focus to
profits from holding financial assets. It might appear that for him the source of profits
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That is why it is not surprising that for van Treeck financial profits can only come from the process of
production, as this statement is reduced to a simple accounting identity. Dividends are a part of the output
already created, and capital gains are netted out as they do not add value.
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from all types of financial transactions, and not only lending and investment, is the
current output, unless it is a zero sum game. This is illustrated by his example of profits
from corporate takeovers that, in Pollin’s view, have often ultimately come from wages
via redistribution of income in favor of the capitalist class as a whole (Pollin 1996, p.
115, Arrighi 1997). Thus, Pollin wants to retain the classical political economy
conclusion that value is created only in the sphere of production, and the sphere of
circulation, including its financial dimension, only redistributes the already created value.
From the perspective of the present study, Pollin and van Treeck are right in
posing the question of the macroeconomic sources of financial profits and linking them to
flows of value. Nevertheless, they are too quick to dismiss both the idea of the purely
financial deals and other potential sources of financial profit. Although one can think of
reasons why they are dismissive of these two points.
First, the concept of purely financial deals does not have a definite content in
Arrighi who uses it interchangeably with lending and speculation. But lending is not
speculation. At the same time, there is a vast array of financial activities that are indeed at
one remove from production – trading securities, facilitating mergers and acquisitions,
and so on. They might indeed be called “purely financial deals”, and Arrighi’s insight
about the distance between the process of value creation and financial transactions needs
to be retained. By the same token, although Pollin is right that the macroeconomic
sources of profits from these activities require an analysis, it is not enough to postulate
that they come from either wages or profits. Even if it is the case, it remains to be shown.
Second, it is not surprising that for Pollin and van Treeck only the current output,
i.e. profits and wages, can be sources of financial profits, given that in both post-

100

Keynesian and neoclassical theories there is no other macroeconomic aggregate that can
be an independent source of profit. Van Treeck (2009, p. 908) is very clear about it
arguing that “macroeconomic profits must always be based on real income flows”.
Therefore, Pollin and van Treeck face an objective limitation in the form of a lacking
analytical framework and tools for an analysis of financial profit as distinct from the
current flows of value. It will be argued in chapter 4 that a Marxist theory has a category
of loanable capital that can be such a macroeconomic aggregate and which can constitute
another independent source of profit. It would give an analytical advantage for an
analysis of financial profits to a Marxist theoretical framework.
To recap, the discussion on financial profits in the literature on financialization
can offer important insights for understanding bank profit. Although in this literature
financial profit is often identified with the rentier income, similar to bank profit within
the circuitist approach, there are other takes on financial profit. An important angle was
suggested by Pollin and later by van Treeck, who emphasize the macroeconomic sources
of financial profit, although they do not address bank profit in particular. The present
study will attempt to bridge the gap between the two streams of the literature – on the
bank profit and on the financial profit in general. It spite of offering important insights,
Pollin and van Treeck are too quick to dismiss Arrighi’s idea of the purely financial
deals, although for a good reason. First, Arrighi is not clear what he means by it, which
does not deny that there are financial transactions that are indeed at one remove from the
sphere of production, which would have implications for the nature and sources of profit
from these deals. Second, Pollin and van Treeck face objective limitations of their
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analytical apparatus, in which revenues – unless they are a zero-sum game – can only
come from redistribution of wages or profits.

3.6. Conclusion
It was argued in the present chapter that the approach to banking within the
monetary theory of production offers some insights that can overcome the limitations of
the mainstream theories of banking and bank profit. Contrary to the old mainstream
approaches, the circuitist take on banking places banks on a foundation other than
information asymmetries and market imperfections that have been challenged by the
ongoing transformation of banking. Furthermore, unlike both the old and the new
mainstream theories, the monetary theory of production acknowledges difference across
economic sectors and explicitly posits banks in their relationship to these sectors.
Thus, at a first glance the take on banking within the monetary theory of
production seems to be well suited for providing a theoretical foundation for
understanding banking and bank profits. Nevertheless, a closer look at this theory
uncovers its limitations and shows that it is a partial theory of banking that, similar to the
mainstream theories, encounters its limits while trying to explain the ongoing
transformation of banking. By the same token, the take on bank profits within the
monetary theory of production was shown to be inadequate for the purposes of the
present study. To address the problematic treatment of bank profits, some insights can be
gained from a broader discussion of financial profit in the literature on financialization.
The emphasis on the macroeconomic sources of financial profits is shown to be
paramount.
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On the basis of the discussion of the theories of banking and bank profit in
chapters 2 and 3, it has become clear that in order to address the transformation of
banking and bank profits, a theory of banking should satisfy a series of requirements.
These can be summarized as follows.
First, similarly to the circuitist take on banking, a theory of banking should posit
banks in their relationship to the circuit of capital and revenue. Nevertheless, contrary to
the monetary theory of production, the essence of banking business in general cannot be
defined through a particular link to these circuits.
Second, banks should not be theorized as essentially phenomena of informationcollection, risk management, or development. Banks are primarily a monetary
phenomenon, and Keynes’ emphasis on liquidity provision can offer a take on a transhistorical function of banking. Money creation ex nihilo is merely a particular form of
this function of banking. Nevertheless, liquidity provision per se also does not offer a
sufficient foundation for theorizing banking, and an emphasis should rather be shifted on
the counterpart of the act of liquidity provision, namely, extension of a promise to pay. It
would give more mileage for understanding social relations involved in financial
transactions.
These two aspects highlight the role of the method of abstraction. Banks should
be theorized not at the level of abstraction of money, but rather of a particular form of
capital with its own circuit. By the same token, this abstraction should pivot on the
simplest form of the banking business that contains a possibility to be developed into its
more concrete forms.
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Third, bank profits are paramount. It was argued that they can be a good lens for
showing that banks have not been dying out and for studying the content of their
transformation. Nevertheless, the mainstream literature has a strong empiricist bent. As a
result, it merely lists a number of types of bank profits as they are given by the
accounting standards, without questioning their content and the underlying social
relations. The multiplicity of forms of bank profits is the only insight that can be gained
from this literature. By the same token, the circuitist theory of banking also fails to offer a
satisfactory theory of bank profits as they are analyzed as a homogeneous rent. Therefore,
a theory of banking should allow for a multiplicity of forms of bank profits, at the same
time it should pose them on a theoretical foundation and show their macroeconomic
sources and the underlying social relations, as stressed in the literature on
financialization.
Chapter 4 will discuss a possible theory of banking and bank profits that would
satisfy these requirements.
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CHAPTER 4
MARXIST THEORY OF BANKING AND BANK PROFIT
4.1. Introduction
It was shown in the previous chapters that banks have been changing over the past
few decades. These changes have been documented in the vast empirical literature.
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 2, theoretical literature has also shown signs of
awareness of these trends. In the course of this transformation, the mainstream theory of
banking has encountered its limits. Therefore, there have emerged attempts to put
banking on a foundation other than information asymmetries and market imperfections.
These attempts addressed various aspects of the transformation, but no coherent
mainstream theoretical framework has emerged to replace the information-theoretic
approach. Chapter 3 argued that the heterodox theories have never theorized banking
through information asymmetries, and they also explicitly locate banking among the
other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the exact way they do it is self-defeating, and
the heterodox theories fail to provide a foundation for understanding banking and its
transformation.
On this basis chapter 3 concluded with requirements to a theory of banking that
would provide a broad analytical framework for understanding banking, its
transformation, and bank profits. Given that the mainstream and heterodox theories do
not offer such a framework, does it mean there is a need for a new theory of banking and
bank profit?
It will be argued in the present chapter that a Marxist theory can offer such a
theoretical framework. Like the new mainstream theorizations and heterodox approaches
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to banking, it offers a broad theoretical foundation for understanding the content of
banking activities. This content is different from information asymmetries and market
imperfections that have been challenged by the transformation of banking. Yet, contrary
to both the old and the new mainstream theories, it explicitly locates banking among the
sectors of the economy, but does it in a way allowing for multiple links to the circuit.
Thus, unlike the heterodox approaches discussed before, it is better suited to explain the
transformation and it does so retaining the strengths of the discussion on financial profit
in the literature on financialization. As a result, a Marxist theory of banking can nest
other approaches to banking and their major insights, but also overcome their limitations.
Therefore, it also provides a better basis for understanding the nature of bank profits and
changes in them.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out Marx’s theory of banking
by locating it in the approaches to banking that have existed in the history of economic
thought – the bills view and the goldsmiths view. Marx is shown to have adopted the
general theoretical framework of the bills view, yet to have fundamentally altered it to
explicitly posit banks in their relationship to the circuit of capital and revenues. Section 3
shows the mileage this theory gives for understanding the ongoing transformation of
banking. It is argued that contrary to the widely spread belief, some of the changes in
banking are not unprecedented. At the same time, other changes – that have attracted less
attention, especially in the mainstream theories – are more profound, and a Marxist
theory gives a basis for understanding them. Finally, it is argued what seems to be a small
change within the bills view can imply a more profound change that can be recognized
due to Marx’s emphasis on the link between banks and the circuit of capital. Section 4
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compares a Marxist theory of banking and transformation of banking with other theories
and shows that the former is a more general theory and how exactly it incorporates the
major insights of other approaches. Section 5 lays out a general theoretical framework for
understanding bank profits. This framework is grounded in the Marx-Hilferding theory of
bank profit, but it advances this theory by, first, further developing the concept of
loanable capital and, second, distinguishing between two key types of financial profit –
profit from holding promises to pay and profit from handling (dealing in) them. It is
argued that the latter is a special type of financial profit that is conceptually distinct from
both profit in the sphere of production and interest. The section lays out a general theory
of this form of profit and prepares the ground for a discussion of concrete forms taken by
this type of profit to be discussed in the following chapter. Section 6 concludes.

4.2. Bills View vs. Goldsmiths View
There are two approaches to banking in the history of economic thought – what
can be called the bills view and the goldsmiths’ view. According to the bills view, banks
emerge from discounting instruments of commercial credit, mostly, bills of exchange.
This serves as a basis for their issuing bank notes in exchange for the bills they discount.
By doing it, banks substitute one promise to pay by another which is more widely
accepted as a means of circulation. As a result, the banking business of discounting
generalizes the credit relations beyond the counterparties exchanging the commodities.
Within the bills view, this activity of issuing one promise to pay in exchange for another

107

is viewed as the essence of banking business, with all the other banking activities
developing out of this simplest form.55
Adam Smith can be considered an early proponent of the bills view. He first
mentions banks in the context of paper money, arguing that promissory notes issued by
banks are the most well known and, in fact, the most suitable form of paper money
substituting for gold and silver money (Smith 1884, p. 118). This way of introducing
banks might be interpreted as his staying at the origin of theories of banking based on
money creation ex nihilo. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present study it is decisive
that although Smith does indeed introduce banks in the context of money creation, he
does it not by retreating to an abstract process of money creation ex nihilo. Contrary to
the theories discussed in the previous chapter, Smith connects banks issuance of
promissory notes with discounting (Smith 1884, p. 121). His discussion of the actual
historical origin of banks pivots on the establishment of Banks of Deposit by the city of
Amsterdam and other small states56 in the context of this state policy aiming to protect
the interests of domestic merchants who would otherwise face unfavorable terms of
discounting due to uncertain value of the national currency (Smith 1884, p. 194-198).
Thus, the trust that emerges with establishing large banks aims to substitute for a lack of
55

It is worth noting that Schumpeter’s treatment of the two approaches to banking is confusing. Only once
he rightly refers to the commercial-bills view as the opposite of the goldsmiths’ view (Schumpeter 1954, p.
317). Elsewhere, he conflates the former with banking as intermediation (Schumpeter 1954, p. 729-730,
1111), and on these grounds is highly critical of it, which is not surprising given that he was a strong
advocate of the emphasis on money ex nihilo (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934]). In our view, Schumpeter
misunderstood the gist of the commercial-bills view and overlooked that its core is not the intermediary
function of banking, but rather the business of exchanging promises to pay as the simplest form of the
banking business. This exchange does not hinge on either intermediation function of banking, or its
capacity to create money ex nihilo. Put differently, bills can be discounted by either cash deposited with
banks or bank notes, with the two being concrete forms of doing what essentially constitutes the banking
business.
56

Among them were also Venice, Genoa, Hamburg, and Nuremberg.
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trust in national currencies of the small states of origin of these banks. Taken in this
context, the link to discounting operations and exchange of promises to pay is again
apparent.57
The emphasis on banks’ discounting operations gives Smith a strong starting
point for a study of banking, because, first, it immediately puts the question of money
creation in the context of a swap of two promises to pay – merchants’ bills and bank
notes. It has nothing to do with an abstract activity of money creation, which obtains its
content from the needs of commerce, trade, and later industrial capital. Therefore, it
allows one to look at banking business, even in its simplest form of discounting, as an
exchange of promises to pay. Second, Smith treats promissory notes as a way for banks
to increase the scope of their operations, hence, raise their profits. Through issuing notes,
a banker is “enabled to make his clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum” (Smith
1884, p. 121). This in turn brings to the surface the active principle governing the
banking business. Banks are capitalist firms aiming at increasing their profits58, and
issuing own promissory notes to discount bills of exchange and granting cash accounts
become but one way of achieving this goal.

57

Considering the historical origin of banking, Smith also has a lengthy discussion of banks as deposit
takers. It might be interpreted as his advocating for treating banks as intermediaries. Therefore, one might
argue that there is a clash between Smith’s treatment of the logical and the historical origin of banking. In
his discussion of the former, he might be interpreted as being concerned with banks as money creators, in
the latter – with their intermediation function. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the present study, there
is no clash between the two approaches to banking in Smith. The unifying principle behind these two parts
of Smith’s theory is in his identifying banking with an exchange of promises to pay that explains both
banks’ strive to create money and the small states establishing Banks of Deposit.
58

As Smith put it, “public utility, however, and not revenue, was the original object of this institution
[bank]. Its object was to relieve the merchants from the inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange. The
revenue which has arisen from it was unforeseen, and may be considered as accidental” (Smith 1884, p.
198). The profit motive of banks is apparent, although, contrary to Smith, there is obviously nothing
accidental about banks becoming profit-seeking enterprises.
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This general framework of tracing the origin of bank credit to the spontaneously
arising commercial credit, and the origin of bank notes – to commercial promises to pay,
pivoting on the active principle behind the banking business, was also adopted by
Thornton (1802, p. 37). In a study of the origin of the money market, Bagehot has also
stressed that banks could not have even emerged unless they were active issuers of notes,
contrary to passive collectors of deposits. For him, “in the issue of notes the banker, the
person to be most benefited, can do something… But in the getting of deposits he is
passive” (Bagehot 1877, p. 86). According to Schumpeter, bills view was also adopted by
the Banking School (Schumpeter 1954, p. 729-730). Willis (1921, p. 3) has summarised
this view by defining the function of banking as “guaranteeing the limited or individual
purchasing power represented by the obligation of each individual, by accepting it and
substituting in lieu thereof the bank’s own obligation”.
The second approach to banking is represented by what is called the goldsmith’s
view (Schumpeter 1954, p. 317), or deposit banking (Bagehot 1877, p. 75), according to
which banks have emerged as safe keepers of hoards, or custodians. They have issued
notes to certify their acceptance of deposits, which is the embryo form of bank notes.
Accumulation of large amounts of deposits has made banks seek profitable outlets, which
is the origin of their lending business. From this perspective, the essence of banking
business consists in collecting deposits and making loans, that is, in passive
intermediation. Cantillon was an early advocate of this view. For him, banks collect
deposits and make loans after having secured the necessary reserves (Cantillon 2001
[1755/1931], p. 120-121). This allows them to accelerate the circulation of money.
According to Schumpeter (1954, p. 319), similar ideas were expressed by Galiani and
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Turgot. Rist is viewed by Schumpeter as the leading exponent of this view in the 20th
century. It has also become the dominant approach within the mainstream theories of
banking.
Marx has adopted the general theoretical framework of the bills view, but he has
also fundamentally altered it. As it is always the case with the bills view, for Marx,
commercial credit which spontaneously emerges among industrial capitalists forms the
foundation of the banking credit (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 479). As elaborated by Itoh and
Lapavitsas (1999, chap. 4), the latter emerges as a way to overcome the limits of the
former. Yet Marx’s fundamental contribution to the theory of banking is his emphasis on
the difference between credit relations in general and the specific form they take within
the capitalist mode of production. He discusses it within the context of the difference
between usury and interest-bearing capital. As capitalism develops, it poses the credit
relationship on the capitalist foundation and subsumes it to the purposes of value
creation. Thus, the difference between usury and interest-bearing capital amounts to the
difference not in the act of lending per se, but rather in the conditions under which
lending takes place and characteristics of the lenders and the borrowers. As he put it,
What distinguishes interest-bearing capital – in so far as it is an essential element
of the capitalist mode of production – from usurer’s capital is by no means the
nature or character of this capital itself. It is merely the altered conditions under
which it operates, and consequently also the totally transformed character of the
borrower who confronts the money-lender (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 600).
Thus Marx preserves the main pillar of the bills view by treating the essence of
the banking business as an exchange of promises to pay. Hence, he also retains the
emphasis on the inherent flexibility of this business, as promises to pay can take multiple
forms, can be exchanged in various ways and on different conditions. Nevertheless, in
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line with his general contribution to political economy, Marx moves away from an
ahistorical theory of banking characteristic of the bills view as it existed at his time.
Instead, he explicitly locates banks within the capitalist mode of production.59
In spite of its origin more than a century ago, the Marx’s version of the bills view
can be a powerful foundation for understanding modern banking. It involves two aspects.
First, the multiplicity of forms of financial transactions is inherent to the bills view, yet
there is a unifying principle behind these many forms. An exchange of promises to pay
lying underneath the act of discounting remains the content of more complex financial
transactions. It was emphasized by Hicks, for whom
financial transactions are always, in some sense or other, loans; so the simplest
form of loan contract – money being paid over now, in return for a promise of
repayment, with interest, at some future date or dates – is the element from which
we should start. One could start that way, and go on to admit that the amounts,
and dates, of repayment may be not fixed but conditional on things that may
happen in the future; so proceeding to insurance contracts, subscription to
equities, and so on (see also Hicks 1967, p. 53, Hicks 1989, p. 50).
According to this approach, the content of all financial transactions involves an
exchange of money for a promise to pay, so that a simple credit relation can be viewed as
an embryo form of more complex forms, both debt- and equity-like. Then banking
business can be understood as the business of exchanging one set of promises to pay for
another, in different ways, on different conditions and terms, and using different
instruments. This approach is different from Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999, p. 82) who also
look at discounting as the simplest form of credit relations and define the content of
banking as an exchange of promises to pay. Nevertheless, for them the difference
59

Incidentally, the emphasis on locating banks within the mode of production is what distinguishes Marx
from more recent versions of the bills view, such as, for instance, developed by the Austrians and Hicks.
Both Marx and the Austrians stress the spontaneous origin of the credit relations, but the former brings in
the role of the mode of production thus radically differentiating himself from the latter.
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between debt and equity is decisive and needs to be retained. Although Hicks is right that
a credit relationship is a fruitful starting point for an analysis of more complex financial
deals, there are significant differences between loans and, say, equities. The latter is a
title of ownership that does not involve a promise to pay back the principal amount
invested. Furthermore, from a broader perspective, a difference between certain financial
instruments can be important as it can reflect differences in social relations, changing
structural or institutional characteristics of an economy. For example, Hilferding (1910,
p. 107-109, 121-123) stressed that joint-stock capital corresponds to a new set of social
relations reflecting changing conditions in capital accumulation, namely, separation of
management and ownership associated with a rising scale and fixed capital investment
requirements. For the purposes of the present study, the question of joint-stock capital in
its relationship to capital accumulation is of secondary importance. Therefore, we will
adopt the general framework of the bills view broadly defined and treat all financial
transactions as an exchange of money for a promise to pay.
Second, the emphasis on the active principle endemic to banking since its origin
can shed the light on the ongoing transformation of banking and put it in a broader
historical context. This deserves a closer analysis to be undertaken in the following
section.

4.3. Transformation of Banking
Marx’s approach to banking opens a room for two types of transformation,
namely, transformation of the specific ways in which promises are exchanged, i.e. in the
mode of performing banking business, and, second, in the way banks relate to the mode
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of production and the circuit of capital. The general framework of the bills view provides
a basis for understanding the former, while Marx’s contribution to it by locating banks in
the mode of production sheds the light on the latter. The strength of a Marxist approach is
in its ability to capture both. As was shown above, while the first transformation is often
discussed in the mainstream theories, the second one is usually overlooked. The latter is
recognized only by the heterodox theories of banking and, more broadly, in the literature
on financialization, yet its theorization is misleading due to the self-defeating way the
connection of banks to the circuit is specified. Consider the two types of transformation
in a greater detail.
Transformation I. The transformation of the ways in which banking business is
performed has a long history. In a sense, the history of banking is the history of the
multiplicity of types of instruments banks deal in, and specific modes and conditions of
handling these instruments. It obviously deserves a separate historical and empirical
examination, which is beyond the scope of the present study. What is important for our
purposes is that behind the multiplicity of forms the Marx’s theory of banking recognizes
a general logic of development of the banking business. Given that banks are independent
capitalist enterprises their functioning is driven by the profit motive.60 Their profit is
positively related to the volume of their activity, hence, there is a tendency for banks to
strive to increase their lending capacity. If banks were to lend only their own capital, the
amount of lending would be limited. The traditional ways to increase the lending capacity

60

The active principle behind banking has always been emphasized by Minsky (1993, p. 14) for whom
banks are profit-seeking firms, “they are not charitable institutions”.
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is to issue bank notes and to attract deposits (Itoh, Lapavitsas 1999, p. 94-95, Lapavitsas
2003, p. 79, Lapavitsas 2007, p. 426) 61.
Thus, banks come to create money and become intermediaries. But contrary to the
circuitist and the mainstream approaches, respectively, neither of these two functions can
be viewed as the essence of banking, hence, neither can be a starting point of analysis of
banking. Rather, deposit taking and money creation develop out of banks being capitalist
enterprises striving for profit which in turn depends on the scale of their lending
operations. These two activities are essentially two original forms of financial innovation,
and they do not appear innovative only from the perspective of the 21st century. An
important consideration here is that, once developed, there is neither logical nor historical
reason to assume that one of these functions would disappear. Even when banks develop
mechanisms of further raising their lending capacity, money creation ex nihilo and
deposit taking remain. A casual observation confirms that even modern banks engaging
in liability management, asset sales, and securities trading, continue to hold demand
deposits and issue bank drafts. Hence, the description of the ongoing transformation as
disintermediation is not quite accurate. Banks remain intermediaries, but also develop
additional modes of performing banking business.
Once deposit taking and money creation are theorized merely as particular ways
in which banks increase their lending capacity, the ongoing transformation of banking
does not appear any more as an unprecedented change. Rather, it is a concrete form of the
same strive to increase the lending capacity that has existed since the origin of banking,
although under altered historical conditions, on a different scale and using more advanced
61

An increase in the lending capacity as a major concern of banks is also emphasizes by Cutler, Hindess,
Hirst, and Hussain (1977, p. 102).
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methods and technologies. This holds for the major changes in banking, both on the asset
and liability sides.
First, liability management that emerged in the US in the early 1960s with an
invention of marketable certificates of deposits (CD) is often treated as a profound
change in banking business (e.g., Moore 1988, p. 27). Later on, borrowed funds have
took the form of the Eurodollars, commercial paper, federal funds, repurchase agreements
(repo), and other non-deposit liabilities, whose share in bank liabilities has been growing
since then. In spite of the multiplicity and complexity of these instruments, it is
misleading to treat this form of liability management as a fundamental shift in banking,
as in their essence attracting deposits or money creation constitute two original ways of
managing bank liabilities. In all the cases, banks seek liabilities to match their assets. By
the same token, in all the cases the bank activity is driven by a motive to increase lending
capacity or replenish reserves. In spite of these similarities, there is a difference in the
source of liabilities, as deposit taking represents collecting idle funds scattered across the
society, issuing own liabilities does not hinge on anyone’s assets and is based on demand
deposits becoming money-like (Hicks 1989, p. 55-58), while wholesale funding rests on
attracting liquidity from the market. The latter obviously depends on the existence of the
developed money and capital markets, hence, cannot emerge at an early stage of financial
development.
Second, loan sales and securitization represent the same logic of raising lending
capacity. They differ from liability management in that they operate through the asset,
not liability, side of the bank balance sheets, nevertheless, they reflect the same principle
of banks seeking ways to increase their lending potential. As a result of operating through
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the asset side, the other major difference between the liability management and the loan
sales is that the latter frees up banks from the other major concern of the banking
business – adjusting reserves to match up to the increased liabilities. Therefore, it is
superior to liability management, from the banks’ perspective. The fact that the special
purpose vehicles (SPV) have not been required to hold reserves against their liabilities, in
the case of the loan sales the question of costly reserves is removed for the financial
system as a whole, not only for the banks originating a loan. Incidentally, another widely
spread argument about the novelty of securitization stresses a radical transformation from
loans being non-marketable assets to their becoming a security, like any other. It is not
quite correct, as, first, historically banks have emerged as holders of marketable assets,
bills of exchange, and in that sense there is nothing extraordinary in marketability of bank
assets in principle. In this sense marketability of loans should be treated as a challenge
not to the banking business in general, but rather to a particular form of banking business
– that based on the relationship lending and commitment which used to be dominant in
the bank-based financial systems. Second, the public confidence in banking – that
periodically gets shaken by crises – is the basis for marketability of loans. In that sense
the socialization and objectification of the credit relationship that emerges with the
development of the pyramid-like financial system stressed by Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999,
p. 98) and Lapavitsas (2003, p. 70-71), becomes a foundation for the possibility of loan
sales. Put differently, if bills of exchange held by banks were originally marketable on the
basis of the productive activity of the capitalists involved, bank loans acquire the same
marketability through the functioning of the financial system itself. In this sense, the
social foundations of acceptability of bank liabilities as means of circulation and of
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marketability of their assets are not drastically different from each other, and both are
actively shaped by the financial system itself.
To recap, banks are self-standing capitalist enterprises governed by the profit
motive. Since their origin, they have been seeking ways to increase their lending
capacity, subject to the need to hold reserves. Deposit taking and issuing bank notes were
two original forms of banks accomplishing this goal. Once developed, these functions of
banking remain, even in developed financial systems. Nevertheless, there is no reason to
assume that these would be the only forms of banks’ increasing their lending capacity. In
general, specific mechanisms of achieving this goal would vary depending on the
concrete historical, institutional, and other country-specific conditions. Nevertheless, as a
general rule, as the financial system expands, the motive to further raise lending capacity
does not go away, whilst the demand for wholesale funds on a short notice increases.
Thus, more developed forms of banks’ increasing their lending capacity emerge, such as,
for instance, liability management and loan sales and securitization. Contrary to the wide
spread belief, the proliferation of these activities per se 62 should not be considered as a
radical transformation of banking, but rather as a new historical form of the same logic of
banking aiming at raising lending capacity to increase profit.
Transformation II. Marx put the theory of banking on a dual foundation by
adopting the general framework of the bills view yet locating banks within the capitalist
mode of production. As a result, in addition to changes in the concrete mechanisms,
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It will be argued below that although it is misleading to view liability management and loan sales per se
as a fundamental transformation of banking, contrary to the widely spread approach, these changes in
banking involve some other transformations that do represent a radical change in banking, specifically, in
the sources of bank profit. This latter change is much more fundamental than the former, yet it is
overlooked in the literature.
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instruments, and related conditions of performing the business of banking, there emerges
a possibility for another type of the transformation of banking. It concerns a change in the
prevailing link between banks and the circuit of capital and revenue.
The traditional banking activity in the capitalist economies used to be lending to
non-financial enterprises. Lending to industrial and commercial capitalists signifies that
the credit system was placed to the needs of the capitalist mode of production, and credit
was mainly used for the creation and realization of value. Incidentally, this is in line with
Marx’s derivation of interest-bearing capital through lending in order to embark on the
circuit of capital (Marx 1977 [1894], chap. 21, p. 340, 349).
Nevertheless, given that banks are self-standing capitalist firms operating in
pursuit of profit, there is no reason to assume that productive lending would be the only
type of lending banks would engage in. That is why Marx’s emphasis on the
characteristics of the borrower discussed above becomes important (Marx 1977 [1894], p.
600). The act of borrowing can remain the same, but it can have a different content
depending on the social relations underlying this borrowing and characteristics of the
borrower. Incidentally, the fact that the act of lending remains the same regardless of the
nature of the borrower explains why this type of transformation remains unrecognized by
the mainstream theories that do not capture the social dimension attached to banking
activities.
The concept of financial expropriation or exploitation, advanced by Lapavitsas
(2009) and dos Santos (2009) should be placed in this context. Following Marx, they
argue that lending to households is qualitatively different from lending to industrial and
commercial capitalists for a number of reasons. First, the former approach borrowing
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from the perspective of use-values, whereas the latter from the viewpoint of value
(Lapavitsas 2009, p. 132). That is, the former borrow to secure access to basic
necessities, such as housing, education, healthcare, and consumer goods, whereas the
latter borrow to embark on a circuit of capital and extract surplus value. As a result,
second, lending to industrial and commercial capitalists helps create the source of its own
repayment, whereas lending to households normally does not (Dos Santos 2009, p.
191).63 This argument is in line with Adam Smith’s distinction between lending for
production and consumption. For him, borrowing for production allows the borrower to
“both restore the capital, and pay the interest, without alienating or encroaching upon any
other source of revenue” (Smith 1884, p. 144). By contrast, a borrower for consumption
can “neither restore the capital nor pay the interest, without either alienating or
encroaching upon some other source of revenue” (Smith 1884, p. 144). Therein lies the
fundamental difference between the two types of borrowing. For Smith, the latter is the
case “where gross usury is out of the question, contrary to the interest of both parties”
characteristic of the former (Smith 1884, p. 144).
For Lapavitsas and dos Santos, the shift from lending to firms to lending to
households represents a transformation of banking signifying a reinstatement of
essentially usurious relations within the capitalist mode of production. This
transformation has become possible due to substantial changes in the major capitalist
economies associated with a retreat of the public provision of basic necessities
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Dos Santos considers residential real-estate bubbles as an obvious, yet partial exception, given that they
can generate a temporary source of capital gains for households. In addition, another exception when
lending to households can help generate the source of its repayment would be borrowing for education, or
student loans. But even in this case the relationship between borrowing and repayment of a student loan
remains mediated by, among the other things, becoming employed.
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(education, healthcare, pensions, and housing). 64 Repression of the wage share has also
played a role, but to a lesser extent, given that the major bulk of borrowing by households
in the developed countries has been in the form of mortgages, and not consumer credit.65
It is crucial to recognize that this transformation of banking constitutes more than
a plain reinstatement of usury. For Marx, there are two aspects of interest-bearing capital
that make it a specifically capitalist relationship. First, borrowing to embark on the circuit
of industrial and commercial capital is a specifically capitalist type of borrowing (Marx
1977 [1894], p. 349, 352). Second, equally important, although often less appreciated, the
circuit of capital systematically generates temporarily idle hoards, leakages of value, that
are assembled by the credit system and transformed into loanable capital (Marx 1977
[1894], p. 403, Marx 1967 [1885], p. 78, 83-85, 321-322, 451).66 This generation of the
idle funds is the other aspect giving the credit system a specifically capitalist character. It
is further reinforced by the credit system coming to assemble idle funds of not only
capitalists, but also workers, that is, coming to use both the circuit of capital and the
circuit of revenue as the basis of its functioning. The shift of lending away from firms to
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As stressed by Lapavitsas (2004, p. 176-177), the role of the State in designing financial systems and
institutions should not be underestimated. The modern US financial system is a good example, where the
lack of the public provision of the basic human necessities is coupled with implicit and explicit State
guarantees for a specific type of banks created for mortgage lending to households – government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs). Thus, the State not only has helped create conditions under which lending to
households on a massive scale has become possible, but also in the best mercantilist tradition described by
Steuart (1770b, p. 414) has helped establish financial institutions engaged in this type of lending by
assuring their solvency. GSEs have become a modern version of development banks – what Steuart (1770b,
p. 359) called ‘banks of circulation upon mortgage’ – in the context of financialization. Instead of land,
residential houses have become Steuart’s solid property to be ‘melted down’.
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This is not to deny the significance of second mortgages that became a major source of maintaining or
increasing consumer spending in the face of wage repression in the 2000s, along with consumer credit in
the form of credit card borrowing.
66

This point was further elaborated by Hilferding (1910, p. 67-81), Itoh (1988, p. 259-260, 401), Itoh and
Lapavitsas (1999, p. 65-69), and more formally by Lapavitsas (2000).
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households obviously undermines the first specifically capitalist aspect of the credit
system. Nevertheless, the second capitalist foundation of the credit system does not go
away. It continues to assemble hoards scattered across the society and use them for profit
extraction. Therefore, lending to households on the basis of the capitalist financial system
is even more predatory than usury proper. A usurer normally lends out only own capital,
whereas modern banks use temporarily idle money capital of the society as a whole. As a
result, banks can perform the essentially usurious activity on a larger scale, hence,
generate a greater mass of profit than a usurer.
To recap, a Marxist theory of banking can offer a foundation for understanding
the content of banking business and its transformation. It allows one to theorize two types
of transformation. The one is related to the concrete ways in which the banking activities
are performed, and in many cases it is associated with an increase in the lending capacity.
Acknowledging the active principle behind banking gives the unifying principle to the
multiple banking activities and shows that there is no fundamental change often attributed
to the modern banks. The other type of transformation refers to the type of the borrower
and is directly related to broader social transformations.
These two types of transformation of banking appear unrelated. This impression is
reinforced by the existing literature. For instance, as was shown in chapter 2 above, the
mainstream theories focus only on the first type of transformation, with the second one
remaining unnoticed. Chapter 3 argued that heterodox theories of banking recognize both
changes, but in general treat them independently of each other. The specificity of a
Marxist theory of banking is in the analytical advantage it could give in tackling this
issue. As it will be shown in chapter 5, what according to the bills view broadly defined
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appears to be a small change in banking corresponding to a mode of performing banking
business in some cases entails substantial changes in the way banks relate to the circuit of
capital and hence in the relationship between bank profit and flows of value. Loan sales
and securitization would be one example. Thus, the two transformations should not be
treated in isolation.
The really interesting question thus is to show that some of the current changes in
banking stressed in the literature do not represent as great a transformation as it is often
portrayed. Nevertheless, in some cases, this small transformation involves a profound
change in the way banking relates to the circuit, hence, in the relationship between bank
profit and flows of value – a considerable change that nevertheless remains unnoticed in
the literature. Put differently, the transformation of ways of doing the banking business is
important, but for reasons other than the ones assumed by the mainstream theorists.

4.4. Marxist Theory of Banking in the Light of Other Theories of Banking
Marx’s theory of banking thus understood can serve as a broad theoretical
foundation for studying banking and its transformation. It can nest relevant insights of
other theories, yet overcome their limitations. Consider how the suggested approach
relates to the other existing theories discussed in the previous chapters.
A Marxist theory of banking grounded in the bills view places banks on a
foundation other than information asymmetry and market imperfections. This is not to
deny that information between borrowers and lenders is asymmetrical – an obvious point,
which does not get one far – but rather to acknowledge that even if information were
symmetrical there would still have existed a need for banking. In this sense the bills view
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has the advantages of the portfolio theories over the information-theoretic approach
discussed in chapter 2.
In spite of this similarity, the fundamental differences between a Marxist theory
and the portfolio theory should not be overlooked. Contrary to the former grounded in the
bills view, the portfolio theory can be viewed as a peculiar mixture of the bills view and
the goldsmiths view. In its emphasis on the intermediation function of banking, the
portfolio theory resembles the goldsmiths view. At the same time, the theory places a
strong emphasis on banks assets and liabilities as promises to pay with different
characteristics. Therefore, banks are treated as institutions actively transforming these
characteristics. In this sense, the portfolio theories retain an element of the bills view.
This explains the differences between a Marxist theory of banking and the
portfolio theories. First, the latter focus on a particular aspect of the bills view – the one
when it is applied to the intermediation function of banking. In that sense, the portfolio
theories can be regarded as bills view tailored for understanding the realities of banking
as it existed in the middle of the 20th century. By the same token, the recent theory of
shadow banking as banking (Pozsar et al. 2010) can be viewed as a reinstatement of the
bills view to capture the realities of banking today, as portfolio theories captured its
intermediation dimension. Contrary to that, a Marxist version of the bills view embraces
all forms of exchange of promises to pay, from discounting through intermediation to the
modern forms of shadow banking and asset management. Second, a Marxist theory and
the portfolio theory differ in their explanation of reasons why the need for this asset
transformation arises. For the latter, the reasons can be traced back to differences in
subjective preferences of lenders and borrowers. For the former, it is driven by the
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objective differences between requirements of value production and the logic of the value
leakages from the circuits of capital and revenue.
Another recent theoretical conceptualization of banking was proposed by Gorton
(2009), for whom banking is about creating informationally-insensitive debt. This idea
fits in a Marxist theory of banking, nevertheless not as an explanation of the raison d’être
of banks, but rather as an attribute of functioning of banking. Lapavitsas (2003, p. 79-81,
2007, p. 426-427) argues that given that banks do not engage in production and do not
create value, establishing trust in their operations is qualitatively different from that for
industrial enterprises. Contrary to the latter, credibility of banks’ promises to pay cannot
be directly assessed based on the economic factors related to value creation or noneconomic determinants facilitating their access to liquidity. Hence, there emerges a need
for, first, diversification of bank assets to lower the risk of default and, second, an access
to reserves. As a result, bank liabilities do obtain a certain degree of independency of
individual assets they hold. But there is no insensitivity with respect to information about
the bank itself, as the times of bank runs prove. Therefore, informational insensitivity of
bank promises to pay objectively arises from the limits in assessing banks’ prospects to
repay and is based on the trust created and generalized by banks. Nevertheless, there is
only partial independency, as bank promises to pay might be insensitive to information
regarding individual banks debtors, but not to information about the bank itself.
The relationship between a Marxist theory of banking and theories centered on
risk taking and management (Allen, Santomero 1997, 2001) is also apparent. Banking
business obviously involves intermediating and reallocating risk for others. But the fact
of existence of risk does not provide a basis for arguing that dealing in risk constitutes
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raison d’être of banks. Incidentally, this immediate connection between dealing in assets
and risk is acknowledged by Allen and Santomero. For them, “by dealing in financial
assets, intermediaries are by definition in the financial risk business. By virtue of the fact
that they originate, trade, or service financial assets, intermediaries are managing and
trading risk” (Allen, Santomero 1997, p. 1478). In this sense Greenspan (1994, p. 3) is
right relating all banking activities to some form of dealing with risk. It is inevitable that
to the extent that banks deal in assets, they handle risk, as well. But it makes risk
handling a secondary, derivative characteristic. Nevertheless, Allen and Santomero
mistakenly interpret the ongoing transformation of banking as a change in the
fundamental functions of banking, instead of banks finding new ways of making profit
based on the same function of exchanging promises to pay.
This brings us to an essential feature of the bills view in general and its Marxist
formulation, in particular. Banks are specialists dealing in money, or trading in money
(1977 [1894], p. 317, Marx 1991 [1861-63], p. 45-47). Marx stresses that banking
functions evolve out of and acquire their content from the functions of money (Marx
1991 [1861-63], p. 42-47). Banks handle risk, because it is an attribute of promises to
pay. They also collect information, because it is a necessary counterpart of their business.
But they do not emerge as dealers in either risk or information.
A characteristic feature of banks within the capitalist mode of production is their
becoming the repositories of temporarily idle funds scattered across the society
channeling them into value creation. As a result, money acquires a specifically
capitalistic character of loanable capital, which is a two-stage process. First, the function
of money as a hoard acquires its capitalist specificity when the circuit of capital comes to
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systematically release temporarily idle funds, i.e. when a specifically capitalist form of
hoards emerges. Second, these hoards do not remain scattered across the society, but
become centralised within the banking system, which gives this money a further
determination of loanable money capital. Thus, in a developed capitalist economy banks
deal in a specifically capitalist form of money further modified by the functioning of the
banking system itself. They deal in loanable money capital.
Incidentally, the emphasis on banks as fundamentally dealers in money is what
unites a Marxist theory of banking with the heterodox takes on banking as developed by
the circuitists and post-Keynesians. In addition to this common ground, a Marxist theory
of banking represents a broader theoretical framework for understanding banking. It
incorporates the major insights of the other heterodox traditions, but also overcomes their
limitations.
First, as was stressed in the previous chapter, Keynes’ major contribution to the
theories of banking is his emphasis on liquidity provision. Nevertheless, it is usually
neglected that exchange of promises to pay and liquidity provision represent two
moments of the same transaction. When a bill is discounted, its seller obtains liquidity
and its buyer obtains a promise to pay. When a loan is advanced, the borrower gets an
access to liquidity in exchange for a promise to repay with an increment. In the case of
banks’ deposit taking, bank promise to pay takes the form of guaranteeing liquidity
provision on demand or after a certain time period, depending on the form of the deposit.
In spite of the two representing the opposite sides of the same coin, it is crucial to stress
not only liquidity, as Keynes does, but also the exchange of promises to pay, because the
former is a one moment event and does not imply more than just a well known fact of
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money being the general form of wealth, or universal equivalent (Marx 2003 [1867], p.
136). The concept of liquidity does not allow one to discuss other social relations
involved, in particular, social relations specific to credit. The concept of liquidity and
promises to pay operate at different levels of the functions of money. The former sheds
light on the social relations at the level of money as coin, i.e. universal equivalent. The
latter requires more determinations, as it operates at the level of money as money,
namely, money as means of payment and money as hoard. By requiring more
determinations, it also sheds light onto a broader set of social relations, including the ones
specifically related to credit and not just money. For this reason, for the purposes of
analysis of banking it is essential to shift the emphasis away from liquidity to promises to
pay, as it would give more mileage for uncovering social relations involved.
Second, as was argued in chapter 3, the circuitist emphasis on the difference
between the economic sectors and the need to posit banks in their relationship to these
sectors is paramount. Nevertheless, as was also demonstrated before, the way the
circuitists locate banks is inherently self-defeating and does not permit to capture the
transformation of banking without sacrificing the core of the theory. A Marxist theory of
banking allows one to retain the crucial distinction between the sectors and locate banks
among them, yet without necessarily reducing it to a single link. Put differently, the
theory allows for a multiplicity of links to the circuit. As a result, the transformation of
banking can be theorized not as an increase in roundaboutness of productive lending, as
in Parguez (2004, p. 46) and Graziani (2003, p. 21), but rather as a change in the
prevailing link. This in turn allows one to pose a question of the conditions under which a
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prevalent link to the circuit shifts, the social relations underlying this change, and
implications thereof.
To recap, a Marxist theory of banking grounded in the bills view yet altered by
Marx to account for the specificity of capitalist banking can incorporate the relevant
insights of other theoretical approaches to banking by nesting them as particular cases
emphasising particular dimensions of banking. Furthermore, it also allows one to
overcome the limitation of those theories that have become obvious in the course of the
ongoing transformation of banking, hence, a Marxist theory can offer a broader
theoretical framework for an analysis of banking and its transformation.

4.5. Bank Profit
As was argued above, the bills view with its emphasis on inherent changeability
of banking implies a multiplicity of forms the banking business can take. It would
correspond to a multiplicity of the underlying social relations, concrete mechanisms of
profit making, and forms this profit would take. Thus, bank profit does not necessarily
have to be interest spread, as it is suggested by theories looking at banks as financial
intermediaries. Nor does it have to be homogeneous quasi-monopoly rent as asserted by
theories emphasising money creation ex nihilo (Bossone 2001a, 2001b, Graziani 2003,
Parguez 2004, 2003) and neglecting existence of costs of funds, costly reserves, limits of
money creation, and differences in the macroeconomic sources of profit. In this sense the
origin of a Marxist theory of banking in the bills view allows for the multiplicity of forms
of profit, underlying social relations, and mechanisms of profit extraction, whereas
Marx’s innovative emphasis on the relationship between banking and the circuits of
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capital and revenue gives insights in the macroeconomic sources of bank profit, stressed
by a few studies of financialization, but not addressed by theories of banking per se.

4.5.1. Bank Profit in Marx and Hilferding
Given that banks are capitalist firms, one might expect that the general formula of
capital would apply to the circuit of banking capital as a particular form of capital. That
is, capital invested would abide to M-C-M’, with bank profit being simply surplus
value.67 This impression is reinforced by Marx’s discussion of the general formula, when
he stresses that it applies to all types of capital, namely, industrial, merchants, and
money-dealing (Marx 2003 [1867], p. 153). This take on bank profit might be
strengthened further by Sekine who suggests that as long as banks take deposits and make
loans, they function similar to merchants who buy cheap and sell dear, with the only
difference being that they handle a specific commodity – idle funds (Sekine 1983, p.
422). In that case bank capital would abide to the circuit of merchant’s capital (M-C-M’),
with profit being a form of surplus value.
A direct application of the general formula of capital to the circuit of banking
capital would, nevertheless, be misleading. Banks operate in the sphere of circulation,
hence, they do not create value and surplus value.68 Therefore, the primary concern with
respect to bank profit becomes twofold, namely, first, the mechanisms of profit extraction
and the grounds of banks partaking in value created in the sphere of production, and
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Probably precisely this desire to fit banking capital into the general formula of capital drives arguments
that financial profit comes from surplus value (Fine 2010).
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In this sense bank capital is similar to merchant’s capital that also does not create value and surplus
value.
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second, the macroeconomic sources of this profit. The formal shape of the circuit of
capital becomes of secondary importance. This is drastically different from the circuit of
industrial capital, because in that case the question of the form of the circuit of capital,
mechanism of profit extraction, and macroeconomic sources of profit coincide. Put
differently, by arguing that industrial capital abides to M-C-M’, one simultaneously
addresses the question of the mechanism of profit extraction (buying commodity-labour
power) and its source (in the value created by labor power being above its own value).
Marx was very clear about it arguing that “propositions about profit, etc., derived directly
from the examination of productive capital, cannot be applied directly to mercantile
capital” (Marx 1991 [1861-63], p. 64), which for him includes commercial and banking
capital.
Given that it is not particularly helpful to try to fit banking capital into the general
formula of capital in order to claim that bank profit comes from surplus value, a different
approach to bank profit is required. Marx’s discussion of profit in general and banking
profit in particular can offer some insights helpful for understanding bank profit.
Consider both aspects in greater detail.
The first set of considerations necessary for understanding bank profit originates
in the classical political economy discussion of profit in general. In classical political
economy, a theory of profit took its clearest form in Ricardo (1821, p. 48-51, 107-130),
for whom profit is a part of the fresh flow of value accruing to capitalists as a residual,
after workers receive their wages and landlords – rent. Marx adopted this general
theoretical framework by treating profit as a part of the fresh flow of value, yet he also
fundamentally altered Ricardo’s approach. For Marx, profit is not a residual, but rather an
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unpaid part of the newly created value, made possible through exploitation of workers
(Marx 2003 [1867], chap. 6-7). The systematic difference between the value of labour
power and the value created by workers accounts for existence of surplus value. This take
on profit has become the cornerstone of Marx’s theory.
Nevertheless, a different approach to profit prevailed before Physiocrats. Profit
was argued to arise in the sphere of exchange – a view that according to Marx (1969
[1905-10], p. 41) took its “scientific” expression in Sir James Steuart. For him, profit
represents “profit upon alienation” (or “relative profit”) that emerges in the sphere of
circulation through redistribution of the already created value – what he calls “a vibration
of the balance of wealth between parties” (Steuart 1770a, p. 206). This profit from trade
effectively arises through a zero-sum game, when the gain of one of the parties represents
a loss for another. Marx argued that it was wrong to identify the capitalist profit with
profit arising in the sphere of circulation (Marx 2003 [1867], chap. 5, Marx 1969 [190510], chap. 1). Nevertheless, he thought that the concept of “profit upon alienation or
expropriation” can offer relevant insights, because “however little it touches the nature
and origin of surplus-value itself, [it] remains important in considering the distribution of
surplus-value among different classes and among different categories such as profit,
interest and rent” (Marx 1969 [1905-10], p. 42). He also used this category in relationship
with profit arising in the sphere of financial transactions, especially those involving
workers:
[i]nterest may be a mere transfer and need not represent real surplus-value, as, for
example, when money is lent to a “spendthrift”, i.e., for consumption. The
position may be similar when money is borrowed in order to make payments… In
this case interest, like profit upon expropriation, is a fact independent of capitalist
production – the production of surplus value. It is in these two forms of money –
money as means of purchase of commodities intended for consumption and as
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means of payment of debts – that interest, like profit upon expropriation,
constitutes a form which, although it is reproduced in capitalist production, is
nevertheless independent of it and [represents] a form of interest which belongs to
earlier modes of production (Marx 1972 [1905-10], p. 487).
To recap, in the history of economic thought there have existed two approaches to
profit – as a fresh flow of value (what Steuart called “positive profit”) and as a
redistribution of the already existing value (Steuart’s “relative profit”). Marx identified
the former as the major form of profit under the capitalist mode of production, although
some elements of the latter can be found in capitalism. This is the first pillar that will be
deployed in the present study of bank profits.
The second set of analytical tools comes from Marx’s discussion of the
components of banking activity (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 402) that was further developed
by Hilferding (1910, chap. 10). Banks operate in the sphere of circulation and in this
sense are similar to merchants who, according to Marx, do not create value and surplus
value (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 280). Nevertheless, they perform functions indispensible for
functioning of the capitalist economies, and on these grounds they partake in value
created in the sphere of production. They do it in several ways, hence, receive several
forms of profit.
First, they perform the function of money-dealing – monetary services not related
to lending. Among them are safekeeping the hoard, settling balances, foreign exchange
operations, and book-keeping (Marx 1977 [1894], chap. 19). These are the functions of
the total social capital in the sphere of circulation69, and banks become specialists in
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In Volume 2 of Capital Marx (1967 [1885], p. 48) discusses functional forms taken on by capital-value at
the various stages of its circulation. He distinguishes between money-capital, commodity-capital, and
productive capital. Thus, money-dealing capital emerges when the functions of money-capital get to be
performed by a group of capitalists, specializing in these operations (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 315).
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performing them on behalf of the total social capital, hence, do it more efficiently and
minimize the pure costs of circulation. On these grounds banks partake in the value
created in the sphere of production and earn an average rate of profit. This profit is a
deduction from the surplus value (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 322).
Second, banks engage in advancing loanable capital, and earn interest for parting
with liquidity for a specific period time. The interest earned falls into three parts, namely,
interest paid on deposits, costs of doing banking business (both constant and variable
capital), and bank profit. Focusing mainly on bank lending to industrial and commercial
capitalists, Marx considers this interest as a deduction from surplus value created in the
sphere of production (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 378-381). Nevertheless, lending operations
of banks, like any lending activity, does not earn average rate of profit (Marx 1977
[1894], p. 362-364). The interest rate is determined merely by the supply of and the
demand for loanable capital and has no immediate relationship to the rate of profit.
An important aspect of Marx’s treatment of banking is that both components of its
profit come from surplus value created in the sphere of production. Thus, for Marx, bank
profit is a part of the fresh flow of value. This approach is further developed by
Hilferding who analyzes two more forms of bank profit.
First, for Hilferding, banks come to perform the underwriting function by floating
shares. On these grounds they earn a part of the founder’s profit (Gründergewinn70)
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The German category Gründergewinn was translated by Watnick and Gordon in the Bottomore edition of
Finance Capital as “promoter’s profit”. Itoh (1988, p. 404-405) suggested a more accurate translation
might be “founder’s gain”. It is a more literal translation of the original German term. Moreover, this type
of gain can accrue to founders of an enterprise when it is converted into a joint-stock company. Founder’s
profit therefore exists regardless of incorporation being facilitated by a promoter (an individual or a bank).
Given that the economic content of this form of gain stems from the process of incorporation per se,
regardless of who facilitates underwriting and distribution of the shares, in the present study Hilferding’s
concept Gründergewinn will be referred to as “founder’s profit”.
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which for Hilferding is “an economic category sui generis” (Hilferding 1910, p. 112,
italics in the original). It is a special kind of profit because it is an economic form taken
by a new type of social relations – separation of management and ownership and a related
genesis of the joint-stock capital. Following Marx, Hilferding assumes the interest rate to
be below the rate of profit in the sphere of production (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 358,
Hilferding 1910, p. 109-110). Given that buying shares is formally akin to investing
loanable capital, he further assumes the interest rate to be equal to the dividend yield. It is
worth noting that Hilferding is not entirely consistent on this, and at times he mentions
the risk premium which would bring the dividend yield above the interest rate (Hilferding
1910, p. 108). Nevertheless, in the final analysis, trying to map Marx’s distinction
between interest and profit of enterprise onto the difference between dividends and
founder’s profit, respectively, Hilferding assumes the risk premium away. As a result, he
argues that the founder discounts the future surplus value (S) with the rate of profit (r),
whereas shareholders – with the interest rate (i). Given that the interest rate lies below the
profit rate (i < r), the flow of the surplus value discounted by the former exceeds the
surplus value discounted by the latter (

S
r

S
). Thus, the differences in the rates of
i

return bring the price of the shares over and above the amount of capital invested. The
difference between the two constitutes founder’s profit which for Hilferding is profit of
enterprise accruing in a lump sum (Hilferding 1910, p. 129). Given that banks facilitate
floating the shares, they receive a part of this profit.
Second, banks engage in trading securities – an activity identified by Hilferding
as speculation. As a result, they earn what he calls speculative profit – the other, fourth,
type of profit. For Hilferding (1910, p. 135), “speculators gain only from each other.
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One's loss is the other's gain”, so speculative profit is a zero-sum game among the
financial institutions. In other words, it is what Steuart called “profit upon alienation”.
Hilferding obviously advanced Marx’s theory of banking and bank profit.
Nevertheless, his treatment of bank profit is problematic at times. First, as noticed by Itoh
(1988, p. 287), Hilferding’s claim that founder’s profit is a profit of enterprise accruing in
a lump sum is not convincing, for a number of reasons. The most important one is that if
founder’s profit is a capitalized future, i.e. not yet created, surplus value, its
macroeconomic source remains unclear. How can one partake in value that does not exist
yet? Furthermore, the exact mechanism of how this not yet existing surplus value can be
appropriated is also not explained by Hilferding. By the same token, he does not pose the
question of the macroeconomic consequences of the existence of this type of profit for
distribution of national income, price dynamics, and so on. Second, his treatment of the
so-called speculative profit is even less successful. By labeling it a zero-sum game,
Hilferding manages to stay away from the question of the relationship between trading
gains and flows of value. Nevertheless, as it will be shown below, a relationship between
the two does exist, although it is not apparent and mediated. Certain transactions
associated with capital markets, including trade in assets, can be positive-sum games
involving wealth transfers due to differences in the rates of return. These gains can be
further magnified by fraud and speculative bubbles.
To recap, the emphasis on the distinct forms of bank profit, with each of them
associated with specific social relations, mechanisms of profit extraction, and different
connection to the flows of value, is a hallmark of Marx-Hilferding theory of bank profit.
The present analysis of bank profit and its transformation will be based on both
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cornerstones of this theory. Specifically, we will deploy Marx’s distinction between
profit as a part of the fresh flows of value, and profit as a redistribution of the already
existing flows of value. We will also start by acknowledging that bank profit should be
viewed as an envelope category comprising a number of forms of profit, each having
distinct underlying social relations, and mechanisms of profit extraction. Bank profit
should not be treated as interest spread, as it would follow from theories based on banks
as intermediaries, nor can it be treated as a homogeneous quasi-rent as asserted by
theories emphasizing money creation ex nihilo (Bossone 2001a, 2001b, Graziani 2003,
Parguez 2004, 2003). Furthermore, the relationship between the two moments of Marx’s
theory of profit, namely, its relationship to the flows of value and the multiplicity of
forms, are not always apparent in his writings. It is especially clear in the case of bank
lending to workers, when profit is interest spread, yet is not a part of surplus value.
Therefore, we will bring them together by stressing how different forms of bank profit
are connected to flows of value. This will be an organizing principle of what follows. It is
worth noting that this approach would allow us to incorporate the observation by
DeYoung and Rice (2004a) that the composition of bank revenues is important and, even
more, this composition is the most appropriate lens for studying the transformation of
banking. At the same time, the general analytical framework outlined above would allow
us to go beyond DeYoung and Rice’s empirically-driven analysis, and uncover both the
social relations corresponding to these types of profit and their macroeconomic sources.
The emphasis on the macroeconomic sources from a political economy perspective
would be in line with Pollin’s (1996) insightful argument discussed in chapter 3.
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4.5.2. Bank Profit and Loanable Capital
To develop an analysis of bank profit further, we need another analytical tool that
is grounded in Marx’s and Hilferding’s discussion of finance, yet goes beyond them by
incorporating insights of Marxists who worked on these questions later. The concept of
loanable capital is decisive for these purposes.
Marx defines loanable capital as capital available for lending, i.e. “intended for
bearing interest” (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 478)71. It is true though that he does not start his
analysis of finance with this concept. His starting point is the category of interest-bearing
capital, which, as was briefly mentioned above, has two specifically capitalist
dimensions. Consider it in a greater detail.
First, and widely accepted, interest-bearing capital is a credit relationship
corresponding to borrowing for the purpose of embarking on a circuit of capital (Marx
1977 [1894], chap. 21, 23). The second, and less appreciated specifically capitalist
dimension of interest-bearing capital, is its origin in temporarily idle hoards generated by
the circuit of capital itself. As shown by Marx (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 403, Marx 1967
[1885], p. 78, 83-85, 321-322, 451, Marx 1991 [1861-63], p. 169), further developed by
Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999, p. 65-69), and more formally by Lapavitsas (2000), and also
emphasized by Campbell (Campbell 2002, p. 215), the circuit of capital systematically
releases temporarily idle hoards, “leakages of value” that are collected by the financial
sector and converted into interest-bearing capital. As a result, the circuit of capital itself
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Loanable capital is money capital concentrated within the financial system, thus, converted from passive
(potential) to active capital. “One can understand the pleasure experienced when all these potential capitals
within the credit system, by their concentration in the hands of banks, etc., become disposable, "loanable
capital," money-capital, which indeed is no longer passive and music of the future, but active capital
growing rank” (Marx 1967 [1885], p. 493).
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forms a foundation for a systematic hoard formation, hence, for functioning of the credit
system. This is further reinforced by the financial system coming to accumulate
temporarily idle hoards scattered across the society as a whole, thus, the circuit of
revenue becomes the other foundation for a systematic hoard formation. As a result, the
financial system comes to be the repository of the temporarily idle funds that are placed
for the needs of capital accumulation. As Marx put it, “borrowing and lending money
becomes their [money-dealers’] particular business… this aspect of the banking business
consists of concentrating large amounts of the loanable money-capital in the bankers’
hands… They become the general managers of money-capital” (Marx 1977 [1894], p.
402, also p. 368). The fact that the financial system assembles funds across the society is
also the basis for Harvey’s conclusion that in the financial system the circuits of capital
and revenue are mixed together (Harvey 2006, p. 273-276), so that Marx’s careful
distinction between the money-form of revenue and the money-form of capital (Marx
1977 [1894], p. 443) is abandoned in practice by the very functioning of the financial
system. It essentially means that loanable capital is homogenized by the financial system.
Loanable capital is a more developed form of the interest-bearing capital, both
historically and logically. Therefore it is not surprising that Marx extensively uses the
former category in his analysis of banking at a lower level of abstraction (Marx 1977
[1894], chap. 30-32).
First, the very functioning of the financial system mitigates the importance of the
purpose of borrowing. From a bank’s perspective, it does not matter whether a loan is
extended for a productive purpose, or for a purpose of household consumption – an
observation which, as was shown in chapter 2, becomes a foundation of all the
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mainstream theories of banking, for which the difference across economic sectors does
not exist. Incidentally, this banks’ indifference to the purpose of borrowing is entirely
consistent with Marx’s methodology. He argues that the quantitative division of profit
into interest and profit of enterprise leads to a qualitative division of capital into capitalas-property and capital-as-function (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 372-379). Thus, an ability of
bearing interest becomes viewed in the society as a capacity of any sum of value. A
logical conclusion is that the origin of interest in surplus value becomes unrecognizable,
and the link between lending and the necessity for surplus value production as its material
support – if this lending were to have a systematic self-sustained foundation – becomes
obscured. Therefore, it is not surprising that the purpose of borrowing ceases to be a
decisive feature of the credit relationship.
This is reinforced by the fact that credit relations pre-date capitalism: there is
nothing unprecedented in borrowing for purposes other than starting a circuit of capital.
Nevertheless, there is also a fundamental difference between this indifference to the
purpose of borrowing on a capitalist basis and within the previous modes of production.
If usury was condemned in the feudal society as parasitic and predatory, the qualitative
division of capital into capital-as-property and capital-as-function rationalizes what used
to be condemned, and gives essentially usurious practices social justification which it
could never have before. Thus, the development of capitalism rationalises, justifies, and
subsumes certain pre-capitalist relations. While usurious practices used to be condemned,
they are nowadays viewed as an entirely justified profit-making activity of modern banks.
And this happens in spite of this activity having taken a grander scale, with a larger share
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of population absorbed into it, and its being based on deploying idle funds of the society
as a whole, and not just own capital of an individual usurer.
Second, as the banking system develops, banks come to create money, so that
their reliance on the results of previous accumulation and idle hoards scattered across the
society is also mitigated. Thus, loanable capital originates in temporarily idle hoards, but
also in a pure money form created by the banking system itself. An important aspect here
is that in both cases loanable capital has a purely social nature. In the former case, it is
amassed idle funds of the society as a whole (Marx 1977 [1894], p. 366), in the latter
case, money creation by banks is based on acceptability of demand deposits as means of
circulation, i.e. on deposits acquiring money-like features. Furthermore, more
importantly, in both cases there is no immediate relationship between loanable capital
and flows of value.
When loanable capital originates in the idle hoards, these hoards either stem from
fresh flows of value or represent hoarded leakages of value coming from the previous
cycles of accumulation. In spite of the immediate origin in the flows of value, once these
hoards are amassed by the credit system, they leave the circuit of capital and revenue, and
enter a separate circuit – that of loanable capital. The lack of connection between
loanable capital and flows of value is even more apparent when banks create their own
money. In this case loanable capital originates within the financial system itself. An
important point here is that loanable capital has its own circuit as distinct from the
circuits of capital and revenue, and no matter what is the origin of its elements – hoards
scattered across the society or bank money – once they become a part of the circuit of
loanable capital, they cannot be a part of the circuit of revenue or capital at the same
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time. To be a part of one of these two circuits, money would need to exit the circuit of
loanable capital. This argument is somewhat related to Keynes’ distinction between
industrial and financial circulation (Keynes 1971 [1930], chap. 15).
An important characteristic of loanable capital is its inherent tradability.
Discounting bills of exchange is the simplest form of a trade in securities. This inherent
tradability is accentuated by the very functioning of the financial system. On the one
hand, it reinforces the possibility of trade in loanable capital by extending the range of
counterparties engaged in this trade, expanding variety of financial instruments, and
homogenizing the methods of trade. On the other hand, the financial system also
strengthens the need for this trade. Issuing short-term liabilities characteristic to banking
and specializing in lending on demand, as in the case of some types of banks (Smith-like
banks, in line with the Anglo-Saxon “sound banking” tradition), makes banks the main
source of demand for liquid funds. This demand for liquidity by banks themselves is
further reinforced by the need to settle inter-bank obligations, meet reserve requirements,
and by banks increasingly issuing contingent liabilities. As a result, tradability of
loanable capital increases. The inherent tradability of loanable capital is important
because it shows that it is misleading to treat the trade in financial assets as an arbitrary
activity of the financial sector, even less as pure gambling, or speculation.
The discussion of loanable capital is of paramount importance. It will be shown in
the following section that some characteristics of this form of capital are essential for an
analysis of the bank profit. Among those are inherent tradability and existence of a
separate circuit of loanable capital that does not have an immediate connection to the
circuits of flows of value, be it the circuit of capital or the circuit of revenue.
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4.5.3. Bank Profit: Beyond Marx and Hilferding
It was argued above that the content of all financial transactions can be
understood as an exchange of loanable money capital for a promise to pay. Banks are
specialists dealing in loanable capital. Therefore, in the most general terms, bank profit
arises from this exchange of loanable capital for a promise to pay.72
There are two broad types of profit associated with promises to pay. This major
distinction will lie at heart of the subsequent analysis. First, there are profits arising from
holding promises to pay issued by others. These profits are justified by parting with
money for a specific time period, and normally take the form of interest payments,
coupons or dividends. Those come directly from flows of value – surplus value (profit) in
the case of the promises being issued by capitalists or value of labor power (wages) in the
case of promises issued by workers. These profits represent a direct deduction from these
flows, because, in the former case, the money form of capital is essential for starting a
circuit, therefore, the credit relationship helps generate the source of repayment of
interest. Interest from lending to workers comes directly from their wages, as it enters the
value of the labour power together with the value of the commodities that involve
borrowing and paying interest. In this sense, although Harris (1976, p. 160-161)
mistakenly treated interest paid by workers as profit on merchant’s capital, thus
conflating interest with merchant’s profit, he was right in his emphasis that the value of
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The only exception is profit from money-dealing discussed above.
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labor power comprises both interest on borrowing in order to purchase specific
commodities and the value of commodities themselves (cash price).73
Nevertheless, profit associated with holding promises to pay is not the only form
of profit related to the promises. The second form arises from various ways of dealing in,
or handling these promises. Its most obvious example is trading revenue, both on own
account (proprietary trading) and fees from trading for others. But, as it will be shown in
the next chapter, more complex ways of dealing in promises to pay have similar
characteristics. These other ways of handling promises result in profit from underwriting
(and securitization income and mergers and acquisitions fees as its particular form), and
to some extent even asset management fees.
There are essential differences between these two types of profit. First, profit from
holding promises accrues to the one who parts with liquidity and obtains a promise. By
contrast, profit from handling promises accrues to the one parting with a promise and
restoring the money form of capital advanced. Therefore, liquidity provision, which is a
social justification of profit in the former case, cannot justify profit from dealing in
promises. Second, profit from holding promises presupposes that money leaves the
circuit of loanable capital and enters the circuit of capital or revenue. On the contrary,
profit from dealing in promises does not have this prerequisite, and it accrues to the
dealers in loanable capital as money travels within the circuit of loanable capital itself.
Third, as it will be illustrated below, these two differences result in different
73

If one adopts a definition of value of labor power from volume I of Capital, interest payments by workers
would imply that wage is greater than the value of labor power. It leads some to conclude that interest
payments by workers come from surplus value (see, e.g., Fine 2010). The present study assumes that profit
in the sphere of circulation is better theorized as a combination profit from redivision of surplus value (as in
the case of merchant’s profit, profit from money dealing, and interest from lending to capitalists) and
“profit upon alienation” (unrelated to redivision of surplus value). This argument is elaborated in
Lapavitsas and Levina (2011).
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macroeconomic sources of profit. Profit from holding promises involves loanable capital
leaving its circuit, and entering a circuit of capital or revenue, therefore, associated profit
can be drawn from one of these circuits. By contrast, profit from dealing in promises can
accrue without money leaving the circuit of loanable capital, therefore, this profit does
not have an immediate relationship with flows of value. Rather, it can come from
loanable capital itself.74
If the sources and mechanisms of profit extraction from holding promises to pay
are straightforward and represent re-division of the flows of value, profit from dealing in
promises deserves a more careful analysis. It was argued in section 4.2 that the simplest
form of credit relations can be identified with commercial (trade) credit. By the same
token, the embryo form of dealing in promises to pay can be traced back to discounting
the instruments of trade credit. In spite of the apparent simplicity of bills of exchange and
related transactions, some relevant insights on the nature of profit from dealing in
loanable capital can be gained from an analysis of these simple instruments.
Assume that a bill of exchange is generated through the sale of commodity output,
and is then discounted by other capitalists. The property that matters for our purposes is
that the ultimate holder of the security is not the sole receiver of interest payments.
Rather, the payments made by the issuer of the security are distributed among all
participating capitalists, depending on the period of holding the bill as well as the rate of
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Under certain circumstances profit from holding promises to pay can also come from loanable capital.
This would happen when interest or dividends are paid by means of borrowing. Following Minsky (2008
[1986], p. 231), this case is normally referred to as Ponzi finance. Nevertheless, this is a characteristic of
pre-crisis periods and cannot be viewed as a general case. Therefore, profit from holding promises to pay
can be argued to come from loanable capital only in exceptional cases, whereas it is the general rule in the
case of profit from dealing in promises to pay.
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interest (Itoh, Lapavitsas 1999, p. 94, Itoh 1988, p. 266). 75 This insight can be elaborated
through a simple numerical example.
Assume capitalist A buys commodities from B, with cash price of $100, issuing a
bill of exchange amounting to $110 due in 2 months. Suppose now that B sells the bill to
capitalist C for $105. When the bill matures, there can be two broad analytical outcomes.
The first is that A generates the expected flow of surplus value, which is then
distributed among the bill holders, mediated by a transfer of loanable capital.76 Thus,
when the bill falls due, C receives $110 from A, and in effect the total interest of $10 is
equally distributed between B and C. In this case, B’s gain has a dual nature. Ultimately,
it is part of the interest paid by A, originating in the surplus value created by A. But in
immediate terms, it comes directly from the loanable capital of C advanced in exchange
for the bill. Note that it is the tradability of the debt instrument that opens up the
possibility of inter-temporal distribution of flows of value.
The other possible outcome is a pure redistribution of the loanable capital of the
ultimate holder. This would occur if A failed to generate the expected surplus value and
paid only pa when the bill fell due. Three analytically important cases are evident (Figure
1).
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For commercial credit, interest is the difference between the credit price and the cash price. This severely
constrains analysis of the impact of interest rates on financial profits, even though some conclusions could
still be drawn. For this reason, it is best to examine the role of interest rates in the context of bonds, which
is also the natural terrain for analyzing the relationship between interest rates and capital gains. Henceforth,
for trade credit instruments, discounting at a price higher than the cash price will be interpreted as a result
of approaching maturity. Nevertheless, it is also conceivable that a promissory note could be immediately
resold at a price higher than it was bought. This would be analogous to a change in the interest rate, thus
providing an explicit link between, on the one hand, simple trade credit and, on the other, bonds and
equities.
76

Formally speaking it should be ‘idle funds’ and not ‘loanable capital’ of C since the category of loanable
capital simply does not exist at the level of abstraction of commercial credit among capitalists. But this
would merely complicate expressions without offering any analytical benefits.
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Case 1: pa < 100. The total loss of B and C would be equal to 100 – pa. This
would be less than the loss of the ultimate holder, C, which would amount to 105 – pa,
arising from A’s underpayment but also from reallocating C’s loanable capital in favor of
B. By the same token, there would be a gain of $5 for B originating in the appropriation
of C’s loanable capital.
Case 2: pa = 100. Total losses of B and C would be equal to zero, but B would
make a gain of $5 from the redistribution of C’s loanable capital. This is a pure zero-sum
game.
Figure 1: Distribution of gains from trade in a bill of exchange
p

105
pa (case 3)
pa (case 2)

100

pa (case 1)
t0
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Case 3: 100 < pa < 105. Total gains of B and C would be equal to pa – 100, with
the ultimate source of these gains being surplus value produced by A. Nevertheless, C
would still have losses amounting to 105 - pa. This implies that B’s gains are the sum of
some of C’s loanable capital and some of the flow of surplus value. Thus, even when a
flow of surplus value is produced and distributed, there exists the possibility that profit
would exceed surplus value by appropriating a part of the loanable capital of another
capitalist. In immediate terms B’s gain arises from C’s loanable capital. Once mediated
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by the (inadequate) return of loanable capital to C, some of B’s gain would arise from the
flow of surplus value, but some would still be a part of C’s loanable capital.
All three cases represent the redistribution of the ultimate holder’s loanable
capital in favor of the intermediate capitalist, B, and each represents a different degree of
total loss.77 The gain from selling the bill comes either completely from C’s loanable
capital, or from a combination of C’s loanable capital and the surplus value created by
A.78
There are several relevant conclusions from this analysis of a trade in instruments
of commercial credit. First, there is no immediate relationship between profit from
discounting a bill of exchange and flows of value. This profit accrues apparently
independent of and prior to the value generating process. Second, nevertheless, this does
not imply that there is no connection between this type of financial profit and flows of
value. Profit from discounting a bill has a dual nature. Immediately, it comes directly
from loanable capital of the bill buyer. 79 The subsequent return of loanable capital to the
ultimate bill holder mediates the content of profit of the bill seller. Therefore, once
mediated, this profit ultimately becomes associated with the future flows of value. In this
case the re-division of loanable capital facilitates an inter-temporal redistribution of flows
of value. Put simply, the security seller gets profit without corresponding output
77

B’s gain is a type of appropriation through exchange where the market value of the item exchanged is not
known at the moment of transaction. The gain would come from either good luck or fraud on B’s part.
78

A word of caution is in order. Joint liability characteristic of commercial bills could limit the reallocation
of C’s loanable capital in favor of B, thus modifying the redistributive results.
79

Incidentally, loanable money capital as an immediate source of capital gains was identified by Marx in
his analysis of cyclical fluctuations in the capital markets and related fluctuations in interest rates. He
argued that, if securities are bought when interest rates are high, hence stock prices low, and sold when
stock prices regain their level, “a portion of the money-capital of the public is thus appropriated” (Marx
1977 [1894], p. 502).
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produced, and the ultimate holder gets the whole surplus produced, but a part of it is used
to compensate for the monetary wealth transferred to the previous holder of the security.
If mediation is incomplete, i.e. if returns fail to materialize as expected, profit from
discounting represents a pure redistribution of loanable capital. Thus, it is a reinstatement
of “profit upon alienation”, but with respect to loanable capital.
The dual nature of profit from handling loanable capital has important
implications.
First, this profit obtains its definite content only upon mediation. Depending on
whether loanable capital (and its increment) returns to the ultimate holder of the promise
to pay, the profit of the intermediate dealers becomes either a part of the flows of value
inter-temporally distributed, or profit upon alienation when loanable capital is re-divided.
But until loanable capital is recovered by the ultimate holder of the promise, profit from
dealing in promises remains a “pure form”. This is what might be called “fictitious
profit”.80 It is fictitious in the sense that it comes from loanable capital itself, which, as
was argued above, has its own circuit. To some extent loanable capital originates in the
flows of value, but the rest of it originates through issuing promises to pay that are not
related to flows of value. Individual constituents of this mass of loanable capital might or
might not have a counterpart in the freshly produced value. Therefore, taken as a whole,
loanable capital does not have a counterpart in the newly created value, and profit coming
from loanable capital also cannot be said to correspond to the current flows of value.

80

After the 2007-2009 crisis, there have emerged (on the left but not only) some ideas of “fictitiousness” or
“falseness” of financial profits, but those were just words and, at most, good intuitions, without any
content, let alone a theoretical analysis. In the present study this “fictitiousness” of profits coming from redivision of loanable capital does not mean that the profit is somehow not real, it only means there might be
no corresponding value produced at the time of accrual of this profit.
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Incidentally, the fact that profit from re-division of loanable capital originates outside of
the flow of capital and revenues is acknowledged by National Accounts that exclude
capital gains from current national output.
Second, in spite of not having a counterpart in the newly created value, profit
coming from re-division of loanable capital acquires existence on a par with profit from
the fresh flows of value. Put differently, this “fictitious” profit has real effects on the
economy. Prior to the time of final repayment, the final holder can borrow against the
expected market value of the bill and spend what is borrowed. Furthermore, a realized
gain made by the seller of a bill, which comes from the ultimate holder’s loanable capital,
is indistinguishable from profit backed by flows of value. This profit can be spent at any
point of time, prior to or after the maturity of the bill. This becomes possible due to a
peculiar role of money in capitalist economies. Profit coming from loanable capital, like
any other profit, has a monetary form. Money is primarily a universal equivalent, i.e. is in
a monopolistic position of direct exchangeability with other commodities. It is the
absolute form of existence of exchange value, or the universal commodity (Marx 2003
[1867], p. 136). Hence, although some parts of profit from dealing in loanable capital
might not have flows of value as their counterpart, it does not prevent this profit from
having the same purchasing power as profit backed by flows of value. Therefore, this
profit can have redistributive impact on the current output.81 Furthermore, in addition to
the monetary form of this profit, the other factor contributing to this profit having
existence and real effects on a par with profit backed by current flows of value is the
wide-spread view that whatever earns profit corresponds to useful services. An example
81

Profit from re-division of loanable capital has two real effects on the economy. It affects, first, the
present distribution of output and, second, future monetary wealth of the asset holders.
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of this approach can be found in Samolyk (2004, p. 30, 55) for whom profit reflects the
amount of financial services provided. She does not question whether some of these
profits can exist without associated useful services.
Third, the ability of the financial system to create its promises to pay that are
universally accepted as means of circulation places it in a strategically important and
privileged position compared to the other sectors. By augmenting loanable capital beyond
the idle hoards leaking from the circuits of capital and revenue, the financial system can
create loanable capital, hence, the source of its own profit. This loanable capital would
need to be validated by the circuit of capital through generating the hoards ex-post,
nevertheless, in the short run the financial system can create the source of its own profit.
Therefore, fourth, there is an intrinsic motive for financial institutions to generate
expansion of loanable capital, or, what is usually called “overextension in balance sheets”
(Borio 2007). It is not surprising that financial institutions feed on bubbles, and periods of
euphoria are endogenous to this type of profit.
Finally, given that profit from re-division of loanable capital in immediate terms
comes from loanable capital itself, and not from fresh flows of value, at each point in
time there is no immediate relationship between the magnitude of this profit and total
output produced. Put differently, this profit is not immediately related to and, therefore,
not limited by the value of the current output, and even less so by the current surplus
value.
4.6. Conclusion
The chapter argues that in the history of economic thought there have existed two
broad approaches to banking – the bills view and the goldsmiths view. Marx has adopted
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the general theoretical framework of the former by, first, tracing the origin of bank credit
back to commercial credit and treating banking as a business of exchanging promises to
pay, and second, by emphasizing the active principle behind the functioning of banks that
strive to increase their lending capacity. At the same time, Marx has fundamentally
altered the ahistorical bills view by explicitly locating banks within the capitalist mode of
production.
This dual foundation of Marx’s theory of banking gives it an analytical advantage
in theorizing banks, in general, and in addressing their ongoing transformation, in
particular. Contrary to the theories discussed in the previous chapters, Marx’s theory of
banking can capture both a change in the mode of performing banking business and a
change in the character of the borrower.
In particular, it is argued that contrary to the wide-spread arguments, the ongoing
transformation of the ways in which the banking business is performed is not that
unprecedented. Deposit taking and issuing bank notes can be viewed as the original forms
of financial innovation, and liability management and asset sales are merely new ways of
banks raising their lending capacity. At the same time, the other aspect of the
transformation of banking – its turn to households – is shown to be a more profound
change in a broader historical context. It represents more than just a reinstatement of
usury. On the one hand, contrary to usurers, banks use for essentially usurious activities
not only their own capital, but the truly social funds scattered across the society and
money created by banks themselves on the basis of trust bestowed on them by the
society. On the other hand, paradoxically, banking becoming a capitalist enterprise like
any other gives these usurious activities a rational justification. As a result, what used to
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be condemned in the previous modes of production attains rationalization, in spite of
taking even worse forms and a larger scale.
As a result, a Marxist theory of banking is shown to be able to nest relevant
insights from other theories, while also overcoming their limitations.
This discussion of a Marxist theory of banking serves as a foundation for
understanding bank profit. The present study deploys two relevant analytical
considerations coming from the classical political economy, Marx, and Hilferding. First,
in general, profit can originate in fresh or in existing flows of value. Second, as stressed
by Marx and Hilferding, banking business is constituted by multiple activities each
earning a distinct type of profit.
In spite of the study being explicitly rooted in the Marx-Hilferding theory of bank
profit, their theory requires a further development. Two analytical considerations become
paramount in accomplishing it.
First, the concept of loanable capital is important. On the basis of inherent
tradability of loanable capital and its having its own circuit, it is shown to be a separate
source of profit, in addition to flows of value.
Second, it is useful to distinguish between two types of profit associated with
promises to pay – profit from holding them and profit from dealing in them. The former
is straightforward, as this type of profit has had enough attention before and is shown to
originate in flows of value, fresh or existing. The latter has not been studied at a
theoretical level before and represents a more complex case.
Profit from dealing in promises to pay is shown to have a dual nature. In its
immediacy, it comes from re-division of loanable capital. Once mediated by a return of
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loanable capital of the ultimate holder of the promises to pay, this profit becomes a part
of surplus value. If the mediation is incomplete, this profit remains a pure redistribution
of loanable capital. The former represents an inter-temporal redistribution of flows of
value mediated by reallocation of loanable capital, the latter is a reinstatement of “profit
upon alienation”.
It was argued above that there are many forms of profit from non-lending
activities associated with the transformation of banking. Among them are profit from
trading financial assets (both on own account and for others), underwriting revenues, fees
for mergers and acquisitions, securitization revenue, and asset management fees.
Therefore, a question arises how these forms of profit can be explained on the basis of the
suggested theoretical framework. This will be an object of study in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPITAL GAINS: THROUGH THE LENS OF
TWO SETS OF PRICES OF CAPITAL GOODS
5.1. Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to argue the rise of the financial markets brings about a
particular form of profit making that restores the predatory aspects of finance by raising
them on a capitalist foundation. To make this point, the chapter uses the dual price
system of capital goods – the market price based on capitalization of their future yields
and the replacement costs – to show the gap between the two prices creates a foundation
for extraction of a particular type of financial profit that rose to prominence over the past
few decades. A starting point of analysis of this form of profit should not be speculation.
Instead, the gain is shown to come from redistribution of monetary assets scattered across
the society, be these already existing or newly created assets. This type of financial profit
can be extracted through a variety of mechanisms, with an initial public offering being
the simplest of them. Among the other mechanisms are mergers and acquisitions and
securitization. In all these activities liquidity is necessary for this form of profit making,
therefore, banks perform a necessary function of liquidity provision which in turn allows
them to share in financial profit associated with these transactions. Given that the nontraditional banking activities involve a more profound transformation of bank revenues
and profits than of the bank function which remains to be liquidity provision, a fuller
understanding of the social significance of the transformation of banking requires using
the character of bank revenues as the lens for analysis. This argument is developed as
follows.
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Section 2 discusses the dual price system of the capital goods as a basis for a
theory of investment introduced by Keynes and further developed by Tobin and Minsky.
These theories, however, do not explain a number of empirical facts due to conceptual
problems with these approaches to investment. Drawing on Mehrling and Hilferding,
section 3 argues that the problematic character of these theories stems not from the
distinct conceptualization of capital goods as having two sets of prices but rather from an
attempt to use it as a general theory of investment. The dual price system is argued to be
relevant, as it signifies a transformation of the concept of capital in the 20th century. The
social significance of this transformation lies in a rise of a particular form of profit
making associated with a rise of the capital markets. Section 4 compares Hilferding’s and
Minsky’s approaches to profit associated with the capital markets and argues that they
agree that this form of profit arises due to the gap between the two sets of prices, that a
starting point of analysis is not speculation but rather realization of gains associated with
value that is not yet created. Hilferding, however, differs from Minsky in identifying the
difference in the rates of return as the social foundation of extraction of this form of
profit, whereas for Minsky the capital markets remain a black box that merely changes a
mode of valuation. It is argued in section 5 that the financial profit associated with the
gap between the two sets of prices requires specifically capitalist social relations, yet
simultaneously reinstates the pre-capitalist, predatory forms of profit making. Section 6
shows this profit comes in many forms and accrues not only to financial institutions, but
also to non-financial institutions and individuals, making the usual criticism of the
financial system too narrow. Section 7 focuses on the concrete forms taken by profit due
to the gap between the two sets of prices and on this basis reevaluates the question of the
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transformation of banking. Initial public offerings, mergers and acquisitions, and
securitization are suggested to be analyzed as concrete mechanisms of profit making.
These transactions require liquidity making banks well suited to facilitate these
transactions, which in turn becomes the basis for banks’ sharing in profit associated with
the dual price system. On these grounds it is concluded the significance of the
transformation of banking cannot be fully recognized on the basis of bank functions, and
the focus of analysis should rather be shifted to the character of bank revenues and
profits. Section 8 concludes.

5.2. From the Dual Price System to a Theory of Investment: Keynes, Tobin and
Minsky
Keynes offered a distinct conceptualization of capital goods that lies at the heart
of his theory of investment further developed by Tobin and Minsky. The debate around
the theoretical and empirical validity of these theories offers, however, good reasons to
believe that Keynes-Tobin-Minsky approach to investment has a limited explanatory
power, and the gap between the market value of capital goods and their replacement costs
cannot be a foundation of a general theory of investment.
Keynes (1973 [1936], p. 135-137) suggested that capital goods – what he called
“capital-assets”, or investment – have two sets of prices, namely, the demand price and
the supply price. The demand price of the investment is determined by the prospective
yield from an asset and the current rate of interest. The prospective yield is a difference
between the selling price of the goods produced with an aid of the capital asset and the
running expenses during the life of the asset. The supply price of the capital-asset is its
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replacement cost. Keynes used this conceptualization as a starting point of his theory of
investment. For him, investment is carried out up to a point when the supply price of
investment is equal to its demand price.82
This approach was subsequently formalized by Brainard and Tobin (1968) as a qtheory of investment. As in Keynes, for Brainard and Tobin (1968 p. 103-104), the key
determinant of investment is the relationship between the market valuation of equities
and the replacement cost of the physical assets they represent. Investment is stimulated
when the market valuation exceeds the replacement costs, which is equivalent to the yield
on equity being below the return to physical investment.
This conceptualization of physical capital as having two sets of prices has entered
into a general equilibrium approach developed by Tobin (1969). The physical capital at
reproduction costs (p) generates profits at a rate equal to the technologically determined
marginal efficiency of capital (R). Tobin allows the market value of the physical capital
to diverge from its reproduction costs due to the required rate of return for investors
diverging from the marginal efficiency of capital. If the market value of capital is qp, the
rate of return for investors is

r

K

R . Tobin emphasized the divergence of the two sets
q

of prices in the short run (Tobin 1969, p. 29)83. A long run equilibrium condition,
however, requires the market value and the reproduction costs of the physical capital to
equalize.
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At this point, the current rate of interest is equal to the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), as Keynes
defined the MEC as the discount rate making the present value of the stream of future net revenues from
use of the asset equal to its supply price. Marginal efficiency of capital in Keynes is equivalent to what
Irving Fisher (1930) called “the rate of return over cost” (Keynes 1973 [1936], p. 140).
83

Among the other reasons, this divergence is important because it constitutes for Tobin the principal
channel of the monetary policy.
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The question of equalization of the two sets of prices in the long run has become
the dividing line between the two strands that emerged out of the q-theory. On the one
hand, equalization of the two prices has become a foundation for the neoclassical
approaches. An alternative approach was suggested by Minsky in his two-price theory of
investment. As in Keynes, for Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 160, 195-205) one and the same
element of the means of production can be treated both as an investment good, i.e. a part
of the current output, and as a capital asset having the capacity to yield future profits.
This results in two distinct principles of determination of value of these means of
production. Their value as an investment good depends upon money wage rates, the
productivity of labor, and the markups on the labor costs, whereas the value of the same
means of production as capital assets is determined by the cash flows the assets are
expected to generate and the capitalization rate. Minsky (1994, p. 25) summarized this
insight saying that “a capitalist economy has both a “CPI” and a “Dow Jones””. Unlike
Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969), for Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 200-201,
1993, p. 16-17) there is no need for the market value and the replacement costs to
equalize, even in the long run. This is due to their being dependent on different factors
and determined in different markets. Another departure from Brainard and Tobin (1968)
and Tobin (1969) is an explicit account of, first, the borrower’s and lender’s risk and,
second, the financing conditions of investment.
In spite of the differences among the theories of investment suggested by Keynes,
Tobin, and Minsky, there is a fundamental unifying principle making these theories
similar at their core. The three approaches hinge on a distinct conceptualization of capital
assets as having two sets of prices – the market value based on capitalization of future

159

yields and the replacement costs. Moreover, the three theories argue that it is the gap
between the two sets of prices that constitutes an inducement to invest.
The debate around the empirical and theoretical validity of these theories of
investment offers good reasons to believe that the approaches to investment developed by
Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky have a limited explanatory power.
For one, the theories contradict a number of empirically observable phenomena.
Comparative econometric and case studies find mixed or weak support for the q-theory of
investment (e.g., Fisher, Merton 1984, Bosworth 1981) and show it to be inferior to other
investment theories (Clark 1979, Kopke 1982). Crotty argues the inability of the theories
of investment developed by Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky to stand empirical tests is not
surprising due to the conceptual problems at the heart of these theories. This idea found
its sharpest expression in the conclusion that “the financial theories of investment
espoused by Tobin, Minsky, and the Keynes of Chapter 12 are simply wrong” (Crotty
1990, p. 538). Although Crotty underestimates the validity of these theories under
particular circumstances and thus arrives at a too strong conclusion, he nevertheless puts
a hand on an important conceptual mistake preventing these theories from being a general
theory of investment. The mistake is the conflation of managers and shareholders, as in
the case of Tobin and Minsky, or the domination of owners over managers, as in Keynes.
For Crotty (1990, p. 535-537), by contrast, investment decisions can be relatively
independent of q. There is a number of reasons why managers and shareholders would
have a different approach to investment. First, managers and shareholders respond
differently to competition. Facing a decline in profitability due to intensified competition,
shareholders would sell the equities to invest in a more profitable enterprise, whereas
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managers might invest and build up excess capacity. Second, due to liquidity of
investment in securities and irreversibility of investment in real capital, owners and
managers have a different tolerance of risk associated with investment projects.
The discussion around the theories of investment developed by Keynes, Tobin,
and Minsky offers good reasons to believe that the gap between the market value of the
capital assets and the replacement costs cannot be a foundation of a general theory of
investment. Does it make the idea of the two sets of prices of capital goods irrelevant?

5.3. From the Dual Price System to the Nature of Financial Profits: Hilferding
The problematic character of the theories of investment developed by Keynes,
Tobin, and Minsky lies, however, not in the distinct conceptualization of capital goods
and the two sets of prices associated with them, but in an attempt to use this
conceptualization to develop a general theory of investment. The relevance of the dual
price system goes beyond the theory of investment. A look in the history of thought can
offer insights into other possible questions that can be addressed with an aid of the dual
price system.
One such set of questions is the theory of capital and capital controversies. Hicks
(1974) argued that a possible way of looking at the history of capital controversies – from
Ricardo and Malthus to the Cambridge capital controversy – is to understand it through
the lens of evolution of two distinct approaches to aggregation of the real capital for the
economy as a whole. These two approaches are called by Hicks “fundist” and
“materialist”.84 For “materialists”, capital is a stock of physical goods. The “volume of
84

Hicks considers Smith, British classical economists, Marx, Jevons, Boehm-Bawerk, Taussig, and Hayek
to be “fundists”, and Cannan, Walras, Marshall, Pigou, and J.B.Clark – “materialists”.
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capital” is aggregated using prices of capital goods themselves. By contrast, for
“fundists”, capital is a capacity of producing goods in the future which is embodied in
these physical goods. The “value of capital” can thus be measured as capitalized values
of future net products. Thus, for Hicks (1974, p. 315), the “fundist” concept of capital is
forward-looking, whereas the “materialist” concept is backward-looking. Viewed from
this angle, the relevance of Keynes’s two prices of investment is in that it explicitly
acknowledges that the concept of capital is simultaneously forward- and backwardlooking, making him both a “fundist” and a “materialist”.85 Capital is both a sum of
values necessary for reproduction of the given stock of capital and a discounted future
flow of value accruing to this stock. Keynes’s two sets of prices suggest that the two
approaches to capital, which represent two opposing camps in some of the capital
controversies, are in fact not mutually exclusive.
Without denying the continuous co-existence of the two approaches to capital,
Mehrling (2001, p. 53) shifts the emphasis from continuity to change in the prevalent
approach to capital in the 20th century. The forward-looking concept of capital rose to
dominance shifting the backward-looking concepts to the margins. In Merhling’s words,
“the economics view” of capital has given way to “the finance view”. In this context
Mehrling (2006, p. 73) finds Irving Fisher interesting in that he was “caught with one
foot in the 19th century and the second in the 20th”. By this Mehrling means Fisher
inherited the classical political economy view, according to which “the accumulation of
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Keynes probably took this idea from Irving Fisher. Hicks (1974, p. 309) mistakenly treats Keynes as
mostly a “materialist” with “no more than slight signs” of “fundism”. Hicks clearly underestimated the
essential role Keynes attributed to investment as capital assets yielding future revenues, and on these
grounds treated only Irving Fisher as simultaneously a “materialist” and a “fundist”. Similarly, Hicks was
one-sided treating Marx as a “fundist”, whereas Marx was in fact both a “materialist” and a “fundist”.
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capital-wealth from the past determines the flow of future income-services”, but also
anticipated the development of the modern theories of finance (CAPM) and the modern
macroeconomic theory (DSGE models), according to which “future income flows
determine current capital valuations”. An early appreciation of the two modes of
valuation of capital stressed by Mehrling is not unique to Fisher. It was anticipated by
Marx (1977 [1894]) and Veblen (1904).
For Marx, the shift in the prevailing concept of capital to what he called fictitious
capital comes from the emergence of the joint stock companies leading to the titles of
ownership becoming commodities. The market value of these titles of ownership is
determined differently from the value of the constant and variable capital these titles
represent, therefore, there is no economic reason for the two to coincide. Marx (1977
[1894], p. 320) stressed that these titles of ownership
“become commodities, whose price has its own characteristic movements and is
established in its own way. Their market-value is determined differently from
their nominal value, without any change in the value (even though the expansion
may change) of the actual capital. On the one hand, their market-value fluctuates
with the amount and reliability of the proceeds to which they afford legal title…
But assuming the expansion of the actual capital as constant, or where no capital
exists, as in the case of state debts, the annual income to be fixed by law and
otherwise sufficiently secured, the price of these securities rises and falls
inversely as the rate of interest”.
Thus, anticipating Fisher, Marx stressed the co-existence of the two systems of
valuation of capital.86 The market value of capital (also called by Marx “fictitious
capital”) is determined by discounting the expected flow of surplus value by the ongoing
interest rate, while the nominal value of the capital invested is determined by its
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Unlike Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky who were concerned with valuation of the elements of the capital
assets (or constant capital, in Marx’s language), Marx focused on the total sum of values invested, i.e. a
sum of the constant and variable capital.
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reproduction costs, or the socially necessary labor time necessary to reproduce the
elements of the constant and variable capital.87
The significance of the transformation of the prevalent concept of capital from a
backward- to a forward-looking stressed by Mehrling goes beyond the mere question of
capital valuation. This transformation has also brought about a new form of profit
making. An emergence of a new form of profit is what makes this transformation of the
concept of capital socially relevant. An observation that the gap between the two sets of
prices created a scope for extraction of a particular type of profit is Hilferding’s
theoretical innovation that has not received its due appreciation.
Hilferding explicitly associated the gap between the two sets of prices with a
particular type of profit, namely, founder’s profit. Being concerned with a genesis of the
joint stock capital, Hilferding considered money capital K invested in purchasing the
means of production and labor power. If the average rate of profit is r, the expected flow
of surplus value generated per period in the process of production would be equal
to

r K . Following Marx, Hilferding assumed that the rate of profit systematically

exceeds the interest rate, r

i , due to a different social status of money lenders and active

capitalists. Given that from the perspective of an owner of money capital buying shares is
akin to lending, Hilferding argued that shareholders would be satisfied with the rate of
interest, as opposed to the rate of profit, and that they would be willing to pay

87

i

for the

For Marx, the nominal value of capital is determined by the present conditions of its reproduction, not its
historical costs, and is therefore not backward-looking, as in Hicks, but “present-looking”. The same
emphasis can later be found in Tobin and Minsky.
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shares.88 From the rate of interest being lower than the rate of profit ( r

i ), it

immediately follows that discounting the future stream of surplus value with the former
would necessarily result in the market value of an incorporated enterprise standing above
the value of the actual capital invested (

i

r

). The difference between the market

value paid by investors and the initial capital invested,

i

r

i

K , constitutes

founder’s profit.
A relevant observation for our purposes is that founder’s profit thus understood
represents the difference between the two sets of prices of capital – between the market
price of the capital asset and the cost of reproduction. Even if the dual price system does
not offer a framework for a general theory of investment, the conceptualization of capital
goods as having two sets of prices is relevant, because it sheds the light on the nature of a
peculiar form of profit.

5.4. Reading Minsky through Hilferding’s Lens. What are Capital Gains?
The shift of focus to the character of profit offers a useful lens for revisiting
Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky. Although none of them had a theory of profit associated
with the gap between the two sets of prices, Minsky has insights that can further our
understanding of financial profits.
Minsky (1986) developed his argument in the context of profits from mergers and
acquisitions. In spite of this specific focus, the general thrust of his argument is clearly

88

Hilferding also considered risk premium that would bid the rate of return on shares above the interest
rate. However, he assumed that competition would eliminate the risk premium. On these grounds he
dropped the risk premium in his ultimate analysis of founder’s profit.
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applicable to a broader range of profits associated with functioning of the capital markets,
e.g., capital gains and underwriting revenues. He opened up the discussion with Keynes’s
(1973 [1936], p. 158) distinction between speculation and enterprise. Minsky maps this
distinction onto that between the corresponding types of profit – something not actually
argued by Keynes himself. Profit from speculation is taken by Minsky to arise due to
appreciation of the value of the assets, profit from enterprise comes from the income the
assets earn in production. Minsky (1986, p. 349) argued that “Keynes’s sharp distinction
between speculation and enterprise is not wholly warranted”. For Minsky, any enterprise
is motivated by capital gains, because there is an implicit capital gain realized at the
moment of investment, whenever the price of a capital asset exceeds the cost of
investment (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 238-239).89 To explain this gain, Minsky (1993, p.
13) argued that at the moment of purchase of an investment output there is a change in its
value – from its sale price to capitalized earnings it is expected to produce. This results in
a capital gain. On these grounds, he shifted the focus away from the distinction between
speculation and enterprise. The relevant fact for Minsky (1986, p. 348-351) is that in the
case of mergers and acquisitions financial markets transform future increases in market
power (or in labor productivity, as one might want to add) into immediate capital gains.
This is in line with his general view of financial markets as mechanisms transforming
expected future cash flows associated with capital assets into a set of current prices
(Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 194).
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Minsky disagrees with a point Keynes himself never made. Keynes did not try to map his distinction
between speculation and enterprise onto the corresponding types of profit. Keynes (1973 [1936], p. 151)
was aware that investment can be driven by “an immediate profit” from floating it on the stock exchange,
as opposed to a series of future flows of value.
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Thus, for both Hilferding and Minsky, at the most abstract level the gap between
the market price and the reproduction costs of an enterprise represents a particular form
of profit, namely, founder’s profit and gain from mergers and acquisitions, respectively.
Hilferding and Minsky agree on several characteristics of capital gains. First, an analysis
of capital gains should not start with a presupposition that they are speculative. Second,
capital gains should rather be linked to creation of surplus value (for Hilferding), or to the
expected future yield of the capital assets (for Minsky). Thus, third, functioning of the
capital markets allows one to realize gains associated with value that is not yet created.
In spite of these similarities between Hilferding and Minsky, there is a
fundamental difference between their approaches. Specifically, they offer different
explanations of the existence and persistence of the gap between the two sets of prices.
For Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 200-201, 1993, p. 16-17), the two sets of prices,
although related, do not have to be equal due to their being dependent on different factors
and determined in different markets. Furthermore, while the price of current output is in
principle sluggish, the price of capital assets is inherently volatile (Minsky 1975, p. 92).
Therefore, the two sets of prices can and do vary independently of each other, thus,
resulting in endogenously generated cycles.
Hilferding’s position combined the arguments by both Marx and Veblen. Recall
that for Hilferding it is precisely the difference in the rates of return required by
shareholders and active capitalists that creates a systematic divergence between the
market capitalization and the actual capital invested. Hilferding followed Marx
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emphasizing the difference in the rates of return.90 At the same time, in the subsequent
analysis Hilferding (1910) also emphasized the difference between the information
possessed by managers and shareholders, resulting in a different valuation of the same
enterprise. In this respect he is close to Veblen (1904, p. 77) who stressed a discrepancy
between the actual and the putative earning capacity of the enterprise. Thus, the problem
for Veblen boiled down to the difference between managers and investors – insiders and
outsides. Given that the latter do not know the actual earning capacity and that the former
can, furthermore, manipulate or withheld relevant information, it is not surprising that the
valuation of the company by investors would exceed that by managers. This discrepancy
between the actual and the putative earning capacity resulted in the value of the business
capital exceeding the actual capital invested in the process of production by the amount
of good-will and other intangible assets (Veblen 1904, p. 60, 72-73).
Thus, Minsky differs from Hilferding by not connecting the gap between the two
sets of prices with a difference in the rates of return. Moreover, there are reasons to
believe Minsky would have been critical of this explanation of capital gains, because he
criticized Keynes on similar grounds. Keynes (1973 [1936], p. 137) argued that
investment would be carried out until marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the rate of
interest, or until the supply and demand price of investment are equalized. He considered
these two approaches to be equivalent. Minsky (1975) was critical of seeing them as
equivalent and he favored the approach based on a comparison of the two sets of prices of
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Hilferding also echoes Marx’s (1977 [1894], p. 477) conclusion that the value of the imputed capitalvalues “may fall or rise quite independently of the movement of value of the real capital for which they are
titles”.
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the capital goods. For Minsky, the difference in the rates of return was an evidence of
Keynes’s being trapped in the classical economics.
Hilferding’s argument, however, shows that the emphasis on the differences in the
rates of return does not need to be associated with the neoclassical economics. In fact, the
difference in the rates of return is an important aspect of Marx’s theory, because it
corresponds to a different social status of lenders and active capitalists. The significance
of the difference in the rates of return is also appreciated by Tobin (1969). His q-theory
of investment is usually associated with equalization of the rates of return, but this
reading of Tobin overlooks the importance he assigned to the divergence of the rates of
return. He was very clear that the divergence between the rate of profit and the rate of
interest is the principle channel of the monetary policy that operates through revaluing
the market value of capital in relationship to its reproduction costs. Thus, for Tobin,
without the gap between the rates of return monetary policy would not have been
possible.
The difference in understanding the reasons of existence of the gap between the
two sets of prices has an important implication.91 Given that Minsky does not have a
convincing explanation why the gap would not be eliminated in the long run, in his
approach financial markets remain a black box creating capital gains by a mere act of
changing the mode of valuation of the capital goods. There is no social content to it. Nor
is there a discussion of the macroeconomic sources of the gain associated with the change
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In spite of the differences, Hilferding and Minsky agreed that there is a deeper conceptual distinction
between the two sets of prices. Unlike the price of produced commodities, the price of capital assets is “the
price of a revenue” (Hilferding 1910, chap. 7) or “prices for future streams of incomes” (Minsky 1993, p.
10). Thus, the price of capital as assets is actually not a price of capital, but rather of the flows of income
associated with this capital.
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in valuation.92 By contrast, focusing on a different social status of active capitalists and
shareholders, Hilferding explains the origin of the gap between the two sets of prices,
which in turn allows him to uncover the social relations allowing for this change in the
mode of valuation. Thus, what passes for a solution to the problem of the nature of capital
gains for Minsky – the transformative nature of the capital markets – itself requires an
explanation for Hilferding.
There is, however, a deeper reason that can possibly explain why the capital
markets can remain a black box for Minsky, whereas Hilferding finds it necessary to
focus on the social relations behind it. A possible root of the difference between the two
approaches lies in the theories of value supported by Minsky and Hilferding. Whereas the
existence of capital gains does not challenge Minsky’s theory of value, capital gains do
pose a major challenge for Hilferding’s theory of value. This could be a reason why
Minsky could be satisfied with the transformative function of the capital markets,
whereas Hilferding needed to explain this function itself as a change in the social
relations. Consider the difference in the theories of value in a greater detail.
For Minsky, an ability of the capital markets to change the mode of valuation of
the capital assets results in capital gains being indistinguishable from profits from
production. But this is not a problem for him, especially in his early work (Minsky 1975)
in which he inherited Keynes’s theory of capital and value, according to which profit
from production itself appears as nothing more than a capital gain.
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By not providing a reason why the gap would be systematically maintained, Minsky welcomes
explanations according to which the two sets of prices would equalize, at least in the long run. This is
impossible in Marx and Hilferding, for whom the gap would persist.
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Keynes (1973 [1936], p. 135, 213-214) analyzed profit from production as quasirents, or yield on capital assets – the difference between the total returns from selling the
output produced with the aid of the capital assets and the technically determined costs of
production.93 The quasi-rents exist due to scarcity of the capital assets. Given that this
scarcity is determined outside of the process of production in which these capital assets
are deployed, there is no immediate connection between the magnitude of the quasi-rents
and the costs of production. Therefore, profit from production itself appears in Keynes as
an abstract return on capital assets, i.e. as a form of a capital gain. This is reminiscent of
the labor commanded theory of value advanced by Adam Smith.94 According to Smith,
the value of the output is not the value embodied in the commodities produced, it is rather
the value this output can command, i.e. be exchanged for. Skidelsky (1992, p. 326) made
an even stronger argument claiming that in The Treatise on Money Keynes “had no real
theory of profit”, i.e. no theory of what determines “the rate of return on physical
capital”. This observation holds for The General Theory, as well. It was noticed by Joan
Robinson (1985, p. 158) when she argued “the formation of an overall rate of profit is left
hazy”.
If profit from production is studied as akin to capital gains, it is not surprising that
for Minsky capital gains are reminiscent of profit from production and that one cannot
distinguish between profits from enterprise and profits from speculation. In this sense,
Keynes’s theory of value and capital also adopted by early Minsky made this conclusion
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Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 228) suggested Marshall and Keynes used the concept of quasi-rents to draw a
parallel between the returns on capital assets in the sphere of production and ground rent in Ricardo.
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I am thankful to Tomas Rotta who drew my attention to the similarity between Keynes’s theory of value
and Smith’s labor commanded theory of value.
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inevitable. An important point here is that the distinction between profit from production
and from functioning of the capital markets vanishes not because there is no difference
between them, as suggested by Minsky. It is rather because Keynes, and then following
him Minsky, mistake profit from production for a sort of capital gain. It is particularly
clear in Minsky’s take on a firm as a cash-flow machine (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 228),
and his argument about investment in capital assets being akin to buying a bond (Minsky
2008 [1986], p. 238). This view culminates in Minsky’s (1975, p. 132) statement that “in
Keynes’s asset-valuation model, productive capital assets are perhaps best viewed as
another, albeit peculiar, speculative financial asset”.
If there is no distinction between profit from production and capital gains, and
both arise in the sphere of exchange, treatment of the capital market as a transformative
devise does not pose a major problem for a theory. There is no inconsistency between
profits from production arising in the sphere of circulation and capital gains arising
through a particular mechanism of the sphere of circulation, namely, the capital market.
Thus, the capital market can indeed remain a black box.
This approach stands in sharp contrast with Hilferding’s. Following Marx, he
considered profit to be a form of surplus value arising through exploitation. If profit is
understood as a form of subdivision of the flows of the currently produced value,
founder’s profit poses a theoretical problem. What is the connection between value and
founder’s profit that does not seem to bear any relationship to exploitation in the sphere
of production? Thus, the labor theory of value forces Hilferding to pose a question of the
social relations in order to reconcile founder’s profit with the flows of value.
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Hilferding (1910, chap. 7) solves this theoretical conundrum by treating founder’s
profit as an economic category sui generis associated with a transformation of capital. At
the most abstract level, the genesis of the corporate form of the business organization
involves a transformation of the profit-bearing capital into interest-bearing capital.
Another way of looking at this process is as a transformation of the nature of capital from
individual capital into truly social. In the 19th century an individual capitalist invested in
the process of production and retained control over it. With a spread of the corporate
form of business organization ownership of capital becomes diffused across the society,
and the amount of capital invested depends on the temporarily idle funds scattered across
the society as opposed to funds of an individual capitalist. It is the social nature of the
joint-stock capital that makes possible to turn certain assets into assets with a greater
value.
For Hilferding, a counterpart of this change in the nature of capital is a systematic
divergence between the rate of profit established in the sphere of production and the rate
of return required by shareholders. Without the difference in the rates of return, the
capital markets would not be able to transform the future gains of production into the
current capital gain. The conclusion that capital gains cannot exist without the difference
in the rates of return becomes apparent if capital gains are presented
as KG

r K
i

K

r
1 K , where KG is a capital gain (founder’s profit), r – the rate
i

of profit, i – the rate of interest, K – sum of value. From this it immediately follows that
for capital gains to be positive, the rate of profit should stand above the rate of interest. If
the rates of return are equal, there would be no capital gains, and the asset seller would
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only recover what had been invested.95 Thus, even though Hilferding makes an argument
similar to Minsky suggesting that founder’s profit is a lump sum gain equal to the
discounted expected profit of enterprise, Hilferding does not leave the explanation of how
exactly that happens to the black box of the capital markets.
To recap, if one adopts a theory of value in which profits from production are
theorized as some sort of a capital gain, as in Keynes and Minsky, the difference between
profit from production and capital gains disappears. The description of the capital
markets as a black box does not stand in conflict with the rest of the theory. From the
standpoint of the labor theory of value, however, profit from production is understood as
a form of surplus value arising due to exploitation of workers, as in Hilferding. To
explain the possibility of capital gains, the labor theory of value forces one to analyze the
social relations making capital gains possible. The strength of Hilferding’s approach is
that he simultaneously retains the difference between profit from production and capital
95

Capital gains understood in this way are a particular case of a broader category of profits that do not have
a counterpart in the currently produced output. There are two types of profit involving re-division of
monetary assets. The difference between these types of profit hinges on the conceptual distinction between
lending commodities as use-values and lending commodities as values, introduced by Teixeira and Rotta
(2010). When a commodity is loaned as a sum of values, it generates capital gains of the type discussed
here. These capital gains hinge on the difference between the rate of return on the sum of values and the
rate of return required by the holder of the claim. By contrast, when a commodity is loaned as a use-value,
the concept of a rate of return on its value becomes meaningless. Therefore, there is also no role to be
played by the difference in the rates of return, and the sum total of profit from dealing in these commodities
is reduced to a “pure form” – a simple difference between the current market price determined as a rent per
period discounted with a required rate of return and the reproduction costs of this commodity (in this case,
equal to zero). Thus, the resulting profit is reduced to KG
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0
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Q
, where Q is the expected future
i

rent per period, i is the ongoing interest rate. This pure form of capital gains requires a separate study and is
not addressed in the present article. The paradigmatic case of lending commodities as use-values is given
by valueless commodities, such as land and knowledge commodities. For a compelling analysis of
valueless commodities, see Teixeira and Rotta (2010). The issues involved in determination of value of
non-commodity money characteristic of modern capitalism raises a question whether capital gains from
dealing in money should be theorized as profit of type one or type two above. To address this question, one
would first need to establish a relationship between the value of money and the value of credit as an asset
whose exchange value is determined by the current value of the future money payments it promises to
make (Mehrling 1996, p. 332). Complications for the nature of capital gains that arise with valueless money
lie beyond the scope of the present work.

174

gains, yet also shows the connection between the two. The connection is important,
because it implies that founder’s profit remains a specifically capitalist form of profit.
The very act of discounting of the future flow of surplus value hinges on an expectation
that flows of surplus value will be systematically created. Therefore, founder’s profit
bears an important, though mediated relationship to surplus value creation. At the same
time, Hilferding argues that founder’s profit cannot be conflated with surplus value.
Thus, the labor theory of value forces Hilferding to open the black box of the capital
markets and examine the relations involved in the transformation of the future surplus
value into the current founder’s profit.

5.5. Characteristics of Capital Gains: Beyond Hilferding and Minsky
The discussion of capital gains by Hilferding and Minsky sheds the light on some
characteristics of financial profits.
First, a gap between two sets of prices of capital assets – their price as an interestbearing asset and their price as a value-containing commodity – constitutes a space for
capital gains. Nevertheless, capital gains should be understood not simply as a result of a
transformative function of the capital markets, as in Minsky, but rather as an outcome of
a particular set of social relations, as in Hilferding. Thus, Hilferding relates to Minsky in
the same way as Marx relates to Smith. In particular, Marx showed that, contrary to
Adam Smith, markets and private property alone cannot create a capitalist mode of
production. Similarly, the existence of the capital markets alone cannot explain the nature
and mechanism of extraction of capital gains.
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Therefore, second, the existence of the type of capital gains considered here
presupposes a set of specifically capitalist social relations.96 Capital gains develop as a
systematic and a large-scale phenomenon on the basis of capitalism for a number of
reasons. Capital gains hinge on discounting future flows of surplus value produced with
an aid of the capital asset. Thus, they presuppose a continuous production of surplus
value. Furthermore, the possibility of discounting future returns with an interest rate
presupposes systematic borrowing and lending and development of the money market.
These in turn hinge on systematic leakages of value from the circuit of capital and
revenue, necessitated by the logic of the circuits themselves.97 Finally, capital gains
require the interest rate to stand below the rate of profit, which is also an outcome of a
prevalence of the capitalist mode of production, as opposed to usurious interest rates
characteristic of the earlier stages of historical development. Thus, behind markets as the
source of capital gains are the differences in the required rates of return.
Not only does the existence of capital gains presuppose a certain level of
development of the capitalist relations, but also the emergence of the two sets of prices
itself hinges on a specifically capitalist process of converting use-values into
commodities. Rotta and Teixeira (2011) show how the commodity form attaches to the
human capacity to create value, to land, and to knowledge, resulting in, respectively,
commodities labor power, land, and knowledge-commodities. In the case of capital gains,
commodity form attaches to capital itself.

96

Capital gains can exist in non-capitalist systems, as long as there are market relations.
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This process of hoard formation analyzed by Marx (1967 [1885], p. 158-159, 163-166) is further
developed by Hilferding (1910, p. 67-81), Itoh (1988, p. 259-260, 401), and more formally by Lapavitsas
(2000).
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From a Marxist perspective, there is nothing surprising in the co-existence of two
prices of capital, and the very possibility of such a divergence is contained in Marx’s
distinction between use value and exchange value. Marx himself uses this insight in order
to explain the origin of surplus value. Commodity labor power has a use-value (ability to
create value) and value (costs of reproduction of the commodity labor power), and it is
this difference that explains the origin and persistence of surplus value. Similarly, capital
has a use value (its ability to extract surplus value) and exchange value (reproduction
costs of the elements of constant and variable capital), and it is the gap between the two –
between the discounted value accruing to the owner of the capital asset and the
reproduction cost of the capital asset – that creates capital gains. Thus, there is an affinity
between valuation of labor and capital, between surplus value and capital gains.98 In the
final analysis, both forms of profit are made possible by the distinction between use value
and value.
Fourth, capital gains do not have a counterpart in the current output. Precisely
because the financial markets transform the future gains into the present capital gains, as
stressed by Veblen, Hilferding, and Minsky, there is no real value created at the moment
of this transformation. This is why, contrary to Minsky (1993, p. 13), it is misleading to
view a simple act of purchasing an investment good as being capable of creating value.99
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There is a difference between the two cases of labor and capital due to the role of time. For the labor
power, its ability to create value and its reproduction cost are simultaneous and both occur in the current
period. By contrast, while the reproduction cost of capital is also current, the discounted flow of surplus
value is a future flow.
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In the case of capital gains narrowly defined, the absence of a counterpart in the current output is
acknowledged by the system of national accounts which excludes capital gains from calculations of GDP.
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Capital gain is a form of advance, or prepayment, and in this sense the profit arising
through the differences in the rates of return can be thought of as ‘fictitious profit’.
The lack of a counterpart in the current output, however, does not prevent these
profits from being monetized, which poses a question of the macroeconomic source of
capital gains. As was shown in Lapavitsas and Levina (2011), at the moment of accrual
capital gains come from re-division of stocks of money of the asset buyers.100 In this
sense, capital gains are a form of profit upon alienation (Steuart) characteristic to the precapitalist stages of historical development. Therefore, the criticisms of capital gains as
somehow not real overlook the point that capital gains involve redistribution of stocks of
money, thus, have very real redistributive outcomes. Capital gains provide their recipients
with purchasing power indistinguishable from income having a counterpart in the current
output.
To recapitulate, capital gains take the form of a gap between the two sets of prices
of capital assets. At their core, capital gains systematically arise only on a capitalist
foundation, but simultaneously they involve predatory relations with respect to the
ultimate asset holders. Thus, paradoxically, the most developed form of surplus
extraction in capitalism is simultaneously a reinstatement of an antideluvian form of
profit-making prevalent in earlier modes of production.
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This was the key point of criticism of Hilferding by Itoh (1988, p. 287). Itoh argued that founder’s profit
should be understood as coming from re-division of monetary assets of a security buyer, not as a part of the
surplus value accruing in a lump sum.
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5.6. Capital Gains Come in Many Forms
Capital gains as a difference between the market price and the costs of
reproduction of capital goods represent the most abstract and general category of
apparent wealth creation. Founder’s profit is a logical origin of a broader range of
financial profits, including profit from mergers and acquisitions.101 This form of profit
attaches to a range of marketable objects having expected future cash flows associated
with them.
It is also a pure form of a broader range of profits, because there is no service that
can be associated with extraction of capital gains. Capital gains, however, come in many
forms. Underwriting revenues, fees from mergers and acquisitions, securitization
revenue, trading gains (both proprietary and on behalf of clients), fees from asset
management, and even managerial bonuses in the form of stock options are other
particular forms taken by capital gains, broadly defined. The mainstream theories and,
hence, national accounting focus on provision of useful services associated with these
activities and on these grounds treat them as value creating. The approach developed
above suggests that these activities, although indeed involving a useful service, do not
create value, at least not at the moment of their accrual. These revenues rather come from
redistribution of monetary assets, facilitated by the differences in the required rates of
return. Therefore, these seemingly different profits are capital gain-like. Monetary assets
are used here as a generic category for monetary wealth that takes the form of either the
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Minsky (1986) was aware that that the market valuation of equities constitutes a starting point for an
analysis of mergers and acquisitions, and it this sense he can be argued to generalize Hilferding’s concept
of founder’s profit onto other forms of financial profit.
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already existing stock of money or the newly created credit. The latter happens when an
asset is purchased using borrowed funds.
The multiplicity of forms of capital gains has an important implication. The shift
of focus from investment to the nature of capital and capital gains helps clarify issues of
validity of Keynes-Tobin-Minsky theory of investment. The dual price system has a
broader relevance than just its connection with investment, because investment is not the
only mechanism for extracting capital gain-like profits. Furthermore, a theory of capital
gains shows conditions under which there would be a connection between the two price
system and investment, as suggested Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky, and under which their
theories are misleading, as argued by their critics. Their approaches are valid when an
agent making an investment decision is remunerated by a capital gain. This is the case
with a founder setting up an enterprise to float it off (a venture enterprise) and to some
extent with managers remunerated by stock options. When an agent making an
investment decision is not remunerated by an associated capital gain, the explanatory
power of Keynes-Tobin-Minsky theories is limited, because under those circumstances
an investment decision is a much more complex process than comparing the market price
and the reproduction costs of the capital assets.

5.7. Forms of Profit due to the Gap between the Two Sets of Prices of Capital and
the Transformation of Banking
The gap between the two sets of prices of capital goods was shown to be a source
of a particular form of financial profit. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the
concrete forms this profit takes and on the mechanisms of its extraction, which will in
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turn be used to reevaluate the transformation of banking. It will be argued that the
significance of the transformation of banking cannot be fully recognized on the basis of
bank functions. Some changes in banking are associated with a much more profound
transformation of the character of bank revenues than functions. The logical origin of this
argument can be established by examining the turn from commercial banking to
investment banking featuring a paradox that reappears in other banking activities.

5.7.1. Profit from IPO
The simplest form of extraction of capital gains is an initial public offering (IPO).
An IPO is a process of issuing equity shares representing claims on future revenues and
selling them to investors. A decision to go public can be made for different reasons, and a
specific combination of factors would vary from case to case. The most common reasons
include owner’s decision to cash out, debt repayment, covering operating expenses,
capital expenditures, and augmenting corporate treasury. The usual debate on the reasons
of existence of IPOs is nevertheless typically centered on two main approaches.
According to the first approach, an IPO is a means of raising funds necessary for
the business expansion. In some cases IPOs were used for this purpose. For example, in
the 1990s IPOs were an important source of finance for start-ups in the high-tech sector.
Nevertheless, outside of these cases, IPOs were more often than not used by companies
that had sufficient cash flows to finance their operations.102 Moreover, even when there is
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For the most recent example, see a debate around Facebook going public. John Gapper (2012),
Facebook Ought to Ditch its Public Offering, Financial Times, February 2, 2012, available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cd03c402-4dba-11e1-a66e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1lSKpGLxa. Sarah
Gordon (2012), The Numbers are Vast, but Beware the Bite of Reality, Financial Times, February 3, 2012,
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aebe570c-4db3-11e1-b96c00144feabdc0.html#axzz1lSKpGLxa. For an insightful discussion, see Mason, JW (2012), The Capitalist
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a need to raise funds, equity issuance is one of the most expensive ways of doing it, not
only because of the transaction costs, but also because of the adverse signals to potential
shareholders suggesting a lack of confidence in the ability to meet debt-service payments
through future earnings. For these reasons, raising funds cannot be the key reason of
existence of IPOs.
An alternative approach explains IPOs by the initial investors’ and stakeholders’
desire to cash in, that is, to substitute their sunk capital for money, the most liquid form
of wealth. Navin and Sears (1955, p. 127) consider this strive for liquidity to be “the
trump card” beating other reasons behind the historical origin of IPOs. They argue “the
years 1887-1902 produced a solution to one of the troublesome problems created by the
industrial revolution, the problem of capital inflexibility in the industrial segment of our
economy… By seeking incorporation the proprietors of industrial enterprises had
acquired, through the issuance of common stocks, a potentially easy means of transfer”
(Navin, Sears 1955, p. 136). The strive to liquidity and associated separation of
ownership and control are sometimes treated as the reason behind the entire history of
IPOs, not just their origin. For example, Lazonick (1992, p. 451, see also 2007, p. 1021,
2004, p. 19) emphasizes that “contrary to shareholder folklore”, “common share issues
have never been important in US industry as a means for financing enterprise expansion”.
The money was rather normally used “to permit owner-entrepreneurs to take their leave
of the firms that they had built up without disrupting the continuity of the enterprises”
(Lazonick 1992, p. 450-451). Thus, in the light of the actual historical experience a flight
to liquidity is a more universal aspect of IPOs than raising funds. This idea is sometimes
Wants an Exit, Facebook Edition, available at http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/02/capitalist-wants-exitfacebook-edition.html.
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put abstractly, namely, that capital strives to exist in the most liquid form, so that an IPO
is a concrete mechanism of accomplishing this goal by releasing capital from a
connection to a particular circuit of capital. This argument plays an important role in
Marxist literature. Uno school of Marxism views development of forms of capital as an
attempt of capital to set itself free from limitations of particular use-values (Itoh 1988).
Kotz makes a similar argument but not at an abstract theoretical level, as in Itoh, but in
the context of a rise of bank control of the U.S. corporations since the late 19th century.
For Kotz (1978, p. 148-149), a rise of the financial control of corporations by banks
implies a shift of ultimate power in capitalism from individual capitalists who invested in
the process of production, owned, and controlled it to banks that own and control
“abstract capital”. Banks, unlike industrial capital, are not tied to any particular industry
and rely on other people’s capital as a principle of their operation. With their becoming a
center of capitalist control, capital seeks to escape the confines of particular use-value
production through taking on a more general form. A similar argument from a broader
historical perspective can be found in Braudel (1983, p. 113, 232, 372-373) who treats the
sphere of circulation as the natural terrain for capital which originated in the sphere of
commerce, and the stock market as a mechanism of reinstating convertibility of illiquid
forms of capital into liquid ones.
A useful way to think about these two approaches to IPO – as a mechanism of
raising funds and of obtaining liquidity – is through the lens of the concepts of funding
liquidity and market liquidity. These notions developed in the context of functioning of
security dealers became well-known through the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). Even though widely deployed, these concepts haven’t acquired a universally
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accepted meaning, and different authors mean different yet related things. For example,
for Borio (2010, p. 71), similar to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), funding liquidity
seems to be a broader category than market liquidity, with the latter being one of the
conditions for the former. In particular, for Borio, market liquidity is “the ability to trade
an asset or financial instrument at short notice with little impact on its price”, whereas
funding liquidity is “the ability to raise cash (or cash equivalents) either via the sale of an
asset or by borrowing”. The same approach is used by CGFS (2011). Mehrling (2011, p.
26) treats market liquidity as the capital market liquidity and funding liquidity as the
money market liquidity. Tirole (2011, p. 288-290), however, shifts the focus to market
liquidity as liquidity of the asset side of the balance sheets, and funding liquidity as
liquidity of the liability side. For our purposes it is useful to distinguish between funding
liquidity and market liquidity as forms of liquidity demand from the perspective of the
size of the balance sheets. Funding liquidity would then involve an increase in liabilities
(an expansion of the borrower’s balance sheets), whereas market liquidity – a change in
the composition of assets or liabilities, with the sum total of the assets and liabilities
remaining the same.103 Market liquidity can be accessed through a sale of an asset or a
substitution of one form of liabilities by another. This distinction helps to see that the two
common approaches to IPOs are about liquidity. When an IPO is explained by a need to
raise funds, it effectively means that IPOs are driven by a need for funding liquidity,
whereas an approach to IPOs stressing a desire to cash out hinges on a particular form of
103

The rise of capital markets provides social foundations of the shiftability view of liquidity suggested by
Moulton (1918). Therefore, the triumphs of the shiftability view emphasized by Mehrling (2011) are a
counterpart of the development of the capital markets. The shift in the approach to bank liquidity – from the
commercial loans view according to which liquidity is assured by cash flows of the ultimate borrower to
the shiftability view in which liquidity depends on the state of the capital markets – then becomes just a
particular aspect of a broader transformation of the concept of liquidity associated with a rise of the capital
markets.
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market liquidity – the one substituting active capitalists’ debt to himself (own capital) by
equity shares.
From the perspective of the present study the two approaches to IPOs – as a
mechanism of raising funds and of obtaining liquidity – have a grain of truth to them, but
neither of them goes to the heart of the matter. Given that capitalists’ most general
objective is making profit, a useful way to think about IPOs raison d’être is profit
extraction. This approach nests the two explanations above as its particular aspects.
First, if IPOs are seen as a mechanism for extraction of an immediate gain
(founder’s profit), it becomes less surprising that in the majority of cases firms going
public have no need to raise funds. At the same time, the desire to extract founder’s profit
is not at odds with the need to raise funds, which occasionally accompanies IPOs. In
addition to founder’s profit, an IPO followed by business expansion can be a source for
profit making in the future.
Second, a conversion of sunk capital into money is a necessary mechanism of
founder’s profit extraction, and in this sense the liquidity-based explanation of IPOs
supplements the argument based on founder’s profit. Nevertheless, the strength of the
approach focusing on profit extraction as a driving force of IPOs lies in its emphasis on
liquidity as a means to an end of profit making, not an end on its own.
Incidentally, even the authors emphasizing the drive of capital to acquire a liquid
form have hints indicating their appreciation of the profit motive behind it. For example,
Navin and Sears (1955, p. 127) argue “the trump card was immediate liquidity at a price
the owners probably never imagined their stock to be worth”. The independent
promoters’ “ambition was to make quick profits from ripening opportunities” (Navin,
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Sears 1955, p. 130). Lazonick (1992, p. 463, 477) also suggests that IPOs in general is a
form of rewarding the new venturers. This form of remuneration has acquired a particular
significance in the course of “financialization of venture capital” which became more like
the money management business (Lazonick 1992, p. 479). For Lazonick (2007, p. 1006),
“the prospect of a quick and lucrative IPO or private sale has generated too much of an
inducement to venture creation at the ultimate expense of the speculating public. The
dot.com boom of the late 1990s was particularly problematic because of the extent to
which US households had become active participants in the highly liquid stock markets”.
If founder’s profit is an end of IPOs, what explains the possibility of its
systematic extraction? Founder’s profit is often associated with fraud and asymmetric
information between insiders and outsiders. This explanation is often identified with
Veblen (1904, p. 29-30, 77-80) who put a lot of emphasis on these factors (Wray 2009, p.
812, Bolbol, Lovewell 2001, p. 533-534). Fraudulent practices have always played an
important role in IPOs bidding up founder’s profit, since the days of Jay Gould, Daniel
Drew, and James Fisk in the late 19th century, when they bought control of a railroad, loot
its assets, and sell out before the damage became known by the general public (Kotz
1978, p. 28). Nevertheless, if fraud and misinformation were the only sources of the
founder’s profit, how could one explain the fact that founder’s profit existed even when
fraud and misinformation were ruled out? Navin and Sears (1955, p. 123, 132-133) argue
that in the early days of IPOs and mergers the shares were distributed mainly among
capitalists themselves who had skills and knowledge of business. Among the buyers of
securities were often commercial distributors of an enterprise going public. Although the
chances of fraud and information asymmetry were thus minimized, founder’s profit was
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still present. It suggests that differences in expectations about the earning capacity cannot
be the only or a key reason behind the market capitalization systematically exceeding the
capital invested, hence, nor can fraud and information manipulation.104 Therefore, fraud
and misinformation, as important as they are, cannot be a conceptual starting point of
analysis. The origin of founder’s profit should be sought elsewhere, after which fraud and
misinformation can be brought into an analysis as symptoms of a deeper structural
problem and as additional factors further raising founder’s profit.105 In fact, Veblen
(1904, p. 62, 68-76) was well aware of this fact, and in his study of founder’s profit he
singled out factors other than fraud making founder’s profit possible. These other factors
however were not appreciated enough by many of his followers.
This is when Hilferding’s insight becomes relevant. He aims to replace the moral
judgment by an economic explanation of founder’s profit which for him is “not itself a
swindle, although it certainly makes swindles possible” (Hilferding 1910, chap. 7). He
treats founder’s profit as a specific economic category by focusing on factors that cannot
as a rule be prevented by law and rather require a more profound change in the way the
economy operates. He argued when an enterprise is incorporated, its mode of valuation
changes. The flow of value that is expected to be generated is no longer confronted by an
active capitalist whose place is taken by a lender who requires a rate of interest on his
investment which stands below the rate of profit. This difference in the rates of return
104

At the same time, the limits to funder’s profit from distributing securities among capitalists offer reasons
why the capitalist class in its pursuit to increase this profit would be interested in drawing in general public
in purchasing securities.
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An emphasis on factors other than fraud and misinformation as the key source of founder’s profit is
important because it suggests this profit can not be eliminated by tighter legislation, better information
dissemination, and fraud prevention measures. This profit arises due to structural characteristics of the
modern business organization and therefore elimination or reduction of this profit would require a
structural reform.
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allows the founder to appropriate a part of the money-lender’s loanable capital. This
raises a question why would an investor accept a lower rate of return?
One explanation would be the difference in risk borne by an active capitalist and
an investor. The risks for a lender are lower than the risks for an active capitalist due to
seniority of debt obligations, whereas an active capitalist is a residual claimant on profits
produced. This however cannot explain why an investor would require a rate of return
below the profit rate, because in fact upon incorporation a shareholder becomes a residual
claimant whose risks are identical with risks of an active capitalist.
Another explanation would be liquidity premium. A process of incorporation
converts illiquid assets tied up in production into marketable securities. Thus, investors
would accept a lower rate of return than individual active capitalists because the assets of
the former are more liquid than the assets of the latter. A problem with this argument is
that although there is indeed a difference in liquidity which can explain some of the
difference in the required rates of return, it does not explain on which grounds it is a
founder of an enterprise, a promoter, and an investment banker who appropriate this
liquidity premium. Although an IPO converts an illiquid asset into liquid, the liquidity of
the asset stems not from the act of IPO itself, but rather from existence of the market in
securities and a group of investors. Therefore, even though some of the difference in the
rates of return could be explained by the difference in liquidity, there still remains a
conflict between the public nature of liquidity and the private appropriation of its
benefits.106
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If an IPO were to be handled by a public agency, as opposed to a private profit-seeking institution (an
investment bank), founder’s profit stemming from a difference in liquidity would be a public gain
belonging to all the people.
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This leaves us with another explanation of the origin of founder’s profit, which
seems to offer a better mileage in understanding this form of profit. Shareholders accept a
rate of return below the profit rate because they lack control over business enterprise.
Control over business enterprise is therefore the key difference between the social status
of shareholders and individual capitalists running an enterprise they own. In the 19th
century capitalism an individual capitalist invested in a process of production and
retained control over it. A genesis of the corporate form of business organization
separated ownership and control, as was first stressed by Berle and Means (1932).
Ownership has become a basis of sharing in the gains of enterprise, and control – “the
power to determine the broad policies guiding a corporation” (Kotz 1978, p. 15). The
separation of ownership and control poses a question: Who controls a modern business
enterprise? There are three answers to this question – managers, owners, and financial
institutions (Kotz 1978, p. 2-12).107 For the present purposes, what matters is that a lack
of control over business enterprise by the ultimate shareholders is a basis for their
accepting a rate of return on investment below the profit rate, in spite of the shareholders
having in principle the same property rights as an individual capitalist before
incorporation. It is therefore a lack of control that forms a basis for a wealth transfer in
the form of founder’s profit.
Founder’s profit reveals the role of control in capitalism, although in a new form
peculiar to the corporate form of business organization. In the 19th century capitalism,
with its unity of ownership and control, workers’ lack of control over means of
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Kotz (1978) emphasized the financial control over corporations by banks – an argument particularly
important for understanding the grounds on which banks share in founder’s profit. One can argue, in
addition to banks, managers and majority shareholders also have some control over business enterprise.
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production was a foundation of a transfer of a part of value created by them in favor of
capitalists (surplus value). With a separation of ownership and control, shareholders’ lack
of control over decision making and cash flows of a corporation has become a foundation
of wealth redistribution through differences in the rates of return. In capitalism in general,
control enables profit making. In a corporate form of capitalism, control enables
extraction of profit of a particular type, namely, founder’s profit which is shared among
all the agents and institutions exercising control over corporation. A peculiar
characteristic of founder’s profit is that it hinges on control over enterprise at a moment
of financial transaction – selling shares through an IPO. Retaining control over time is
irrelevant for an extraction of this gain. Therefore, control gets divorced from its usual
meaning of a medium- to long-run phenomenon, which was typical of the 19th century
capitalism.
Control becomes a basis of extraction of a particular form of profit (founder’s
profit) and of a broader economic and political power. Control over enterprise allows for
three concrete mechanisms of extraction of founder’s profit – a difference in power
resulting in a difference in the required rates of return, fraud, and information asymmetry.
An opportunity of extraction of founder’s profit, with its lump sum character preventing a
repeated relationship between insiders and outsiders, makes the corporate form of
business organization particularly susceptible to fraudulent practices. On the other hand,
an emphasis on control as the root source of founder’s profit reveals that although
fighting with fraud and asymmetric information could reduce founder’s profit, it would
not eliminate it, as long as the difference in power of insiders and outsiders remains
intact.
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Founder’s profit represents a redistribution of the investors’ assets on the basis of
the capitalist’s control over enterprise. Thus, insiders “lock in the gains” at the expense of
the outsiders, as argued by Lazonick (2007, p. 1006, 1010), through having a privileged
access to new shares and selling them at a gain.108 Rightly stressing the role of income
redistribution form outsiders to insiders, Lazonick nevertheless overlooks the possibility
of redistribution of stocks of monetary wealth which has a broader social significance
than just a redistribution of the currently produced output. In spite of this relevant
omission, this approach leads Lazonick (2007, p. 1011) to a powerful conclusion that the
insiders’ behavior should be theorized not as short-termism, as often alleged, but rather as
“the self-interested pursuit of personal financial gain by those in positions of strategic
control”.
Founder’s profit generated through an IPO takes a number of forms. First, it is an
excess of the funds raised through an IPO over the amount of capital invested shared
among a founder and venture capitalist, promoter, investment banks, and even employees
having an equity stake in the form of stock options. This is the classic case considered by
Hilferding. Second, often some shares are retained by stockholders after an enterprise
goes public, allowing for a subsequent realization of a part of founder’s profit. In light of
the empirical evidence that IPOs are often underpriced, a subsequent increase in stock
prices offers an additional source of founder’s profit taking the form of realized capital
gains.
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Blaug (1996 [1962], p. 467, emphasis in the original) argued “the great mystery of the modern theory of
distribution is why anyone regards the share of wages and profits as an interesting problem”. His point is
too strong, yet it is indicative of a real issue, namely, the rising complexity of the class structure in modern
capitalism. One aspect of this rising complexity is the replacement of profit of an individual active
capitalist by founder’s profit associated with a rise of the capital markets, which calls for a modification of
the classical political economy analysis of income distribution.
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Although extraction of founder’s profit is taken to be the raison d’être of IPOs,
this form of profit making requires a conversion of illiquid sunk capital into liquid
marketable securities as a means towards this end. The fact that raising funds for business
expansion is a special case, and in general IPOs merely convert the already existing
assets into a liquid form has important implications for the nature of liquidity provided.
IPOs are about market liquidity, not funding liquidity. They are facilitated by a change in
form of liabilities of a firm (market liquidity), with funding for business expansion being
an occasional supplement to it (funding liquidity).
Given that one of the core functions of the banking business – both commercial
and investment banking – is liquidity provision through swapping promises to pay, it
makes banks well suited to facilitate IPOs. The history of industrial IPOs in the US shows
that although initially they were led by promoters and brokers, investment banks
subsequently took over this function to resolve the limits inherent to IPOs led by
promoters and brokers.109 In particular, investment banks provided the foundation of trust
which in turn was necessary for raising funds.110
The continuity between commercial and investment banking comes from the same
core function of liquidity provision and from both forms of banking emerging to resolve
the limits of the spontaneous liquidity provision among industrial and commercial
capitalists themselves. Moreover, both types of banks initially emerged to provide market
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This process has a historical and logical parallel in bank credit emerging to resole the limits of
commercial credit.
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After 1900 the distinction between commercial and investment banking in the US became blurred, as
big commercial banks formed securities affiliates to handle the floating of new shares and bond issues
(Kotz 1978, p. 35-39). The commercial banks’ share of the business grew in the 1920s, until it was banned
by Glass-Steagall.
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liquidity. Commercial banks did it through substituting bills of exchange and IOUs by
cash or banknotes on the asset side of capitalists’ balance sheets. Investment banks did it
through substituting own capital by equity shares on the liability side of capitalists’
balance sheets.
Behind this continuity there is, however, discontinuity. Over time, commercial
banks came to specialize in credit provision, thus, in funding liquidity. They do it by
lending backed by collecting temporarily idle hoards and by creating own liabilities. In
both cases, funding liquidity provided by banks involves their acquiring liabilities of the
same amount. By contrast, investment banks specialize in provision of market liquidity.
Thus, investment banks acquire liabilities equal to the amount of liquidity provided only
for a short time period between they underwrite securities and distribute them among
investors. They also acquire liabilities to hold inventories of securities to be able to make
markets in them.111
The idea that investment banking is a form of banking in some ways similar to
commercial banking is recognized not only by a Marxist theory of banking, but by all
approaches grounded in the bills view. For instance, it is not always appreciated that
Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 256) also stressed that “the fundamental banking activity is
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This take on the difference between commercial banking and investment banking as the difference in the
type of liquidity provided substantially differs from a common argument about investment banks not being
really banks. This approach, which possibly took its roots in the legal separation between the two forms of
banking initially proposed by Brandeis in 1914 and institutionalized by the Glass-Steagall Act in the US in
1933, has got its second birth in the aftermath of the recent crisis and took the form of discussions about the
need to recreate this separation. According to a view developed here, such an approach is misleading,
because it mistakes the legal differences that are furthermore specific to a particular country in a particular
time period for the differences in the economic content of the two forms of banking. This does not deny the
significance of the difference between the two institutions that arises from commercial bank deposits being
insured by the government. The existence of deposit insurance makes commercial banks more likely to take
on higher risks, including the ones associated with investment banking activities, than they would have in
the absence of such insurance.
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accepting, that is, guaranteeing that some party is creditworthy”. He was very clear that
“the line between commercial banks, whose liabilities include checking deposits, other
depository thrift institutions, miscellaneous managers of money (like insurance
companies, pension funds, and various investment trusts), and investment bankers is
more reflective of the legal environment and institutional history than of the economic
function of these financial institutions” (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 249). More recently, this
idea was restated and further developed by Kregel (2010, p. 7), for whom banking
business is a unity of safekeeping of deposits and liquidity creation for borrowers. On
these grounds he concludes that both commercial and investment banks provide liquidity
albeit do it in different ways. Hence, these two forms of banking are “functionally
equivalent” (Kregel 2010, p. 9).
The change in the function of banking associated with provision of market
liquidity, as opposed to funding liquidity, has important implications for the character of
bank revenues and profits. When a bank provides credit and holds the corresponding
asset on its balance sheet, its revenue comes from the cash flows of the borrower. An
important common feature of discounting as the rudimentary form of banking and
commercial banking as its more developed form is a character of profit. Namely, in both
cases bank revenue arises from interest payments made by the ultimate borrower. These
revenues are then used to cover the operating costs of the banking business and to pay
interest on bank liabilities, with the remainder constituting bank profit. Thus, bank profit
arises from income of the ultimate borrower. For example, when a borrower is
commercial or industrial capitalist, bank profit comes from subdividing commercial or
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industrial profit, respectively.112 Incidentally, such a take on the source of bank profit
does not make a Marxist theory unique. A similar understanding can also be found in
both heterodox and mainstream theories that treat interest paid by banks as a form of
sharing in revenue. For example, Schumpeter (1961 [1911/1934], p. 158, 201) argued
that interest on demand deposits should be understood as banks’ sharing their premium
with depositors – a view later adopted by Bossone (2001b, p. 2266, 2003, p. 156) and
Parguez (2004, p. 32). From a mainstream perspective, this view is supported, for
instance, by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001b, 2001a). Obviously, this approach is also
reflected in accounting practices and income statements.
By contrast to commercial banking, when a bank facilitates an IPO, it shares in
the founder’s profit. Thus, bank fees from underwriting equity shares represent a
particular form of financial profit due to the gap between the two sets of prices of capital
and, therefore, in the first instance come from redivision of monetary assets of the
ultimate investors. It was argued above that control over enterprise forms a basis for
extraction of founder’s profit. Kotz (1978, p. 8, 20, 26) stresses banks’ control over
sources of capital forms the original basis of financial control of banks over enterprise. 113
Therefore, banks’ control over IPO can be seen as a basis for banks’ sharing in founder’s
profit. A take on founder’s profit as resulting from the gap between the two sets of prices
of capital goods can shed some light on bank revenues for secondary equity issues and
bond flotation. From a firm’s perspective, acquisition of this type of liabilities, unlike
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Considering lending to industrial and commercial capitalists, Marx treats interest as a form of
subdivision of surplus value, which makes interest received by banks a particular case of this subdivision.
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Kotz (1978, p. 20, 64) stresses that the main basis of financial control of financial institutions over
nonfinancial corporations has shifted over time from supply of capital in the late 19 th century to holding of
stock in 1946-74.
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IPOs, is not driven by the motive of founder’s profit extraction. It is rather used to raise
additional funds (funding liquidity), or change capital structure of an enterprise by
substituting one form of liabilities by another (market liquidity). Nevertheless, from a
bank’s perspective, floating bonds and secondary equity issues are similar to IPOs. They
involve the same set of skills on the part of banks and, therefore, result in the same form
of profit from the macroeconomic perspective, namely, profit from redistribution of
monetary assets of the ultimate investors.
The transition from commercial to investment banking therefore involves a
transformation of the character of bank revenues that is more profound than the related
transformation of bank function that at its core remains liquidity provision. This “paradox
of the turn” – from commercial to investment banking – explains why the social
significance of this transformation cannot be fully captured by a focus only on the
functions provided by banks. The character of bank revenues can be a useful lens for a
more complete understanding of this transformation. A Marxist theory of banking
discussed in chapter 4 is well suited to capture and explain this paradox of the turn. Its
being grounded in the bills view allows it to recognize the continuity of the banking
functions, while its emphasis on the sources of profit that comes from the classical
political economy makes this theory of banking sensitive to the transformation of the
character of bank revenues and profits.

5.7.2. Profit from Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)
A more developed form of profit associated with a gap between the two sets of
prices of capital is profit from mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are
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buying and selling of bundles of capital assets and market positions as embodied in firms
and parts of firms. Historically the first merger wave swept the US at the same time as
incorporation, at the end of the 19th century.114 Underwriting should however be seen as a
logical origin of mergers, because, first, a merger involves issuing equity shares as claims
on future revenues of an enterprise, with a difference from an IPO being that this
enterprise is a newly created entity consisting of at least two previously independent
firms. Second, even though historically IPOs and mergers developed at around the same
time, and some mergers were among non-incorporated enterprises, the majority of
modern mergers are among the already incorporated businesses. Finally, from a bank’s
perspective, at least in the US, historically banks came to facilitate industrial mergers
only after having facilitated industrial IPOs and recapitalizations (Navin, Sears 1955, p.
124). In fact it took some time for the investment banks leading railroad underwriting to
underwrite securities financing the mergers, which they started doing only after having
witnessed successes of individual promoters and to some extent to resolve the limitations
faced by mergers led by promoters. Investment banks came to play an important role in
railroad consolidation in the 1890s, and in industrial mergers – only after 1898, with J.P.
Morgan’s formation of Federal Steel (Kotz 1978, p. 32). For all these reasons, an analysis
of incorporation and market for claims emerging with it should precede an analysis of
mergers. Purchasing individual equities and bonds lays the foundation for purchasing
entire lines of business, which should be reflected in the second set of prices. Minsky (see
also Minsky 1993, p. 11, 1986, p. 348) was well aware of this fact, when he argued that
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“the starting point for bids on existing firms is the market valuation of the equity and debt
liabilities”.
There are several approaches to why M&A exist, not the least because different
participants of the deal – manufacturers, financiers, investors – enter it for different
reasons and with various motives. The dominant view explains the existence of M&A
through the benefits of the market for corporate control as an institution determining
investment strategies. This view was for the first time articulated by Jensen (1986, 1989).
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Alternatively, second, M&A are treated as a mechanism for controlling or alleviating

competition. Third, M&A can be driven by a desire to cash in by the stakeholders of the
acquired firm. This is, for instance, an explanation of the merger wave in 1895-1904 in
the US by Lamoreaux (1985) who argues that stakeholders wanted liquidity as they tried
to escape intensified price competition. This argument is analogous to one of the two
common explanations of IPOs. Fourth, merger can allow for rationalization of production
resulting in higher future profits.
Although these approaches to the existence of M&A capture some of the specific
motives behind the merger deals, it is useful to shift the focus to profit extraction as a
more general raison d’être of M&A. Mergers can allow for an increase in revenues in the
future. More important however is the ability of M&A to yield profits now on the basis of
an anticipated future gain and thus to lock in a gain, no matter whether the expected
future gain will actually exist. Chandler (1977, p. 332) emphasizes the profit motive
behind the historical origin of mergers arguing that “both manufacturers and financiers
quickly learned how to profit from the actual process of legal consolidation” that swept
115
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the US in the 1890s. An important aspect of mergers is that they “often brought shortterm gains” regardless of their being primarily driven by this gain or attempts to control
competition (Chandler 1977, p. 339). A significance of the profit motive in the historical
origin of mergers is obvious in the case of formation of the United States Steel
Corporation. J.P. Morgan carried out the deal by consolidating three basic steel
companies to form Federal Steel and subsequently buying out the Carnegie Steel
Company and most of the remainder of the steel industry in the US. While the tangible
assets of United States Steel were estimated at $682 million, $1321 million of stock and
bonds were sold to the public, resulting in lucrative founder’s profit (Kotz 1978, p. 3233). According to Lazonick (1992, p. 466), the motive of profit extraction also drove the
conglomeration movement in the US in the 1960-70s.116 Similarly, if leveraged buy-outs
(LBOs) in the first half of the 1980s were defensive – to protect companies from the
market for corporate control – in the second half of the 1980s they became offensive and
were also motivated by profit extraction (Lazonick 1992, p. 472).117 In both cases the
market for corporate control has become a source of financial profit for managers
(Lazonick 1992, p. 464, 473) and other insiders. This is in line with an argument
proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003, p. 296) for whom mergers are “a form of
arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient markets”. An important aspect of
Shleifer and Vishny’s theory is that both the acquirer and the target managers profit by
getting rid of overvalued equity. There is plenty of empirical evidence suggesting these
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In this context it is not surprising the conglomeration wave of the 1960s resulted in dissolution of a third
of the new conglomerates in the 1970s (Lazonick 1992, p. 461, 469).
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Thus, paradoxically, the very mechanism of control of the market for corporate control later became a
mechanism of reinstatement of this same market (Lazonick 1992, p. 473).
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gains come at the short-term expense of shareholders of the acquiring firm and possibly
also long-term expense of shareholders of the targeted firm and other stockholders.118
A representative critique of an approach to M&A through the lens of profit
extraction can be found in Lamoreaux (1985, p. 114) who argues that "it is unlikely,
therefore, that many consolidations were formed solely for the purpose of promoters'
profits; real economic hardship underlay most manufacturers' willingness to sell out". But
even her approach can be nested as a particular case of the profit-driven behavior,
therefore, her criticism of the promoter's profit argument is unnecessarily strong.119 At
the heart of her argument is not so much the motive to cash in as such, but rather the
underlying competitive pressure and associated threat of losses. Viewed from this angle,
her main thesis acquires a different meaning and becomes a particular case of a profitdriven behavior, the opposite side of which is loss aversion.
Gains from M&A have some similarity with founder’s profit. In both cases a
financial reorganization results in a new enterprise whose market valuation increases. In
the case of M&A, a gain would exist whenever the present value of the combined
enterprises exceeds the sum of their individual net present values. There is, however, an
important difference between founder’s profit and gains from M&A. Founder’s profit
arises due to shareholders’ lack of control over enterprise, which translates into
differences in the rates of return, with the gain often being magnified by information
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By the same token, Lamoreaux (1985, p. 116) underestimates the role of the capital markets in the
merger wave by treating them as auxiliary, as opposed to the driving force behind the mergers. Such an
approach misses the point that without the capital markets the merger wave would not have been possible
in principle. Before Lamoreaux, Kotz (1978, p. 24) offered an effective counterargument to perspectives
akin to hers stressing that “in an abstract economic model it is often assumed that purchases and sales take
place effortlessly and directly. In actual history complex institutions may develop to facilitate market
transactions”.

200

manipulation and fraud. There is no change in the expected stream of future profit. By
contrast, gains from M&A stem from an increase in the expected future profits of the two
enterprises combined. This can be due to economies of scale, eliminating inefficiencies,
achievement of market power as seller and/or monopsony power as buyer, economies of
vertical integration, benefits of access to free cash flows of another enterprise, and other
possible advantages. In spite of the difference between founder’s profit and profit from
M&A, an important similarity is that both gains come from an increase in the current
valuation of a reorganized enterprise, which opens an opportunity for a lump-sum gain.
This gain accrues to institutions and individuals having control over the enterprises under
reorganization and to institutions facilitating this process (e.g., investment banks).
Coming from the monetary assets of the buyers of securities of a reorganized enterprise,
gain from M&A also constitutes a form of “profit upon alienation”.
Similar to underwriting, mergers and acquisitions require liquidity. The targeted
firm demands liquidity either in the form of cash or explicit or implicit guarantee of
liquidity of the equity shares with which the targeted firm is purchased. This makes banks
well suited for the business of facilitating M&A through providing access to credit for the
acquiring firm and through creating the foundation of trust necessary for distributing the
shares. This function performed by investment banks today also corresponds to the actual
historical origin of banks’ involvement in the business of M&A. For instance, Navin and
Sears (1955, p. 137-138) emphasized the inherent weaknesses of the mergers led by
individual promoters thus forcing banks to enter the business:
“By the very nature of their operation the merger promoters did not provide the
funds necessary for an expanding industry and they could not, because of their
limited capital resources, guarantee to the issuing companies the funds which a
new issue of securities was intended to raise. The financial men who had been
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accustomed to raising new funds on a guaranteed basis were the investment
bankers, and it was to them that industry eventually turned”.
Investment banks are however not merely passive facilitators of M&A. Already in
the late 19th century investment banks’ control over sources of capital has resulted in their
control over nonfinancial businesses which in turn allowed investment banks to become
active promoters of business consolidation (Kotz 1978, p. 30, 140). In 1898-1903 and in
the 1960s investment banks played a crucial role in encouraging, advising, planning, and
carrying out industrial mergers. This is not surprising in the context of theories of
banking discussed in chapter 4 viewing banks as active enterprises as opposed to passive
intermediaries.
On the grounds of facilitating M&A banks share in the total gain associated with
M&A. Bank revenues from M&A can therefore be seen as a form of profit analogous to
founder’s profit. These revenues come in the form of fees to finding merger partners, for
providing advice regarding the deal and financing the merger, and for managing tender
offers. Fees for M&A are an important source of revenues for investment banks. For
example, in 2003 in the US investment banks facilitated M&A transactions worth $386
billion and received fees that exceeded $596 million (Walter, Yawson & Yeung 2008, p.
342). In 2008 investment banks received $44 billion worldwide in fees for facilitating
M&A, with $12.5 billion captured by six largest investment banks in the US, led by
Goldman Sachs at $3.1 billion (DiNapoli 2008, p. 6). Minsky (2008 [1986], p. 220)
seems to be aware of the peculiar character of gains from M&A when he argued that “the
income of Wall Street operators in the mergers and acquisitions business is part of
national income and output. Thus, while the meaning of the above is clear, it is not
technically correct. In our type of economy, there is a peculiar output called mergers and
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acquisitions… The “golden parachutes” of the 1980s yield “incomes” that are hard to
relate to the standard economic view of incomes”.

5.7.3. Securitization, or Investment Banking for Banking
Securitization has attracted a lot of attention, especially over the past few years
when it has often been presented as a major change in banking. The literature has been
exploding with descriptions of fraud and other malpractices involved in it, in many ways
bringing back the spirit of Veblen. Nevertheless, these important and valid concerns do
not go to the heart of the matter.
Securitization is a process of bundling loans and selling them to special purpose
vehicles (SPVs), bookkeeping entities created by banks. SPVs use these loans as
collateral to issue long term bonds sold to institutional and individual investors. From a
bank’s perspective, securitization is one of the many forms of funding the banking
business. Unlike deposit taking and other forms of liability management, securitization
results in removing loans from the bank balance sheets. For the ultimate borrower,
securitization is not associated with a qualitative change in credit relations, as the
borrower still has to repay the principal and the interest to the loan originator who would
subsequently distribute the collected funds to the bond holders. Nevertheless,
securitization is normally accompanied by lower borrowing costs and in this sense is
beneficial for the borrower. For the ultimate lender, holding an asset backed security
(ABS) issued by SPV is equivalent to holding any other security.
There are two forms of revenue associated with securitization, namely, first, profit
from the loan sale due to a rise in the value of the loan and, second, profit from servicing
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loans. A number of empirical studies have established a growing size of securitization
income. For instance, Inklaar and Wang (2007, p. 33-34) showed that securitization
income increased as a share of the US bank output from 1.2 per cent in 1990 to 11.4 per
cent in 2004. The average annual real growth rate of securitization income also rose from
0.6 per cent in 1987-1995 to 4.1 per cent in 1995-2004. In the second time period it
became the fastest growing fee-generating activity of commercial banks, followed by
investment banking with its growth rate of only 1.1 per cent. The share of securitized
loans went up from 10 percent to 40 percent of total loans. Ashcraft and Steindel (2008)
used another methodology120 of imputing bank output and found that securitization
revenue amounted to 10.63 and 11.95 per cent of the US bank output in 2001 and 2006,
respectively. Securitization output of the US bank holding companies constituted 14.65
per cent of their total output in 2006.
This rise in securitization income poses a question of what this rise signifies.
From the mainstream perspective, bank profits from securitization are explained as a
form of remuneration for the service provided by banks. A bank originating a loan
receives profit from the loan sale due to a rise in the value of the loan. This profit is
explained through the benefits of diversification. An SPV also receives profit for
servicing a loan, namely, collecting payments from the ultimate borrower and passing
them onto the ultimate lender.
This approach represents an accurate description of the specific services provided
by a bank and an SPV. Nevertheless, it leaves two important issues unaddressed. First,
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Ashcraft and Steindel advocate for the usual methodology of imputing bank output that, unlike Basu,
Inklaar and Wang (2008) and later studies based on their approach, treats risk taking as a service provided
by banks.
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under which circumstances do the services provided in the course of securitization
become possible? Second, what are the macroeconomic sources of profit from
securitization? For instance, do they differ from the macroeconomic sources of, say, net
interest? These questions usually lie beyond the scope of the prevalent approaches to
securitization, hence, answering these questions requires a different theoretical
framework.
Minsky has important insights that can shed some light on the issue. He noticed
that securitization is associated with a fundamental transformation of the nature of bank
profit. He was very clear that “in securitization, the underlying financial instruments
[such as home mortgage loans] and the cash flows they are expected to generate are the
proximate basis for issuing marketable paper. Income from paper (cash flows) is
substituted for the profits earned by real assets, household incomes, or tax receipts as the
source of the cash flow to support the paper pledges” (Minsky 2008 [1987], p. 4). Minsky
has not elaborated on this statement, and the subsequent heterodox literature on
securitization has not addressed the important question of the related change in the bank
profit. This is obviously not to deny that this literature has noticed other aspects of the
transformation of banking associated with securitization.
The central bankers and regulators (e.g, Bernanke 2008, Knight 2008, Mishkin
2008) often identify the ‘originate-to-distribute’ view as one of the dominant factors of
the crisis that started in 2007. The usual argument stresses a decline in the underwriting
standards due to incentive problems of the originators whose revenues depend on the
volume of the loans extended and not on their quality. If in line with the informationtheoretic approach banking is understood as the business of solving information
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problems, the shift to the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model undermines the core of the
banking business. As a response to that, there have emerged approaches to banking
aiming to show that securitized banking is still banking at core. This argument is usually
based on viewing banking as a business of creating informationally-insensitive debt
(Gorton 2009, p. 3-4, 14), or of credit, maturity and liquidity transformation (Pozsar et al.
2010, p. 8).121 Which of the two approaches is more adequate? Both, as each perspective
has a grain of truth.
On the one hand, the mainstream theorists are right that shadow banking is still a
form of banking, although for reasons other than the ones they propose.122 It was
established above that banking should be understood as a unity of liquidity provision and
an exchange of promises to pay. Whether loans are securitized or not, banks still provide
liquidity for the ultimate borrowers. The shadow banking system also provides liquidity
to the ultimate lenders – holders of ABS – through making markets in these securities.
Therefore, shadow banks do perform the function of liquidity provision for both
borrowers and lenders. Similar to the underwriting function of investment banks, in the
case of securitization, the exchange of promises to pay is replaced by a promise to make
markets, reinforced by the credit rating agencies that function as trust enhancers. Finally,
in some cases, securitization involves the exchange of promises to pay proper. This
happens when banks provide contingent guarantees to buy back an ABS if its market
price falls below a certain level. In this sense the argument often found in the literature
that the originate-to-distribute model undermines the essence of banking business is
121
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The analytical strengths of a Marxist take on banking compared to other approaches to banking,
including those by Gorton (2009) and Pozsar et al. (2010), were discussed in a greater detail in chapter 4.
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misleading, because it is based on a conflation of a particular form of banking with
banking in general. Hence, this argument also cannot provide a strong critique of the
mainstream thesis that shadow banking is still a form of banking.
On the other hand, the changes in banking noticed in the heterodox literature are
important. However, in order to retain the rational kernel of the approaches focusing on
these changes, it is necessary to shift the axes of the discussion. Similar to the “paradox
of the turn” from commercial to investment banking, the role of the changes associated
with securitization is best retained if they are analyzed through the lens of what these
trends imply for the character of bank profit and implications thereof. Approached in this
way, the problem with securitization is not that it undermines the functions of banking,
but rather that it is associated with a fundamental shift in the character of bank profit. The
banking function of liquidity provision indeed remains relatively unaltered, as rightly
stressed by the mainstream, but it can co-exist with an incommensurable transformation
of the nature of bank profit, which is usually overlooked in the literature. Thus, the
paradox of the turn from commercial to investment banking reemerges in the context of
securitization.
The theoretical framework hinging on the dual price system of capital goods
suggested above can be useful for conceptualizing profit from securitization. A starting
point of analysis is to locate securitization in the development of forms of banking.123
Lapavitsas (2009, p. 135) suggested that securitization can be seen as “adoption of
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fundamental banking act of accepting contingent liabilities.
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investment-banking techniques” by commercial banks, which turns “lending (to earn
interest) into mediating the circulation of securities (to earn fees)” (Lapavitsas 2009, p.
136). Turner (2010, p. 13) has a related insight when he argues that securitization is not a
new function of the financial sector, but rather an application of the functions of the
financial sector – pooling assets, transformation of risk-return characteristics of assets,
maturity transformation, and market making through trading – to a new class of assets,
with a finer degree of differentiation of these functions. Securitization can be thought of
as a shift from commercial to investment banking considered above, but this time applied
to the banking business itself. That is, like investment banks providing liquidity to
industrial capitalists by floating claims on the flows of value that would be produced by
these capitalists, securitization emerged as a mechanism of liquidity provision to banks
themselves by floating claims on their future revenues – interest received on loans. A
shift to securitization is akin to investment banking applied to commercial banking itself.
On these grounds one can use insights from an analysis of founder’s profit to understand
securitization revenue.
First, like founder’s profit, securitization revenue has a structured and mediated
nature. When loans are bundled and sold to investors, the revenues received by a bank
and an SPV come directly from loanable capital of the ultimate investors who in turn
receive a claim on future revenue. If expected payments materialize, investors’ loanable
capital would be restored with an increment. In that sense, bank profit from securitization
would ultimately bear a relationship to the payments by the ultimate borrower. If these
payments, however, do not materialize as expected, securitization profit would come
from a pure redistribution of loanable capital of the ultimate investors. Like in the case of
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founder’s profit in general, at the moment of accrual, profit from securitization comes
from the loanable capital of the ultimate investors, as rightly stressed by Itoh (1988, p.
287). And only after investors’ loanable capital being restored, founder’s profit can prove
to have a relationship to the future flows of value, stressed by Hilferding (1910), or
remain a pure Itoh-like redistribution, if the payments do not materialize. This is why
Minsky (2008 [1987], p. 4) was right to stress a fundamental transformation of bank
profit in the course of securitization, although he did not recognize that this is merely a
particular case of profit exhibiting a structured and mediated nature.
The difference between profit from securitization and founder’s profit consists in
the nature of the future flows of value that are expected to restore the loanable capital of
the ultimate investor. In the case of floating shares of industrial capitalists, these future
flows are the surplus value produced through exploitation of labor. In the case of
securitization, these flows are interest payments and the principal associated with the
bank lending. That is, unlike surplus value, these flows are further removed from the
process of production and linked to the credit relations. Depending on the type of the
borrower, these interest payments can come from surplus value (in the case of lending to
industrial capitalists), wage income (lending to workers), or tax revenue (lending to the
state).124
Second, even when payments to the ultimate investors materialize as expected,
the profit from securitization, like the founder’s profit, is associated with a difference in
the rates of return. In that sense even a fully mediated profit retains a predatory element
of profit upon alienation.
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And indeed, empirical studies of securitization in the US and Europe confirm that
the coupon on ABS is normally lower than the average interest rate on the underlying
assets.125 For instance, Xu and Fung (2005, p. 405, Table 2) showed that in 1988-2001
the ratio of the weighted average coupon rate of the MBS mortgage pool to the 30-year
mortgage rate has 0.97 mean and 0.96 median, implying that on average the coupon on
MBS is systematically lower than the interest on underlying securities.126 It is consistent
with the time series for Ginnie Mae ARM coupon and 30 year mortgage rate in 19862000 (Fabozzi 2001). The same result holds for the 2000s. As shown by Colangelo and
Inklaar (2010, p. 18, Figure 3), interest margin between the 4-year ABS/MBS and 1-5
year housing loans in the euro area was systematically positive from January 2003 till
June 2008, and turned negative only in 2008 – after the outbreak of the crisis. Basu,
Inklaar and Wang (2008, p. 18) found that the interest margin between mortgage loans
and related MBS in the US was 0.8 percent in 2002-2007 and 0.69 using a 5-year moving
average.
This poses a question of the social validation of the discrepancy between the two
rates of return. On which grounds do investors in ABS accept a rate of return below the
interest rate charged by a bank for the underlying loan?
The usual justification is associated with, first, benefits of liquidity due to the
asset being tradable, second, benefits of diversification. Investors can sell an ABS, unlike
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The spread between WAC and the mortgage rate is referred to in the literature as “refinancing
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a bank that used to not be able to sell a loan. The difference in the rates of return can be
thought of as a form of liquidity premium, similar to liquidity premium on equities
compared to the underlying real assets. By the same token, investors acquire an
instrument that is not correlated with their portfolio, hence, can explore benefits of
diversification. Incidentally, given that these are the benefits for investors, not for the
ultimate borrowers, it is not surprising that it is the investors’ loanable capital that
becomes a source of bank profit from securitization.
This type of social justification is well grounded, but it only holds from the
perspective of an individual investor. Viewed from the perspective of the total social
capital, securitization does not generate benefits of either diversification or additional
liquidity. This reveals the conditions under which services associated with securitization
are rendered necessary in an economy. It happens only when there is a gap between the
social nature of capital, on the one hand, and private ownership of individual claims, on
the other hand. Securitization is a means for banks to exploit this gap.127 In the act of
securitization, banks give a truly social nature to a claim by giving it a marketable form
and by subsequently making markets in these claims. At the same time, this act of
socialization involves a private appropriation of benefits associated with it.
The structured and mediated character of profit from securitization has an
important implication. As in the case of underwriting, it is the gap between the
unmediated and mediated character of profit that creates particularly favorable conditions
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for fraud, misinformation, and other bank malpractices all of which has attracted a lot of
attention recently. But it also implies that it is not these practices per se that are the root
of the problem, they are merely symptoms of a deeper transformation of the sources of
bank profit.
To recap, securitization does not involve a fundamental transformation of the core
functions of banking. Nevertheless, it is accompanied by a profound transformation of the
character of bank profits. In this sense the paradox of the turn from commercial to
investment banking re-appears in the context of securitization. It is not surprising, given
that securitization can be understood as investment banking function provided to
commercial banks themselves, as opposed to non-financial corporations and the state. In
spite of different concrete mechanisms of their extraction and apparently different social
justification, profit from securitization and profit from underwriting have a fundamentally
similar nature. Both forms of profit have a structured and mediated character, hence, both
signify banks’ turn to ultimate lenders, not ultimate borrowers, as an immediate source of
their profit. Furthermore, even if the ultimate lenders recover their loanable capital with
an increment, banks’ profit still retains an element of profit upon alienation, because it
hinges on the differences in the rates of return.

5.8. Conclusion
The chapter argues that the distinct conceptualization of capital assets as having
two sets of prices – the market price based on capitalization of the future yield on capital
assets and their reproduction costs – offers limited insights into the patterns of
investment. Nevertheless, such an approach to capital assets is relevant, because the gap
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between the two sets of prices constitutes space for extraction of capital gains – profit of
a peculiar character. The existence and persistence of the gap itself, however, requires an
explanation. Such an explanation boils down to a strategic control of an enterprise by
insiders. A difference in the rates of return – the rate of return on the capital asset itself
and the rate of return required by the outsiders – is a concrete mechanism facilitating
transfers of monetary assets in favor of insiders. The profit due to the gap between the
two sets of prices is shown to take many forms, among which are profit from initial
public offerings, mergers and acquisitions, and securitization.
It is argued capital gains as a prevalent form of profit presuppose a certain level of
capitalist development. At the same time, paradoxically, this most developed form of
capitalist profit represents a reinstatement of profit upon alienation characteristic of the
pre-capitalist modes of profit-making.
Some of the changes in banking practices can be best understood through the lens
of the character of revenues they generate, because these activities involve a much greater
transformation in the nature of revenues than in functions. Therefore, it is not surprising
the prevalent theories cannot capture the scale of the transformation of banking due to
their focus on functions. Underwriting can be taken as a logical origin of this paradox of
the turn which later reappears in the case of mergers and acquisitions and securitization.
The next chapter will use the two key ideas developed in this chapter, namely,
first, of a peculiar type of profit associated with the functioning of the financial markets
and, second, of the multiplicity of forms taken by these revenues, to examine the
transformation of the bank holding companies in the US since the mid 1980s.
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CHAPTER 6
REVENUES AND PROFITS OF THE US BANK HOLDING COMPANIES:
MULTIPLICITY OF FORMS – UNIFORMITY OF SOURCES
6.1. Introduction
The goal of the present chapter is to show that behind an apparent heterogeneity
of the new banking activities lies a fundamental similarity – a turn to extraction of capital
gain-like revenues. These revenues are in turn associated with wealth transfers from the
ultimate asset holders, including households, in favor of banks and other financial
institutions.
The chapter empirically examines a composition of revenues of the U.S. bank
holding companies (from now on, BHC) in 2001-2010 and shows that behind an increase
in the non-interest income stands a multiplicity of non-traditional banking activities, with
the single largest category being “other non-interest income”. To go beyond such
inconclusiveness of a decomposition of BHC revenues based on the accounting
categories, the chapter deploys a theoretical argument developed in the previous chapter,
namely, the multiplicity of forms taken by profit coming from the gap between the two
sets of prices of capital assets. Chapter 5 argued profit associated with a dual price system
for capital assets takes many forms, among which are founder’s profit, underwriting
revenues, fees from M&A, securitization revenue, and capital and trading gains.
Replacing the accounting categories by the theoretical categories from chapter 5, this
chapter suggests the apparent heterogeneity of the non-traditional banking activities
conceals a dominant principle behind some aspects of the transformation of banking.
Almost a half of the revenues associated with the non-traditional banking activities
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represents capital gain-like income, therefore, extraction of this form of revenues can be
seen as a driving force behind a number of changes in banking. Capital gain-like
revenues are, moreover, highly concentrated in the largest BHC, with the largest seven
banks receiving 80 percent, and largest twenty banks – 90 percent of the total capital
gain-like revenues accruing to the BHC sector as a whole in 2009-2010.
The social significance of the transformation of banking being driven by
extraction of the capital gain-like revenues lies in their macroeconomic source. These
gains come from a redivision of financial assets through differences in the rates of return.
It is therefore availability of monetary wealth in the society that makes these revenues
possible. The redivision takes place either immediately (redivision of an ultimate asset
holder’s stock of wealth), or in time (when a rise in leverage of an asset holder and an
immediate redivision of the borrowed funds ultimately results in a redivision of wealth of
an asset holder upon debt repayment). Therefore, the transformation of banking can be
seen as a shift towards redistribution of wealth from the rest of the society in favor of
financial institutions.
In this context an increase in accumulated net worth and net financial wealth
(financial assets less liabilities) as a multiple of GDP signifies an increase in the pool of
assets to be redivided in favor of recipients of the capital-gain like revenues. Household
wealth has become a particularly important source of capital gain-like revenues, for two
reasons. First, household net worth and net financial wealth have risen as a multiple of
their disposable personal income to a level that exceeds a similar indicator for the
economy as a whole, leaving households relatively more exposed to wealth transfers.
Second, this trend is reinforced by a change in the composition of the household financial
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assets in favor of non-deposit financial assets that rose from 76 percent of their total
financial assets in 1973-84 to 87 percent in 2000-11. This rise in size and a change in the
composition of household financial assets was enabled and sustained by neoliberalism
through slashing state social programs, including a turn to private pensions, and through a
shift from compromise between labor and capital to a dominance of labor by capital.
These findings suggest the existing literature is right in the emphasis on the
peculiar character of revenues associated with the transformation of banking. The present
chapter supplements the existing studies focusing on the fictitious character of these
revenues, due to either accounting standards or risk illusion, by shifting the focus to their
macroeconomic sources. It is therefore argued that although accounting practices and
excessive risk taking have played an important role by boosting the profit rates in the
financial sector and by creating conditions favorable to asset price cycles and a crisis,
there is also a structural problem with extraction of some forms of financial profit.
Capital gain-like revenues can be considered fictitious in the sense that their magnitude
can change suddenly for reasons unrelated to the process of production. From the
perspective of the macroeconomic sources, however, far from being illusory, these profits
involve a real wealth transfer, with individual forms of revenues being particular
instances of a more general problem associated with a shift of banking towards extraction
of capital gain-like revenues. The main contribution of the present chapter is thus in its
bringing to the surface a structural problem with capital gain-like revenues, namely, their
connection to implicit wealth transfers. This in turn suggests that tackling the issues of
accounting and excessive risk taking, as important as it is, is not sufficient to address the
problem of the financial sector profits. Capital gain-like revenues would continue to exist
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and involve wealth transfers even if accounting standards and risk taking were properly
regulated.
Section 2 overviews recent contributions on fictitiousness and rent-like character
of bank revenues associated with the transformation of banking. Section 3 presents the
results of an empirical analysis of BHC revenues – first based on the accounting
categories and then based on the concepts developed in chapter 5. Section 4 discusses the
social significance of capital gain-like revenues being a driving force behind the
transformation of banking by connecting them to wealth transfers enabled and sustained
by neoliberalism, and evaluates the suggested approach in the context of existing
literature. Section 5 concludes.

6.2. Transformation of Banking: Illusory Profits, Mirages, and Rents
A concern with a rise of financial profits and their peculiar character is a
relatively new phenomenon. As recently as in 2009, Friedman (2009, p. 42) argued “an
important question – which no one seems interested in addressing – is what fraction of
the economy’s total returns to productively invested capital is absorbed up front by the
financial industry”. Although this is too strong a statement, and a question of the size and
the nature of financial profit has attracted some attention before (see, e.g., Krippner
(2005) for one of the earlier contributions), this issue had not been widely debated until a
more recent proliferation of such banking activities and practices as securitization,
mergers and acquisitions, and trading in financial assets. The total revenues and profits of
the financial system and banking are often believed to be too high. This point is most
clearly stated in Reid (2008) who argues between 1998 and 2008, the U.S. financial
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sector has made cumulative “excess profits” amounting to $1.2 trillion.128 The literature
usually points out a peculiar character of revenues associated with these activities and
questions the social benefits of these activities thus casting doubts on the actual value
added by the new banking practices.
One strand of literature focuses on illusory profits associated with failures in the
accounting system. Profits are illusory, or fictitious, when accounting standards allow
banks to overstate profits by recognizing revenues associated with uncertain future as
current profits. According to Kerr (2011, p. 7), “much of the activity in the banking
sector is aimed at nothing more than exploiting these accounting rules to register inflated
fake profits and hence convert shareholders’ equity and, in extremis, debt-holders’ and
taxpayers’ funds into executive bonuses”. 129 Such an overstatement of profits occurs in a
number of ways. First, uncertain future cash flows can be turned into current profits by
selling credit default swaps (CDS) that would however leave an insurer exposed to
potential future losses. Second, an increase in value of assets, or a decrease in value of
liabilities, is treated as profit due to mark-to-market accounting, mark-to-model
accounting, or due to other estimation of the net present value based on implausibly
optimistic forecasts. Third, inadequate provision for expected losses can boost current
profits. These accounting practices are in the interests of security owners receiving
capital gains and company’s executives whose pay is linked to company’s profits.
Turner (2010, p. 14) is concerned whether financial deepening has delivered value
added to the economy. To address this issue, he singles out four main changes in banking
128

The financial sector “excess profits” are defined as profits above the rate of growth of nominal GDP.
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Entitling his book False Profits, Baker (2011) also hints toward the illusory character of the financial
sector profits, although he never explains in what sense these profits were false.
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(2010, p. 17-21). First, a shift from the transformation of saving into investment to a
prevalence of credit to households implies that the modern credit relations facilitate
mainly consumption smoothing across the life-cycle and leveraged investments in the
already existing assets, including acquisition of the real estate. Second, securitization has
become a new form of credit intermediation. These trends have resulted in, third, an
increase in the aggregate maturity transformation raising liquidity risk. Finally, fourth,
there has been a rise in trading in financial assets, an analysis of which is complicated by
a limited ability to distinguish the useful functions of market making and liquidity
provision from proprietary trading not performing a socially beneficial function.130
Turner attempts to connect these changes in banking with a change in the
character of bank revenues by suggesting that “it is possible for financial activity to
extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic value” (Turner 2010,
p. 6). This argument is then explicitly applied to profits from trade in financial assets
(Turner 2010, p. 40). Some of these rents represent a return on a superior knowledge of
the markets.131 Turner poses an important question of the nature of bank revenues
associated with the new banking activities, and his distinction between activities
130

Turner is right, a distinction between market making and proprietary trading is hard to make, though the
difficulty arises not at the level of regulatory purposes, as in Turner, but rather at a conceptual level. One
way to arrive at this conclusion is by acknowledging that market makers do not trade twice – once to make
profit, another time to provide liquidity. Liquidity provision is always a by-product of their pursuit of
profit, be it in a form of capital gains on own account or fees from trading on behalf of clients.
Nevertheless, what matters is what this conclusion is used for. One way would be to try to distinguish
between the two aspects of trading as best as one can for every institutional and historical setting. This
approach is implicit in Turner’s concept of “an optimal level of liquidity”. A better alternative would be,
however, to not try to draw a line between the beneficial market making and proprietary trading and instead
shift the focus of analysis, given that such a line cannot exist at a conceptual level. Therefore, in this study
the focus is shifted to the question of the macroeconomic sources of profits associated with trading in
financial assets.
131

Rajiv Sethi also treats capital gains as return on information. Although he is right that capital gains
cannot be treated as a return on capital, a return on information is not a good starting point of analysis of
capital gains, for they accrue to both informed and uninformed traders.
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delivering economic value and rents is a reinstatement of the classical political economy
distinction between profit from production and profit upon alienation discussed in chapter
4. Nevertheless, Turner’s answer to the question of the relationship between the new
banking activities and revenues is not convincing because he does not provide a clear
criterion of what exactly distinguishes revenues from the new forms of banking (rents)
from the traditional interest spread, and rents from revenues delivering economic value.
Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) have a more sophisticated answer to the
question of the relationship between the transformation of banking and bank revenues.
Their goal is to explain a rise in the financial sector share in gross value added and
profits. For them, this rise is not due to a productivity miracle in the financial sector.
Instead, it is a mirage reflecting a consistent under-pricing of risk in the context of
increased risk-taking. Excess returns and productivity miracle “were built on an inability
to measure and price risk” (Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 102). Therefore, they
are a “risk illusion”.132 The argument that excessive risk taking is one of the key factors
behind the high profitability of the financial sector was earlier developed by Crotty
(2008). Among the other factors he discusses are a growth in demand for financial
products, a rise in concentration in the financial sector, and government interventions
allowing the financial institutions to reproduce themselves. For Crotty (2008, p. 174),
most of the high-risk strategies adopted by banks yield non-interest income, in particular,
fees from securitization, from derivative creation and trading, and gains from trade on
own account.
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Given that banks are in the risk business, “risk illusion is no accident; it is there by design” as banks try
to come up with “imaginative ways of manufacturing this commodity [risk], with a view to boosting
returns” (Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 106).
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An argument by Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) builds on the studies by
Wang, Basu and Fernald (2004), Wang (2003), Mink (2008), and Colangelo and Inklaar
(2010) who proposed to modify the measure of the financial sector output used in
national accounting by not treating risk-bearing as a productive contribution of the
financial sector. Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) go beyond this literature by
arguing the adjusted methodology, while being a step in a right direction, overlooks risk
under-pricing by the markets and, hence, it would still yield an over-estimate of the
financial sector output.
Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) examine the factors behind the “excess
returns” in the financial sector. First, they single out three balance sheet strategies
boosting risks and returns in the financial sector – increased leverage, rising trading
books generating illusory profits due to mark-to-market accounting, and writing
insurance for tail events. These three strategies generate excess returns due to inability to
measure and price risk. An important feature of returns from the last two strategies is that
they are subsequently offset by losses (Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 101). For
example, “trading book profits were in fact largely illusory” and were subsequently offset
by trading book losses, when the risk was re-priced after the onset of the crisis. Similarly,
offering tail risk insurance, while profitable in boom years, also results in substantial
losses once risk materializes.
The second set of explanations of the high returns to banking is based on the
structural features of the financial sector. Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010, p. 106)
suggest looking separately at individual financial activities, because “finance is anything
but monolithic”. They observe what is often perceived to be low-risk and low return
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activities (e.g., asset management, securities services, retail finance) actually yield high
returns – between 20 and 50 percent – probably due to risk under-pricing, price inelastic
demand, and reputational equilibrium. Similarly, what is perceived to be high-risk and
high return activities (commercial and investment banking) yield relatively low rate of
return compared to other activities in the financial sector – only 20 percent. Nevertheless,
it is still high compared to returns for non-financial corporations. Among the revenues
that call for explanation are trading gains. M&A generate even more puzzling returns
because while being value-destroying (Bodnaruk, Massa & Simonov 2009, Kosnik,
Shapiro 1997) they nevertheless yield advisory fees for investment banks amounting to
0.5-1.5 percent of the value of the deal. Similarly, underwriting fees are as high as 3-4
percent in Europe and even higher in the US. The level and persistence of these fees
remain a puzzle for Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010, p. 105) who consider a
reputational equilibrium to be one possible explanation.
For Haldane, Brennan and Madouros, the significance of their findings lies
primarily in acknowledging mismeasurement of bank profits and bank contribution to the
value added. This measmeasurement is particularly apparent after the onset of the crisis.
For example, during the fourth quarter of 2008, equity prices of the major global banks
dropped by around $640 billion, the world GDP and world trade declined at an
annualized rate of 6 and 25 percent, respectively. At the same time, the nominal gross
value added by the financial sector in the UK grew at its fastest rate on record (Haldane,
Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 88). After the crisis, the financial sector value added in the
US and the UK continued to rise and reached it historical high level of 9 percent in both
countries. Thus, “at a time when people believed banks were contributing the least to the
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economy since the 1930s, the National Accounts indicated the financial sector was
contributing the most since the mid-1980s” (Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 88).
A need for a better measure of the true value-added by the financial sector makes an
improved measurement of risks associated with financial transactions a priority (Haldane,
Brennan & Madouros 2010, p. 106).
A peculiar character of some forms of bank revenues that rose to prominence in
the course of financialization is also stressed by Bezemer (2012, p. 36) who noticed that
“the economy becomes concerned more with capital gains than with profit”. He focuses
on two forms of bank profit, namely, capital gains and revenues from mergers and
acquisitions. Bezemer (2012, p. 16) distinguishes between profit from production and
capital gains arguing that for assets to be traded at increased prices there should be “a
growth in indebtedness of the economy”, which is not the case with profit from
production. Asset trade is a zero-sum game, therefore, “for someone to make a capital
gain someone else must give up income or go into debt” (Bezemer 2012, p. 15).
Therefore, capital gains can exist on the macroeconomic level only if there is an increase
in leverage on the economy-wide level or income transfer. At the microeconomic level
the distinction between capital gains and profit from production disappears as for an
individual both forms of revenue provide purchasing power. On these grounds Bezemer
(2012, p. 29) treats M&A as a particular form of extraction of capital gain-like revenues,
namely, as “leveraged asset trades in pursuit of capital gains and fees”. A similar
emphasis can also be found in Wray (2011, p. 11-12) who stresses the principal activity
of investment banks has become not underwriting but trading in financial assets
generating capital gains from a zero-sum game. An appreciation of the rise to prominence
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of capital gain-like revenues in banking by Bezemer (2012) and Wray (2009, 2011)
probably comes from Minsky (1990, p. 69-70) who introduced the concept of money
manager capitalism to describe American capitalism since the 1970s. Accumulation of
monetary wealth in the previous decades and privatization of pensions resulted in
accumulation of funds in the hands of fund managers, or institutional investors. Minsky
emphasized the rise to prominence of the capital gains in the money manager stage of
capitalism, mainly due to money managers maximizing total return on their investment
that comprises dividends and capital gains.
To recap, recent literature recognizes the transformation of banking is associated
with revenues and profits of a peculiar character, distinct from profits in the sphere of
production. These revenues are often treated as illusory, fictitious, or fake – either in an
accounting sense or due to a risk illusion. According to the first approach, bank profits
are overstated due to accounting standards treating uncertain future gains as current
profits. This happens in the case of mark-to-market and mark-to-model accounting, and
inadequate provision for losses (Kerr 2011). A second approach attributes “excessive
returns” in finance to risk under-pricing in the context of increased risk taking (Crotty
2008, Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010). If profits were properly adjusted for risk,
returns would have been significantly lower. Both approaches focusing on fictitiousness
of bank profits emphasize mismeasurement of value added of the financial sector and,
therefore, of GDP as a whole. Furthermore, the illusory character of financial profits
implies these “paper profits” would be subsequently offset by losses of the recipients of
these profits, as it happened during the crisis that started in 2007.
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An alternative though less developed explanation views bank revenues from nontraditional activities as rents extracted from the rest of the economy suggesting an income
transfer without value creation (Turner 2010). This line of reasoning can be seen as a
reinstatement of the classical political economy distinction between profit from
production and profit upon alienation, discussed in chapter 4. The strength of this
approach, compared to the literature on fictitiousness of profits, lies in focusing on the
macroeconomic source of financial profits, as opposed to accounting standards and
mismeasurement of risk.133 This approach is however usually explicitly applied only to
capital gains and trading gains (Turner 2010, Wray 2009, Bezemer 2012, Wray 2011),
and when it comes to other financial activities it remains unclear whether they are a form
of rent extraction or value creation.
The subsequent section empirically examines a rise in the financial sector profits
and the transformation of revenues of the U.S. bank holding companies. After an analysis
based on accounting categories, theoretical categories developed in chapter 5 are
deployed to suggest a possible interpretation of the structure of bank revenues and their
connection to redistribution of financial assets, or wealth transfers. Grounded in the
classical political economy distinction between profit from production and profit upon
alienation, discussed in chapter 4, this interpretation can be seen as a critical development
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Profits overstated due to accounting standards and excessive risk taking can be considered fictitious, or
illusory, in the sense that they are not immediately linked to the process of value creation and can therefore
change suddenly and for reasons unrelated to the process of production – due to legal changes (changes in
the accounting practices) or changes in the market valuations of the assets and pricing of risk. Capital gainlike revenues is one form of profits fictitious in this particular sense. Interest has similar characteristics. By
shifting the focus from fictitiousness of profits to wealth transfers, the chapter alters the social implications
of extraction of this form of revenue. The social implications of fictitiousness of profits are related to the
question of financial stability and redistributing outcomes arising in a crisis. By contrast, capital gain-like
profits as understood in the present study bring to the surface wealth transfers across the society above and
beyond the current income, taking place regardless of a crisis.
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of the second approach to bank profit discussed in the present section – the one focusing
on its macroeconomic sources as opposed to unreality of these profits – applied to a range
of financial revenues.

6.3. Revenues and Profits of the U.S. Bank Holding Companies: An Empirical
Analysis
Profits accruing to the U.S. financial sector have risen from 13 percent of total
domestic profits in the 1950-60s to 32 percent in 2000-11, on average (Figure 2).134
Commercial banks profits as a share of the total domestic profits doubled during the same
time period – from 6 to 12 percent.135 Both figures reached their historical record level in
the early 2000s, when the financial sector profits rose to 40 percent and commercial bank
profits – to 19 percent of the total domestic profits.
An alternative way to illustrate a dramatic rise in financial profits is with an aid of
an index showing the size of financial profit in comparison to a base year (1970 in the
present case, chosen to reflect the beginning of financialization).136 Figure 3 shows that in
1970-2011 GDP has been growing steadily and reached 15 multiples of GDP in 1970.
The nonfinancial sector profit growth has been fluctuating around the trend of GDP. By
contrast, between 1970 and 2006, the financial sector profit increased by 28 times. It
134

Financial and non-financial sector profits are corporate profits with inventory valuation (IVA) and
capital consumption adjustments (CCAdj).
135

Commercial banks pre-tax profits are calculated as a sum of pre-tax net operating income and net
securities gains (losses). Pre-tax net operating income is a sum of net interest income and total noninterest
income less total noninterest expense less the provision for loan and lease losses. Since 1959, net securities
gains (losses) represent the net value of profits on securities sold or redeemed less losses on securities sold.
In 1941-1958, net securities gains (losses) are the net value of recoveries on securities less losses and
charge-offs on securities.
136

This form of illustrating a rise in the financial profit comes from Jim Reid (2008).
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dropped in 2008, but very quickly recovered, and already in 2010-11 exceeded the precrisis level by having reached 31 and 29 multiples of the 1970 level, respectively.137
Figure 2: Pre-tax financial sector profit as a share of total pre-tax domestic profit (US,
1945-2011, different sectors).
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profit is after provision for loan losses, with realized capital gains included.
The trend in the financial sector profit as a share of the total domestic profit is
closely followed by a trend in the BHC profit as a share of total (Figure 2).138 According
to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956139, a bank holding company is a company
which has control over any bank. In December 2010, 80 percent of banks in the U.S.
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The quick restoration of profits would have obviously not been possible to the same extent without
massive government interventions to bail out banks.
138

In the FR Y-9C reports, BHC pre-tax profit is reported as income (loss) before income taxes,
extraordinary items, and other adjustments. It is a sum of net interest income, total noninterest income,
realized gains (losses) on held-to-maturity securities and realized gains (losses) on available-for-sale
securities, less total noninterest expense, less provision for loan and lease losses, and less provision for
allocated transfer risk.
139

The Act is available online at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-100.html
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Figure 3: Pre-tax financial sector profit, nonfinancial sector profit, and GDP (US, 19702011). Index: 1970 = 1.
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were owned by BHC.140 BHC profits rose from 7 percent in 1986 to 30 percent of the
total domestic profits in 2003. Profits declined in the following years and were followed
by losses in 2008, before recovering in 2009-10. Not only do BHC profits trace the
general trend of financial profits in the US, but they also amount to a substantive share of
the total financial profits. BHC pre-tax profits rose as a share of the total financial sector
profit from the average 26 percent in 1986-1992 to 67 percent in 1993-2005, with a
maximum of 83 percent in 2000.141 Given the relative size of the BHC profits in the
profit of the financial sector as a whole, and given the similarities in the two trends, the
rest of the section focuses on an empirical analysis of BHC revenues and profits. A
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Data are from http://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/charts/bank-ownership-by-bhcs.pdf.

141

The relative size of BHC in the financial sector as a whole changed during the crisis, when BHC sector
suffered losses in 2008, unlike the financial sector as a whole. In 2009 and 2010, BHC profits rose but only
to 4 and 25 percent of the total financial profits, respectively. BHC are therefore representative of the
financial sector as a whole only in 1993-2005.
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decomposition of BHC revenues and profits would shed the light not only on the ongoing
transformation of banking, but also on the dynamics of the financial profit in general.
In addition to BHC being a good lens for studying the transformation of profits of
the financial sector as a whole, BHC profits are a worthwhile object of analysis on their
own account as they have been growing at a pace exceeding that of profits of the
financial system as a whole. If by 2005 the financial sector profits rose to 28 multiples of
their 1970 level, and commercial bank profits closely followed this trend, the BHC
profits peaked at 47 multiples of their 1970 level (Figure 4).142 The significantly higher
rate of growth of BHC profits is partly due to a faster rise of profits of the existing BHC
and their subsidiaries, and partly – due to creation of new BHC and acquisition of new
banks and non-bank subsidiaries by the already existing BHC. The percentage of banks
owned by BHC in the U.S. more than doubled in the 1980s. It rose from 34.3 percent in
1980 to 72 percent in 1990.143 Although since then it increased at a much slower pace,
this process still contributed to an increase in BHC profits. By 2000 the percentage of
banks owned by BHC reached 80.1 and in the 2000s it fluctuated around 83 percent.
Regardless of the specific reasons behind a sharp increase in BHC profits, this increase
indicates a rising significance of this type of financial institutions in the US, which in turn
makes an examination of the structure of BHC revenues even more relevant.

142

The data for BHC are available only since 1986. To make the BHC profit index comparable with the
other indices, it is assumed that in 1970-1985 the BHC profits rose at the same pace as commercial bank
profits. Thus, for the BHC profit index 1986 is taken as a base year, with an index number set at 3.19 – the
value of the profit index for the commercial banks that year.
143

Data come from http://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/charts/bank-ownership-by-bhcs.pdf.
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Figure 4: Pre-tax profits of the financial sector, commercial banks, and BHC (US, 19702011). Index: 1970 = 1.
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Source: calculations by author, NIPA, Table 6.16; FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking,
Table CB04; FR Y-9C Reports. Financial sector profit is with IVA and CCAdj. BHC and
CB profit is after provision for loan losses, realized capital gains included.
The data for the US bank holding companies come from the FR Y-9C Reports
filled out by bank holding companies, collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), The Bank Regulatory
Database. The database includes income statements and balance sheets for bank holding
companies for 1986-2010. For the purposes of this study, I aggregate these data to arrive
at an aggregated income statement and balance sheet for the bank holding companies
sector as a whole.
The usual argument about the evolution of sources of bank revenues stresses a
long-term increase in the non-interest income, in absolute terms and as a share of total
revenues. Figures 5 and 6 confirm it. Total noninterest income of the U.S. BHC increased
from $36 billion in 1986 to $401 billion in 2005. After a decline to $209 billion by 2008,
noninterest income doubled and reached its historical record of $420 billion in 20092010. Banking activities generating non-interest income have been growing at a faster

230

pace than the traditional banking business. As a result, between 1986 and 2003,
noninterest income has increased from 15 to 38 percent of total revenue, and after a
decline in the pre-crisis years reached unprecedented 43 percent in 2009-2010. In 19862010, noninterest income as a share of net operating revenue has increased from 30 to 50
percent, as well. It means nowadays almost a half of total BHC revenues and a half of
revenues net of interest expenses are generated through non-interest income. Finally,
after rising gradually as a share of GDP in 1986-1996, noninterest income rose sharply
after 1997. As a result, between 1997 and 2004 noninterest income as a share of GDP
more than doubled – from 1.5 to 3.2 percent. The composition and the nature of noninterest income, therefore, call for analysis.144
Figure 5: Total interest income, non-interest income, and realized capital gains (US BHC,
1986-2010).
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144

Another important trend in bank revenue extraction is a change in composition of the interest income.
This question lies beyond the scope of the present analysis. Suffice it to say that in 2008-2010 between 18
and 20 percent of total interest income of the US BHC was coming from residential mortgage lending.
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(US BHC, 1986-2010).

Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS; NIPA, Table 1.1.5.
A closer look at the composition of the non-interest income reveals the
multiplicity of activities and bank services hidden behind it (Figure 7). Noninterest
income includes trading revenue, income from fiduciary activities, service charges on
deposit accounts, fees from investment banking, insurance commissions and fees, venture
capital revenue, net servicing fees, net securitization income, and net gains on sales of
various assets.145 Thus, a decomposition of the sources of income based on the
accounting categories remains inconclusive, especially given that the single largest
component of the total noninterest income is “other noninterest income”.146
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Prior to 2001, non-interest income was sub-divided into income from fiduciary activities, service
charges on deposit accounts, trading revenue, and other non-interest income. The latter was rising and since
at least 1996 accounted for more than a half of total non-interest income. Therefore, a meaningful
decomposition of non-interest income useful for our purposes is only possible since 2001, when
methodology was changed to further decompose other non-interest income. For this reason, the remainder
of the empirical analysis in this chapter will focus on 2001-2010.
146

Other noninterest income includes income and fees from the printing and sale of checks, earnings
on/increase in value of cash surrender value of life insurance, income and fees from automated teller
machines (ATMs), rent and other income from other real estate owned, safe deposit box rent, net change in
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Figure 7: Composition of non-interest income of the US BHC, 2001-2010.147
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Only two facts stand out from the decomposition grounded in the categories given
in the income statements. First, the BHC sector as a whole incurred trading losses in
2007-2008 and, second, other than that, in 2001-2010 the relative shares of different
types of non-interest income have not changed much. These two observations do not
change the overall inconclusiveness of this decomposition of the non-interest income.
The myriad of activities generating non-interest income, none of which taken individually
is large enough to account for a substantial part of BHC revenues, creates an appearance
of a lack of a dominant principle behind the non-traditional banking business.

the fair values of financial instruments accounted for under a fair value option, bank card and credit card
interchange fees, and gains on bargain purchases.
147

Net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned are visible on the graph only in 2009-2010, and
even then they are hardly recognizable. In other years they do not appear on the graph at all due to their
negligible size. In 2001-2008, net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned averaged to -$0.32
billion, with a maximum loss in the period being $1.48 billion in 2008 and a maximum gain of $0.27
billion in 2006.

233

A conclusion about the heterogeneity of the new banking activities yielding noninterest income is true, however, only insofar as the concrete services and the concrete
mechanisms of revenue extraction associated with these services are concerned. This
apparent heterogeneity conceals an important similarity among some of these new
activities, namely, their being driven by extraction of capital gain-like revenues. An
appreciation of this fact allows for discerning a common dominant principle behind some
of the new banking activities. This in turn allows for a shift in focus from treating noninterest income as something merely different from interest revenue to the emphasis on
the social significance of the rise of the non-interest income, which would have been
overlooked otherwise.
An argument about the multiplicity of forms of profit associated with the gap
between the two sets of prices developed in chapter 5 offers a possible theoretical
framework for understanding the significance of the non-interest income. Some of the
forms of non-interest income provided in the BHC income statements can be grouped
using the theoretical categories from the previous chapter. Founder’s profit would then
correspond to fees from investment banking activities, including IPOs, underwriting, and
M&A.148 Total securitization income would comprise net securitization income, net
servicing fees, and net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases.149 Realized capital

148

Fees from investment banking activities are defined as investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and
underwriting fees and commissions for 2001-2006 and a sum of, first, fees and commissions from securities
brokerage, second, investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions, and, third, fees
and commissions from annuity sales for 2007-2010.
149

Net securitization income includes net gains (losses) on assets sold in securitization transactions, i.e., net
of transaction costs. It includes fees (other than servicing fees) earned from the bank’s securitization
transactions and unrealized losses (and recoveries of unrealized losses) on loans and leases held for sale in
securitization transactions. Net servicing fees include income from servicing real estate mortgages, credit
cards, and other financial assets held by others. Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases include
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gains would include trading revenue and two types of income not being a part of noninterest income, namely, realized gains (losses) on held-to-maturity securities and
realized gains (losses) on available-for-sale securities.150 A sum of these three forms of
capital gain-like revenues – founder’s profit, total securitization income, and realized
capital gains – yields total capital gain-like revenues of BHC. In what follows below, the
categories of founder’s profit, total securitization income, realized capital gains, and total
capital gain-like revenues will be used in the meanings just discussed. Figure 8 shows a
decomposition of BHC non-interest income based on these theoretical categories.
This decomposition brings to the surface several facts. First, in the run-up to the
crisis that started in 2007, realized capital gains were the smallest revenue associated with
the dual price system. For the BHC sector as a whole, trading gains were not as
significant as it might appear based on how much attention they have attracted. This is
probably due to the fact that some of these gains represent redistribution within the BHC
sector itself, so that gains of some BHC were losses of others. In 2009-2010 trading gains
more than doubled compared to their pre-crisis level of $29 billion per year, on average.
Amounting to $70 per annum the last two years, realized capital gains became the second
largest source of revenue, after founder’s profit.

unrealized losses (and subsequent recoveries of such net unrealized losses) on loans and leases held for
sale.
150

Trading revenue includes the net gain or loss from trading cash instruments and off-balance sheet
derivative contracts (including commodity contracts) that has been recognized during the calendar year-todate. Realized gains (losses) on held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities are the difference between
the sales price (excluding interest at the coupon rate accrued since the last interest payment date, if any) and
its amortized cost.
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Figure 8: Capital gain-like revenues (US BHC, 2001-2010).
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
Incidentally, although “paper profits” associated with fair value accounting have
been an important factor in determining behaviour of individual banks and generating
leverage cycles (Adrian, Shin 2010), from the macroeconomic perspective these revenues
have not been an important source of the total bank revenues in the years for which the
data are available. In 2007-2010, the only years when the data are available, net change in
the fair values of financial instruments accounted for under a fair value option was close
to the value of realized capital gains, with an exception of 2008 (Table 1). Nevertheless,
in 2009-2010 this form of income was substantially smaller than trading revenue.
Revenues associated with mark-to-market accounting amounted to 0.33-3.95 percent of
total non-interest income in 2007-2010.
Second, in 2001-2006 total securitization income was a far more important source
of BHC revenues than realized capital gains. Averaging to $58 billion during those years,
this form of revenue was the single largest form of BHC capital gain-like revenues. In
particular, it was twice as high as realized capital gains and trading gains. Although
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securitization income has declined since the onset of the crisis, it still generates for BHC
$20-40 billion per year.
Table 1: Net change in the fair values of financial instruments accounted for under a fair
value option in comparison to other capital gain-like revenues (billion of $) and as a share
of non-interest income (in percent).
2007
2008
2009
2010
Net change in the fair values of
financial instruments accounted
for under a fair value option
0.92
8.26
2.49
10.65
Realized capital gains
1.50
-14.40
2.89
10.12
Trading revenue
-15.70
-53.14
66.18
61.11
Net change in the fair values of
financial instruments accounted
for under a fair value option as a
share of non-interest income
0.33
3.95
0.58
2.54
Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
Finally, third, prior to 2009, founder’s profit accounted for $52 billion per year,
on average, with the crisis years not being an exception. In 2009-2010 it rose to $91 per
annum and thus became the single largest form of BHC capital gain-like revenues, having
taken the place of securitization income.
The significance of the capital gain-like revenues becomes apparent once it is
recognized that these revenues, taken in the multiplicity of their forms, were responsible
for 13 percent of BHC total revenues and for 40 percent of BHC total non-interest
income in 2001-2007, on average (Figure 9).151 It suggests that almost a half of what is
normally known as non-traditional banking activities – activities generating non-interest
income – are driven by extraction of capital gain-like revenues.

151

Insurance commissions and fees, service charges on deposit accounts, and income from fiduciary
activities are the other largest components of the non-interest income.
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Figure 9: Total capital gain-like revenues, as a share of income and profit (US BHC,
2001-2010).
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
Furthermore, since the crisis the share of the capital gain-like revenues in total
BHC revenues has increased. After a net loss from these activities combined in 2008 – a
loss driven by losses from trading and capital losses – capital gain-like revenues quickly
recovered and reached a historical record level of $202 and $185 billion in 2009 and
2010, respectively.152 As a result, total capital gain-like revenues rose to 46 percent of
total non-interest income and 19 percent of total revenues in 2009-2010, on average – the
relative shares also exceeding those prior to the crisis. This quick recovery of the capital
gain-like revenues and their rise above the pre-crisis levels stands in sharp contrast to the
fact that profitability of the US BHC still has not reached its pre-crisis level. As shown on
Figure 10, return on equity (ROE), which averaged to 19 percent in 2001-2006, dropped
to -4.7 percent in 2008 and rose merely to 7.6 percent by 2010. Return on assets (ROA)
152

As in the case of a quick restoration of bank profits after the crisis in general (see footnote 10), a rapid
recovery of the capital gain-like revenues to a level exceeding their level before the crisis might not have
been possible to the same extent if it were not for government interventions to bail out banks and provide
them with other forms of assistance.
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followed the same trend by falling from 1.7 percent in 2001-2006, on average, to -0.4
percent in 2008 and recovering only less than a half of its pre-crisis level by reaching 0.7
percent in 2010.
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Figure 10: Return on equity and return on assets, US BHC, 2001-2010.
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Most of these findings also hold for the largest BHC, with some of them being
even more pronounced for the biggest BHC than for the sector as a whole. An interest in
the sources of revenue and other trends for the largest BHC usually stems from a high
concentration of the banking sector. The largest 7 banks received on average 45 percent
of total revenues of the BHC sector in 2001-2005 and 58 percent in 2006-2010. For the
largest 20 banks the same figures increased from 67 to 78 percent in the same time
period. For the largest 3, 5, 7, and 20 BHC153, the relative size of the capital gain-like
153

The largest BHC are defined by the size of their total revenue, i.e. a sum of their interest and noninterest income. A list of the largest BHC varies by year. In 2010, the top 20 BHC – from the largest to the
smallest – were: Bank of America Corporation, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup, Wells Fargo &
Company, Metlife, Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, American Express Company, U.S. Bancorp,
HSBC North America Holdings, Capital One Financial Corporation, PNC Financial Services Group, Ally
Financial, Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Taunus Corporation, State Street Corporation, BB&T
Corporation, Suntrust Banks, Discover Financial Services, Regions Financial Corporation.
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revenues has followed roughly the same trend as for all BHC, with a drop in 2007-2008
and a return to the pre-crisis levels or even exceeding those in 2009-2010 (Figures 1112).
Figure 11: Capital gain-like revenues as a share of total non-interest income (US BHC,
2001-2010).
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
The share of capital gain-like revenues in total revenue is, however, increasing in
the bank size. For instance, in 2001-2006, capital gain-like revenues amounted to 41.25
percent of total non-interest income of all BHC, 44.06 percent for the largest 20 banks,
and 56.83 percent for the largest 3 banks (Table 2). Thus, the share of capital gain-like
income in the total non-interest income of the largest 20 banks was 7 percent higher than
for all banks, on average (Table 3). For the largest 3 banks, it was 38 percent higher.
Similarly, for the same years capital gain-like income amounted to 15.99 and 19.20
percent of the total revenue of the largest 20 and 3 banks, respectively. For all BHC, this
figure equalled to 14.11 percent, making the relative size of the capital gain-like revenues
for the largest 20 and 3 banks exceeded that for all banks by 13 and 36 percent,
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Figure 12: Capital gain-like revenues as a share of total revenues (US BHC, 2001-2010).
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
Table 2: Capital gain-like revenues as a percentage of total non-interest income and as a
percentage of total revenue, all BHC and the largest BHC, simple averages for 2001-06
and 2009-10.
All BHC Top 3 Top 5 Top 7 Top 20
Capital gain-like
2001-06 41.25
56.83
53.36
46.23
44.06
revenues as a percentage
of total non-interest
income
2009-10 45.72
59.19
53.95
57.49
47.85
Capital gain-like
2001-06 14.11
19.20
18.42
17.08
15.99
revenues as a percentage
2009-10 19.41
22.34
22.66
26.50
22.00
of total revenue
Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
Table 3: Capital gain-like revenues as a share of total non-interest income and as a share
of total revenue: ratio of the largest banks to all BHC.
Top 3
Top 5 Top 7 Top 20
Capital gain-like revenues
2001-06 1.38
1.29
1.12
1.07
as a share of total noninterest income
Capital gain-like revenues
as a share of total revenue

2009-10
2001-06

1.29
1.36

1.18
1.30

1.26
1.21

1.05
1.13

2009-10 1.15
1.17
1.37
1.13
Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
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respectively. Thus, there is a tendency for the larger banks to rely more heavily on the
capital gain-like revenues.
A greater reliance on capital gain-like revenues by the largest BHC results in a
high concentration of these revenues in the largest institutions. Figure 13 shows the
largest 7 banks received about a half of the total capital gain-like revenues accruing to the
BHC sector as a whole in 2001-2005. In 2009-2010, this share increased to 80 percent. In
the same time period, the relative share of the capital gain-like revenues of the largest 20
banks rose from 75 to 90 percent.
Figure 13: Share of the total capital gain-like revenues of the U.S. BHC sector accruing
to the largest BHC.
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
The concentration of the capital gain-like revenues in the largest institutions,
however, differs by types of these revenues. For instance, it is the highest for realized
capital gains (Figure 14). In 2007-2010 realized capital gains received by the largest 20
banks were equal to capital gains of the BHC sector as a whole. The largest 3 BHC
receive about the half of the BHC sector realized capital gains.
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Figure 14: Share of realized capital gains of the U.S. BHC sector accruing to the largest
BHC.
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
The bank concentration by the size of the founder’s profit has also been rising.
The share of the founder’s profit received by the largest 20 banks rose from 70 percent in
the early 2000s to 90 percent in 2010 (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Share of founder's profit of the U.S. BHC sector accruing to the largest BHC.
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
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Finally, concentration of BHC by the size of securitization income has been more
stable, without a pronounced upward trend (Figure 16). It is also the least concentrated
form of capital gain-like revenues, with the largest 20 BHC receiving “only” 80 percent
of the total for the sector as a whole. Even this least concentrated form of capital gainlike revenues is highly concentrated.
Figure 16: Share of securitization income of the U.S. BHC sector accruing to the largest
BHC.
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Source: calculations by author based on FR Y-9C Reports, available through Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and WRDS.
To recap, an analysis of a rise in BHC noninterest income based on the
accounting categories indicates the multiplicity of non-traditional banking activities
generating noninterest revenues. This multiplicity conceals, however, a unifying principle
behind some of these activities. Namely, several non-traditional banking activities have
been driven by extraction of capital gain-like income. This can be seen based on a
theoretical argument developed in chapter 5, according to which income due to the gap
between the two sets of prices of capital assets takes many forms – underwriting revenue,
income from M&A, securitization income, and trading gains. A decomposition of the
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BHC noninterest income based on these theoretical categories reveals capital gain-like
revenues constituted 40 percent of noninterest income in 2001-2007, on average, and rose
to 46 percent in 2009-2010. Securitization income and founder’s profit were the largest
forms of the capital gain-like revenues before and after the crisis, respectively. Although
trading revenues have attracted much attention, they have been the smallest form of
capital gain-like revenues prior to the crisis. Even smaller were the “paper profits”
associated with the mark-to-market accounting. The capital gain-like revenues are highly
concentrated in the largest BHC, with the top 7 banks having received about a half of
these revenues in 2001-2005 and 80 percent in 2009-2010. In the same time periods, the
largest 20 banks received 75 and 90 percent of total capital gain-like revenues of the
BHC sector.

6.4. Beyond the Apparent Heterogeneity of New Banking Activities: Profits from
Redistribution of Assets
A decomposition of revenues of the US bank holding companies suggests that
almost a half of revenues from non-traditional banking activities have been coming from
underwriting, M&A, securitization, and trading in financial assets. Although these
activities correspond to different bank functions with respect to other sectors of the
economy, and although the concrete mechanisms of revenue extraction differ among
them, there is a unifying principle behind these apparently heterogeneous banking
businesses. All these activities yield capital gain-like revenues, therefore, extraction of
capital gains can be seen as a driving force behind many aspects of the transformation of
banking.
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The social significance of the capital gain-like revenues being a driving force
behind the transformation of banking is rooted in the macroeconomic source of these
revenues. As was shown in chapter 5, there are two ways to think about the sources of
capital gains, namely, first, as a process creating this type of income, second, as a
macroeconomic source related to income and wealth redistribution. It was argued that
founder’s profit and securitization income come from similar processes. Incorporation
involves a change in the nature of capital to truly social capital and, similarly,
securitization further raises the social character of banking business, in addition to its
inherently social character due to moneyness of bank liabilities, asset diversification, and
an access to reserves. From the perspective of the macroeconomic sources of bank
revenues a range of banking activities yielding similar revenues is even wider. It was
argued in chapter 5 that bank revenues from underwriting, M&A, securitization, and
trading come from the redivision of assets of the intermediate and ultimate asset holders
through their accepting a rate of return below the rate of return of the underlying assets.
Thus, massive wealth transfers are embedded in functioning of the modern banking,
made possible by availability of monetary wealth of the ultimate investors. The greater is
the pool of monetary wealth, the greater are the opportunities for extraction of capital
gains. Given that the question of sources of capital gain-like revenues as a process was
discussed at length in chapter 5 and given that this issue does not require an empirical
investigation, for the purposes of an empirical analysis, the rest of the chapter will focus
on the other aspect of sources of bank revenues, namely, their macroeconomic sources.
Capital gain-like revenues come from the redivision of assets of others. A rise in
wealth accumulated in the form of financial assets compared to the current output,
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therefore, signifies a rise in the pool of assets that can be redistributed in the form of
capital gain-like revenues. Incidentally, Hilferding was aware of this relationship when
he argued that founder’s profit presupposes the conversion of industrial into fictitious
capital, and this convertibility “depends solely upon the quantity of loan capital available
which, while retaining the form of interest-bearing capital, is ready to be converted into
productive capital. There must be enough money available for investment in shares”
(Hilferding 1910, ch. 10). Figure 17 shows that for the US economy net wealth held in
the form of financial assets, i.e. financial assets net of liabilities, was declining in 197379, then stabilized through the early 1990s, and rose sharply after 1995.154 Financial
assets less liabilities have more than doubled as a multiple of GDP – from 1.15 in 197379, on average, to 2.37 in 1995-2011 (Table 4). This rise in the pool of net wealth held in
the form of financial assets since the mid-1990s is consistent with a rapid rise in BHC
noninterest income as a share of GDP since 1997 (Figure 6). As was shown above, a
significant share of the noninterest income represents capital gain-like revenues having a
pool of net wealth as its source. Incidentally, the rise in the pool of net wealth held in the
form of financial assets is comparable to more than doubling of financial assets as a
multiple of GDP since 1946,155 on the one hand, and stands in contrast to a very modest
increase in net worth, on the other hand. Total net worth – a sum of financial and non-

154

These time periods reflect a regulated social structure of accumulation (SSA) characteristic of the US
after the World War II, a crisis of this SSA in 1973-79, and an establishment of a new SSA by the early
1980s (Kotz 2009, 2011).
155

An increase in financial assets is more dramatic than an increase in financial assets less liabilities due to
lengthening of financial intermediation chain.
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financial assets less liabilities – as a multiple of GDP has increased by only 11 percent,
from the average 4.74 in 1946-1972 to 5.26 in 1995-2011.156
Figure 17: Total economy financial assets, net worth, and financial assets less liabilities
as a multiple of GDP (US, 1946-2011).
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Source: calculations by author, Flow of Funds.
Table 4: Total economy financial assets, net worth, and financial assets less liabilities as a
multiple of GDP (US, 1946-2011), simple average.
Financial assets less
Financial assets as a Net worth as a
liabilities as a
multiple of GDP
multiple of GDP
multiple of GDP
1946-72
4.53
4.74
1.54
1973-79
4.63
4.78
1.15
1980-94
5.87
4.80
1.23
1995-2011
9.36
5.26
2.37
Source: calculations by author, Flow of Funds.
There are two immediate forms of redistribution of assets, namely, redistribution
of the ultimate asset holder’s own funds and redistribution of the borrowed funds. At the
moment of a financial institution making a capital gain-like profit the macroeconomic
source of these revenues differs. In the former case, it is redivision of the already existing

156

Total economy net worth is calculated as a sum of net worth of nonfinancial corporate business,
households and non-profit organizations, financial business, and state, local, and federal government.
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wealth (savings), in the latter case, it is a redivision of the newly created assets and
liabilities trough rising leverage. Given that under normal circumstances a borrower
would repay the debt, both cases can be considered as particular instances of a more
general case of redistribution of wealth (net worth) of the ultimate asset holder, be it at
the moment of transaction or of debt repayment.157 Transactions with borrowed funds do
not alter the fact that the asset holder’s net worth forms the ultimate macroeconomic
source of the capital gain-like revenues of the financial institutions, they merely change
the timing when this redistribution is reflected on the asset holder’s balance sheets.
The wealth transfer behind extraction of capital gains has three characteristics.
First, the wealth thus redivided is not related to the ultimate asset holder’s current income
and can therefore exceed it. At the macroeconomic level, this makes capital gain-like
revenues incommensurable with revenues reflecting the newly crated value in the
economy (value added). Accumulated wealth being a source of financial profits
independent of the current output is one of the reasons behind the rise in the financial
sector profit as a share of total domestic profits, which also explains how this long term
trend could be sustained since the onset of the crisis. Although GDP has been sluggish,
the stock of accumulated wealth still constitutes a pool that can be redivided in spite of a
recession, making the rising share of financial profits in total domestic profits less
puzzling.

157

Debt is not always repaid. For instance, leverage and rolling over debt is immanent to functioning of
financial institutions. Moreover, under particular circumstances, economic agents and institutions can
default and not repay their debt. In both cases, transactions with borrowed funds while still yielding capital
gain-like profits would not lead to an ultimate redivision of assets, therefore, in these cases the assets of
others cannot be said to be a source of the capital gain-like revenues.
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Second, wealth transfers associated with the capital gain-like revenues are not
identical with a zero-sum game. Accepting different rates of return on future cash flows
allows both parties to make profit, which in turn justifies the persistence of these gains.
This positive-sum game is nevertheless consistent with a redistribution of assets, and the
possibility of both parties profiting from a transaction does not make this transaction less
of a wealth transfer.158 It is precisely the apparent win-win game that conceals a wealth
transfer accompanying this transaction. Contrary to Haldane, Brennan and Madouros
(2010, p. 101), capital gains do not have to be compensated by “paper losses” of those
who previously made these profits. The same holds for other capital gain-like revenues.
Nor do these revenues have to be matched by losses of the ultimate asset holders, as in a
zero-sum game. Nor is it puzzling the capital gain-like revenues do not have to revert to
the mean and can instead quickly recover to a pre-crisis level, contrary to Reid’s (2008)
expectation that a crisis should wipe out the $1.2 trillion “excess profits” received by the
U.S. financial sector in 1998-2008.159 This is not to deny that there were structural
reasons why a crisis that started in 2008 and losses it brought with it could have been
anticipated. For example, Kotz (2009, p. 311) argues that the very structural factors that
158

The positive sum game nature of the capital gain-like revenues, co-existing with a transfer, is in some
sense analogous to a positive sum nature of the capital-labor relationship. Both workers and capitalists
receive a net gain in the form of wages and profits, respectively. This net gain for each party co-exists with
a transfer of unpaid labor in favor of capital. Unlike the capital-labor relationship that is directly linked to
the process of production, the process of extraction of capital gains does not create new value and rather
hinges on value created in the sphere of production, but does so indirectly.
159

Reid (2008) argued that “Given that the WDCI function on Bloomberg reports that $184bn has been
written down by US financials so far in this crisis, if one believes that the size of the financial sector should
shrink to levels seen a decade ago then one could come to the conclusion that there is another trillion
dollars of value destruction to go in the sector before we're back to the long-run trend in financial profits. A
scary thought and one that if correct will lead to a long period of constant intervention from the authorities
in an attempt to arrest this potential destruction. Finding the appropriate size of the financial sector in the
"new world" will be key to how much profit destruction their needs to be in the sector going forward”.
According to Alloway (2010), in 2010 Reid confirmed that a mean reversion of the U.S. financial profits
was his expectation in 2008.
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underlay an economic expansion of the previous decades – growing income inequality, a
speculative financial sector, and a series of asset bubbles – were responsible for a crisis.
This crisis resulted in losses for both investors and financial institutions. The fact that
profits of the financial institutions were followed by losses across the society holds,
however, only for the economy as a whole and says nothing about how these losses were
distributed. The losses were born by the ultimate asset holders that might or might not
have been the very individuals and institutions that made profits in the previous years. In
some cases they were (e.g., AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers), in others they were not
(e.g., Goldman Sachs). Some of it is also explained by government interventions that
bailed out banks and provided other forms of assistance to shield them from potential
losses.
Third, capital gain-like revenues involve wealth transfer even in normal times, i.e.
even if the value of the asset does not decline. As was shown in chapter 5, accepting
differential rates of return is the principle mechanism of such wealth transfers. Asset
price deflation, therefore, represents a second-round wealth transfer, in addition to a
wealth transfer prior to devaluation. A problem is therefore not only that the asset value
collapses in crisis, as has been noticed in the literature on multiple occasions, but rather
that transactions in the financial markets are structured in such a way that the ultimate
asset holders have assets of indeterminate value, while others lock in profits.
The significance of the wealth transfers associated with capital gains becomes
apparent once it is recognized that households hold a substantial share of the total pool of
financial assets. Since the World War II, financial assets have amounted to 60-70 percent
of household total assets. With a rise of private pensions and other forms of personal
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saving, it is household assets and ultimately their net worth that increasingly form a
source of the capital-gain like revenues of financial institutions. The wealth transfer
happens either directly through redivision of the household saving, or indirectly through
increased leverage which would ultimately be followed by redivision of net worth upon
the debt repayment.160 In this context a rise of a stock of household wealth in the form of
financial assets and net worth as a multiple of their disposable income acquires a different
significance. It signifies not just a rise in household wealth, but also a rise in the stock of
funds available to be redivided in the form of capital gain-like revenues of financial
institutions.
Figure 18 shows that net wealth held by households in the form of financial
assets, i.e. financial assets net of liabilities, has increased by 35 percent between 19731979 and 1995-2011 – from the average 2.46 to 3.32 multiples of disposable personal
income (Table 5). This figure significantly exceeds a comparable indicator for the
economy as a whole – financial assets net of liabilities as a multiple of GDP – which
stood at 1.15 and 2.37 in the same time periods (Table 4). It means for the households the
pool of net financial assets available for redistribution in the form of capital gain-like
revenues forms a larger share of current income than for the economy as a whole, leaving
households relatively more exposed to wealth transfers in favor of the financial sector. As
160

Given that both rolling over debt for purchasing financial assets and defaults by individuals are
relatively uncommon compared to businesses, the non-repayment of debt by households can be abstracted
from for the present purposes. Households are less likely than other sectors to avoid an ultimate redivision
of their wealth through rolling over debt, default, or a bail-out by the government or some other institution.
Therefore, their wealth is more likely to form a source of the capital gain-like revenues. There is an in-built
asymmetry between households, on the one hand, and financial and non-financial institutions, on the other
hand, with respect to the possibilities for their wealth to form an ultimate source of the capital gain-like
revenues. A further substantiation of this argument and its empirical illustration lie beyond the scope of this
study. For the present purposes suffice it to say that an increase in the household financial assets and in
leverage of the financial sector in the course of financialisation can be seen as two sides of the same
institutional setting favoring extraction of the capital gain-like revenues.
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in the case of the economy as a whole, a sharp (though volatile) rise in net wealth held by
households in the form of financial assets as a multiple of their disposable income since
the mid-1990s is consistent with a rapid increase in BHC noninterest income as a share of
GDP in the same time period (Figure 6).
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Figure 18: Households financial assets, net worth, and financial assets less liabilities as a
multiple of disposable personal income (US, 1946-2011).
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Source: calculations by author, Flow of Funds, Table B.100.
Table 5: Household financial assets, net worth, and financial assets less liabilities as a
multiple of disposable personal income (US, 1946-2011), simple average.
Financial assets less
Financial assets as a Net worth as a
liabilities as a
multiple of
multiple of
multiple of
disposable personal disposable personal disposable personal
income
income
income
1946-72
3.66
5.01
3.12
1973-79
3.14
4.48
2.46
1980-94
3.41
4.82
2.61
1995-2011
4.45
5.70
3.32
Source: calculations by author, Flow of Funds, Table B. 100.
A rising exposure of households to wealth transfers, which is moreover higher
than for the economy as a whole, is reinforced by changes in composition of the
household assets. Households have been holding a rising share of their assets in forms
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other than deposits thus raising the share of the pool of assets available for redivision in
the form of capital gain-like revenues. According to Figure 19, household non-deposit
financial assets have increased from the average 75 percent of the household total
financial assets in 1973-84 to 84 percent in 2000-11. If money market mutual fund shares
are excluded from deposits, over the same time period this figure increased even more –
from 76 to 87 percent of the household total financial assets. This rise in the non-deposit
forms of financial assets means an increase in the share of household assets that can be
redivided yielding capital gain-like revenues for financial institutions, hence, a rising
vulnerability of households due to a specific form taken by their savings.161
Figure 19: Household non-deposit financial assets as a share of household total financial
assets (US, 1945-2011).
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At the heart of a rise in household wealth accumulated in a form of non-deposit
financial assets net of liabilities, which favors a rise in the capital gain-like income, lie
historical and institutional changes associated with a new form of capitalism that emerged

161

An importance of the form taken by savings is also emphasized by Lazonick (1992, p. 473).
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in the US by the early 1980s. This concrete form of capitalism is usually referred to as
neoliberalism. A social structure of accumulation approach to capitalist development
emphasizes several characteristics of neoliberalism (Kotz 2011, p. 3). Some of these
characteristics have directly enabled and sustained a rise to prominence of the capital
gain-like revenues.162
First, the slashing of state social programs backed by a free market ideology has
produced a private pension system, with a rapid rise in the household pension fund
reserves. This rise, supplemented by a rise in the household mutual fund and money
market fund shares due to a search for returns higher than interest on traditional bank
deposits, constituted the main source of a rise in the household financial assets.
Privatization of pensions therefore indirectly benefited financial institutions. As shown
on Figure 20, pension fund and life insurance reserves have increased from almost a half
of household disposable income before 1980 to 81 percent of disposable income in 19801994 and 128 percent since 1995. Mutual fund and money market mutual fund shares
rose from 4 percent to 18 and 47 percent in the same time periods. A rise in these forms
of financial assets added to a traditionally high equity holding by households and resulted
in historically high levels of household financial assets. Kotz (2011, p. 15) argued
financialisation has its roots in a corporate form of capitalism, with a neoliberal
restructuring having removed the barriers that had held in check a proliferation of

162

A social structure of accumulation (SSA) is “a coherent, long-lasting capitalist institutional structure that
promotes profit-making and forms a framework for capital accumulation” (Kotz 2011, p. 2). Neoliberalism
can, therefore, be seen as an SSA that raises to prominence a particular form of profit-making, namely,
extraction of capital gain-like revenues. Incidentally, as was mentioned in chapter 5, capital gain-like
revenues accrue to financial institutions, but also to founders of non-financial enterprises, managers (in the
form of stock options), and even high net worth individuals. An extraction of the capital gain-like revenues
can therefore be seen as a unifying interest of various capitalist strata helping explain why there was no
battle between an identifiable financial and non-financial stratum on the eve of neoliberalism.

255

financialization. Similarly, a significant size of financial assets held by households – a
hallmark of financialization – can be seen as due to household holding of equity shares
(reflecting the prevalence of the corporate form of capitalism) being supplemented by
pension fund reserves and mutual and money market fund shares enabled by
neoliberalism.163 Thus, ultimately it is the neoliberal form of capitalism that has allowed
for both a dramatic rise in size and a change in composition of the household financial
assets that favored a rise to prominence of the capital gain-like revenues.164
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Figure 20: Composition of the household financial assets as a multiple of disposable
personal income (US, 1946-2011).
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Second, a shift from compromise between labor and capital to a dominance of
labor by capital (with aid from the state) manifested in stagnant real wages, even in spite
of growing labor productivity. While in 1948-73 output per hour rose at 2.4 percent per
163

Neoliberalism has further contributed to an increase in the household financial assets by having been
conducive to asset bubbles that caused an increase in the market value of equities held by households.
164

A need for pension fund reserves in the absence of a publicly provided pension and a shift to money
market and mutual fund shares are important causes of “a large and growing volume of investable funds”,
in addition to a rise in profit share and a rising concentration of household income discussed by Kotz (2009,
p. 308).

256

year and real average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers followed closely
growing at 2.2. percent per year, in the neoliberal era the close relationship between labor
productivity and remuneration has broken down (Kotz 2009, p. 309). In 1979-2007
output per hour grew at 1.91 percent per year, on average, but average hourly earnings
declined at 0.04 percent. The gap between the two rates of growth was wider in 20002007 than in the 1990s.
Taken together, these two aspects of neoliberalism, by raising household financial
assets and keeping their disposable personal income stagnant, have resulted in a dramatic
rise in the household financial assets as a multiple of their disposable personal income
(Figure 18). Even a concurrent significant rise in household indebtedness, mostly driven
by home mortgages, did not overpower a rise in the household financial assets. As a
result, household net financial wealth (financial assets net of liabilities) has also increased
as a multiple of their disposable income. This pool of household financial wealth, enabled
and sustained by neoliberalism, has created favorable conditions for extraction of capital
gain-like revenues and wealth transfers in favor of financial institutions. 165
The empirical findings of the previous section and an appreciation of the capital
gain-like revenues being a form of wealth transfer hidden behind the apparently diverse
banking activities generating non-interest income offer a lens for evaluating the already
existing literature. This literature is right in the emphasis on a problematic character of
bank revenues associated with some of the non-traditional banking activities, but this
problematic character involves more than just an illusory nature of financial profits or

165

Neoliberalism has also created favorable conditions for financial profits stemming from problematic
accounting practices and increased risk taking. This aspect of financial regulation has attracted a lot of
attention in the literature and therefore is not discussed here in detail.
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income redistribution through financial mechanisms. Accounting practices and excessive
risk taking have played an important role in boosting profit rates in the financial sector
and in generating conditions favorable for asset price cycles and a crisis which led to
losses. The fact that these profits led to losses in crisis is, however, just one of their
attributes which is moreover characteristic of other forms of income. After all, income of
all forms declined in a recession. The approach developed here supplements the existing
literature by shifting an emphasis to the macroeconomic sources of the financial profit. It
is shown that the existence of this profit is not predicated upon future losses. The main
contribution of this approach is then twofold. First, it treats the problematic character of
revenues from some of the non-traditional banking activities as particular instances of a
more general problem – a turn of banking towards extraction of capital gain-like
revenues. Second, it is shown that substantial revenues accruing to financial institutions,
far from being fictitious, involved real cash flows and systematic wealth transfers behind
them. This shift in emphasis results in a new perspective on the social implications of
financial profits. The suggested approach supplements the emphasis on mismeasurement
of GDP and losses in crisis stressed in the literature by an appreciation of hidden wealth
transfers and asset redistribution across the society that, moreover, take place even in
normal times.

6.5. Conclusion
This chapter showed that almost a half of revenues associated with non-traditional
banking activities represents capital gain-like revenues, making extraction of this form of
income a driving force behind many aspects of the transformation of banking. The rising
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importance of the capital gain-like income in the total revenues of BHC is non-trivial
because it involves wealth transfer from the ultimate asset holders in favor of financial
institutions. Neoliberalism enabled and sustained a rise in households’ stock of net worth
and net financial wealth as a multiple of their disposable personal income, as well as
changes in composition of the household financial assets in favor of non-deposit assets.
These developments have left households increasingly vulnerable to such wealth
transfers. Thus, from the perspective of the macroeconomic sources of bank revenues, the
transformation of banking is associated with revenues that are far from being illusory and
that involve systematic real wealth transfers in favor of financial institutions.
These wealth transfers have a number of peculiar characteristics. First, being
based on differences in the rates of return, they take place even in “normal times” and do
not hinge on a depreciation of the asset value in a crisis. Second, these wealth transfers do
not have to be a zero-sum game, as differences in the rates of return allow all parties to
profit while wealth is still being redistributed. This positive-sum game nature of the gains
gives a social justification to the wealth transfers and makes them sustainable. Third,
coming from a stock of accumulated assets or being based on a rising leverage in
anticipation of a future stock of assets, capital gain-like revenues are unrelated to and
hence incommensurable with the current output. This incommensurability makes a rise in
the financial profits as a share of total domestic profits less surprising, but with that not
less problematic from the perspective of wealth transfers and their social implications.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The present study makes four contributions. First, it compares a Marxist theory of
banking with other theoretical approaches to banking that emerged to explain its ongoing
transformation. A Marxist theory is shown to retain strengths and overcome weaknesses
of other takes on banking. This comparative advantage stems from a dual foundation of
this theory – liquidity provision through exchange of promises to pay as a core function
of banking and an explicit connection between bank revenues and key macroeconomic
aggregates (profits, wages, and assets of various sectors). Second, some of the
characteristics of founder’s profit are shown to hold for profits from securitization and to
some extent gains from mergers and acquisitions. Thus, this study identifies a range of
revenues associated with functioning of capital markets – capital gain-like revenues – that
differ from profits from production, as they involve transfers of wealth. Third, due to
their function of liquidity provision, banks are well suited to facilitate the deals yielding
capital gain-like revenues and, hence, to share in these gains. It implies a relatively
unaltered fundamental function of banking can not only co-exist with but also form a
basis for a significant transformation of the nature of bank revenues. Moreover,
extraction of the capital gain-like revenues is a unifying principle behind a number of
apparently heterogeneous aspects of the transformation of banking. Finally, fourth, an
empirical analysis for the US bank holding companies shows capital-gain like revenues
were indeed a significant part of bank revenues in 2001-2010. In the context of rising
household vulnerability to wealth transfers, such trend in bank income suggests a
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reinstatement of predatory aspects of finance on a new foundation. Consider these
arguments in a greater detail.

7.1. Comparative Advantage of a Marxist Theory of Banking
Since the 1990s new approaches to banking have emerged trying to fill a
theoretical vacuum that arose due to weaknesses of the information-theoretic approach in
addressing the ongoing transformation of banking. The present study compares a Marxist
theory of banking with other approaches to banking, both mainstream and heterodox, and
argues a Marxist framework is better suited for understanding the ongoing transformation
of banking. It is shown to retain strengths and overcome limitations of other approaches
to banking.
A comparative advantage of a Marxist theory in explaining the transformation of
banking stems from its dual foundation (chapter 4). First, it is grounded in the bills view,
according to which banks originate in discounting, and the essence of the banking
business lies in issuing one promise to pay (bank notes) in exchange for another
(discounted bills). Second, Marx distinguishes between different types of credit
relationship based on characteristics of a borrower and a lender, and on a historical
context in which they take place. This offers a useful framework for locating banking in
the circuit of capital and revenue by establishing a connection between various forms of
bank profit and their sources. For Marx, profit in the sphere of circulation can come not
only from redivision of the newly created surplus value, as in the case of merchant’s
profit, profit from money-dealing and interest from lending to industrial capitalists.
Drawing on Steuart (1770a, p. 206), Marx argues profit in the sphere of circulation can
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also come from redivision of the already existing value – wages and existing money
stocks. In this case it would be “profit upon alienation”, which involves “a vibration of
the balance of wealth between parties” – a transfer of income or wealth.
A Marxist theory of banking can be seen as a more general approach to banking
than the mainstream or the circuitist theories of banking. The former retains a transhistorical dimension of the banking business while still allowing for a significant
transformation of banking associated with a change in the social nature and
macroeconomic sources of bank revenues and profits.
First, a Marxist theory of banking retains the strength of the new mainstream and
heterodox approaches to banking by identifying a core of the banking business outside of
the context of information asymmetry and market imperfections. It allows these theories
to overcome the inability of the information-theoretic approach to account for a rising
share of bank profits in total domestic profits (chapter 2). A Marxist theory does it by
defining banking as liquidity provision through an exchange of promises to pay, hence,
makes banks a specifically monetary phenomenon. It still leaves room for screening and
monitoring functions of banking, but merely as necessary aspects of banking business
required for liquidity provision, not as raison d’être of banks. Banks would have existed
even if information were symmetrical, as long as money is a universal equivalent and
demand for universal equivalent poses a need for credit relations. Similarly, banks can
receive a rising share of domestic profits with less screening and monitoring if they find a
new form of liquidity provision.
Second, a Marxist theory of banking can nest the portfolio theories (Fama 1980,
Gurley, Shaw 1956, Tobin 1963) and more recent theories of shadow banking as banking
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(Gorton 2008, 2009, Pozsar et al. 2010) as its particular cases (chapter 2). It becomes
possible because, by focusing on a transformation of one class of assets into another, the
portfolio theories and theories of shadow banking can be seen as partial cases of the bills
view tailored for the realities of banking in the middle of the 20th and early 21st centuries,
respectively.166 Grounded in the bills view, a Marxist theory of banking defines banking
as a business of exchange of promises to pay in general, allowing promises to pay and
forms of their exchange take many concrete forms, from discounting through credit
intermediation to the modern forms of shadow banking and asset management. In
addition to focusing only on particular historical forms of banking, all the recent
mainstream approaches to banking overlook the transformation of banking associated
with a changing character of bank profits. This aspect of the transformation can be
recognized by a Marxist theory which, unlike the mainstream theories, locates banking in
the macroeconomic context and basic macroeconomic aggregates, such as various forms
of income and stocks of monetary wealth.
Third, a Marxist theory retains Keynes’s emphasis on the role of liquidity (chapter
3), because an exchange of promises to pay as a trans-historical function of banking has
liquidity provision as its counterpart. A credit relationship is an exchange of money for a
promise to pay. This relationship therefore involves two aspects – a monetary aspect of
liquidity provision and an issuance of a promise to pay – each corresponding to a
different function of money, namely, money as a universal equivalent and money as a
means of payment. By supplementing the focus on liquidity provision by an emphasis on
exchange of promises to pay, a Marxist theory lowers the level of abstraction at which
166

Similarly, banking for development (Schumpeter 1961 [1911/1934]) is but a particular form of banking
relevant under certain historical circumstances without being a general theory of banking (chapter 3).
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banking is theorized – from a high level of abstraction of a monetary theory to a more
concrete level of credit relations. This change in the level of abstraction brings to the
surface the role of trust, power, and other non-economic factors.
Fourth, an explicit connection between banking and the circuit of capital and
revenue, as well as a take on banking as a monetary phenomenon, makes a Marxist
theory akin to an approach to banking within the monetary theory of production (chapter
3). Nevertheless, the monetary circuit of production theory cannot explain several aspects
of the transformation of banking. First, if the core function of the banking business is
money creation ex nihilo, it is unclear why banks take deposits, and why they engage in
asset sales and securitization. Moreover, this approach excludes the shadow banking
system from the perimeter of banking due to a lack of money creation by the shadow
banking institutions, thus, leaving out of the scope of analysis an important part of the
modern financial system. Second, a rise in lending to households and non-lending
activities reveal the limitations of centering a theory of banking on credit for productive
purposes, as is the case with the circuitist theory of banking. Assuming only one form of
connection between banking and the rest of the economy leads circuitists to explain
lending for non-productive purposes as a roundabout way of extending productive credit.
This attempt to preserve an analytical core of the theory prevents the circuitist approach
from realizing a full potential of an explicit connection between banking and the circuit
of capital, embedded in the theory. Third, the rising multiplicity of forms of bank
revenues that moreover have different sources stand at odds with the circuitist treatment
of bank profit as a homogeneous rent, or seigniorage, extracted from the rest of the
economy. Therefore, a Marxist theory appears to be a more general theory of banking
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than the monetary theory of production, because the former views money creation ex
nihilo as one of the forms of exchange of promises to pay and because it allows for
multiple links between banking and the circuits of capital and revenue, not restricted to
credit for productive purposes.

7.2. A Range of Capital Gain-Like Revenues
The second contribution of the present study lies in identifying a range of capital
gain-like revenues having similar characteristics with respect to the social relations
making their extraction possible and the macroeconomic source of these gains. Certain
features of founder’s profit are shown to hold for profit from securitization and to some
extent gains from mergers and acquisitions.
A genesis of the corporate form of business organization and capital markets has
become a social foundation for a particular form of profit making – extraction of capital
gain-like revenues (chapter 5). An analytical tool for understanding the peculiar character
of these revenues can be found in a distinct conceptualization of capital goods as having
two sets of prices – the market price based on capitalization of their future yields and the
replacement costs. An insight that a gap between the two sets of prices can be seen as a
gain motivating investment is a basis of a theory of investment associated with Keynes
(1973 [1936]), Brainard and Tobin (1968, 1969, 1990), and Minsky (2008 [1986], 1975,
1981). This gap would be however an inducement to invest only under particular
circumstances, namely, when a decision maker about investment is also remunerated by
the gain associated with the gap between the two sets of prices, or at least by a share in
this gain. It is therefore not surprising this theory does not stand empirical evidence as a
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general theory of investment. In spite of a limited explanatory power of the KeynesTobin-Minsky theory of investment, its significance lies in uncovering a peculiar source
of profit associated with two ways of pricing the same capital good (forward-looking and
“present-looking”). This idea forms a point of departure for the main contribution of the
present study – an identification of a range of profits having similar characteristics.
Capital gain-like revenues are shown to be a driving force behind IPO, M&A, and
securitization.
The simplest form of profit due to a gap between the two sets of prices is
founder’s profit – a gain that arises upon conversion of an individually owned enterprise
into a corporation. An identification of this profit as an economic category sui generis is
Hilferding’s (1910) theoretical contribution. Founder’s profit emerges due to a lack of
control over enterprise by shareholders, which is translated into their accepting a rate of
return below the profit rate. This gain is further magnified by information asymmetry and
fraud for which the corporate form of business organization creates a favorable
environment. The social significance of founder’s profit stems from its coming from
monetary assets scattered across the society, either immediately (if the shares are
purchased with the ultimate investor’s own funds, or savings) or after a period of time
(upon repayment of debt, if the shares are purchased with borrowed funds). Capital gainlike revenues can therefore be seen as a form of wealth transfer, or “profit upon
alienation”, the scope of which is unrelated to and can exceed the size of the current
income.
Mergers and acquisitions is another way of extracting capital gain-like revenues.
Unlike founder’s profit, a gain from M&A arises due to an increase in the expected future
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profit of a combined enterprise, not due to a difference in the required rates of return. In
spite of this difference, profit from M&A is akin to founder’s profit in the sense of
coming from an increase in the current valuation of a reorganized enterprise, which opens
an opportunity for a lump-sum gain. This gain accrues to institutions and individuals
having control over the enterprises under reorganization and to institutions facilitating
this process (e.g., investment banks). Coming from the monetary assets of the buyers of
securities of a reorganized enterprise, gain from M&A also constitutes a form of “profit
upon alienation”.
Finally, securitization is akin to incorporation both in terms of the process and
social foundations of the financial deal, and the character of the gain. Securitization can
be seen as a process of incorporation applied to bank lending, which increases the current
valuation of a loan. Consider the similarities. First, similar to IPO involving a
transformation of individual capital into truly social by dispersing the ownership
structure, securitization raises the social foundations of bank credit to a new level. All
bank credit generalizes trust and social foundations of the trade credit by overcoming the
limits of credit confined to intrinsically linked production processes, requiring a match in
volume and maturity, and lacking universal acceptability (Itoh, Lapavitsas 1999, p. 9091, Lapavitsas 2003, p. 79-81, 2007, p. 426-427). Banks broaden the basis of trust
generalizing credit relations beyond the confines of related industrial capitalists through
asset diversification and access to reserves, thus, giving bank liabilities a character of a
generally accepted universal equivalent. The specificity of securitization lies in its
generalizing the social foundations of credit without bearing the costs of reserves and
consequently also lowering the costs of screening and monitoring. Securitization can
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therefore be seen as a way of generalizing credit relations at a minimum cost for banks.
Second, gains from securitization come from a lack of control of the ultimate asset
holders over banks, resulting in their accepting a rate of return below the interest rate on
loans. Third, similar to IPO, gains from securitization are often further magnified by
fraud and information asymmetry for which the difference in the social status of insiders
and outsiders creates a favorable environment. Finally, fourth, both cases involve a
transformation of an illiquid asset into a liquid one – means of production into equity
shares and loans into marketable securities (bonds). Although this difference in liquidity
of the assets can explain some of the difference in the required rates of return from the
perspective of an individual investor, it overlooks a conflict between the social nature of
liquidity and private appropriation of its benefits by insiders and financial institutions. If
incorporation or securitization were handled by a public agency, the benefits of liquidity
– social in nature – would have belonged to the general public.
There are three important characteristics of the capital gain-like revenues (chapter
6). First, being based on differences in the rates of return, the wealth transfers associated
with the capital gain-like revenues take place even in “normal times” and do not hinge on
a depreciation of the asset value in a crisis. Second, these wealth transfers do not have to
be a zero-sum game, as differences in the rates of return allow all parties to profit while
wealth is still being redistributed. This positive-sum game nature of the gains gives a
social justification to the wealth transfers and makes them sustainable. Third, coming
from a stock of accumulated assets or being based on a rising leverage in anticipation of a
future stock of assets, capital gain-like revenues are unrelated to and, hence,
incommensurable with the current output. This incommensurability makes a rise in
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financial profits as a share of total domestic profits less surprising, but with that not less
problematic from the perspective of wealth transfers and their social implications.

7.3. Extraction of Capital Gain-Like Revenues as a Driving Force behind Many
Aspects of the Transformation of Banking
This study contributes to the existing literature by arguing that some of bank
profits represent capital gain-like revenues and that extraction of this form of revenues
has been moreover a unifying principle behind many aspects of the ongoing
transformation of banking. This conclusion can be reached by integrating a Marxist
theory of banking with a suggested take on the capital gain-like revenues associated with
the dual price system. The former emphasizes the role of banks in liquidity provision
through exchange of promises to pay, which serves as a foundation for banks’ sharing in
the capital gain-like revenues. The latter stresses multiple forms taken by the capital gainlike revenues and uncovers their peculiar character.
A dual foundation of a Marxist theory of banking makes this theory well suited to
explain how a relatively unchanged core function of banking can not only co-exist with
but also form a basis for a significant transformation of bank revenues. IPO, M&A,
securitization and trade in assets rose to prominence with a rise of the corporate form of
business organization and capital markets (chapter 5). These activities yield a peculiar
form of profit, capital gain-like revenue, but they also require liquidity. Banks have
responded to a rise in these activities by deploying their function of liquidity provision
through an exchange of promises to pay. On these grounds, banks share in the capitalgain like revenues which in turn potentially makes them active promoters of these forms
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of profit making. This is in line with an active principle behind the banking business in
general stressed by a Marxist theory of banking.
An appreciation of the multiplicity of forms taken by the capital gain-like
revenues allows one to recognize that behind an apparent heterogeneity of banking
activities associated with the transformation of banking lies a common driving force –
extraction of the capital gain-like revenues (chapter 6). This unifying principle would not
be noticed, if an analysis were based on the accounting categories as given in bank
income statements.
How does this analysis of the transformation of bank revenues relate to other
approaches? An emphasis on bank revenues is in line with the literature on
financialization (Epstein, Jayadev 2005, Krippner 2005) stressing a rise in financial
profits (chapter 3) and the mainstream empirical literature (Samolyk 2004, DeYoung,
Rice 2004b) treating bank revenues and profits as an appropriate lens for studying the
transformation of banking due to a peculiar character of this transformation that is not
always reflected on bank balance sheets (chapter 2). Nevertheless, by identifying a range
of capital gain-like revenues, the present study goes beyond an empiricist bias of the
mainstream literature focusing on the forms of revenues as given in the bank income
statements. In this sense the present approach draws on the literature on financialization
(Pollin 1996, van Treeck 2009, Lapavitsas 2009, Dos Santos 2009) posing a question of
the macroeconomic sources of financial profits (chapter 3). An appreciation of a variety
of the macroeconomic sources of financial profits allows this approach to go beyond the
circuitist theory, which treats bank profits as a homogeneous rent. An identification of
accumulated stock of monetary wealth as a distinct macroeconomic source of financial
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profit contributes to Arrighi-Pollin debate (Pollin 1996, Arrighi 1994, 1997) by
supporting Pollin’s claim that financial profits ultimately come from production.
Nevertheless, an approach developed in the present study shows the complexity of the
relationship between production and financial profit. In the case of the capital gain-like
revenues, financial profit comes from an accumulated stock of wealth that is unrelated to
current output, hence, to the current process of production. Finally, the focus on the
macroeconomic sources of bank revenues supplements the existing studies focusing on
the fictitious character of these revenues, due to either accounting standards or risk
illusion (Kerr 2011, Crotty 2008, Haldane, Brennan & Madouros 2010) (chapter 6).
Although capital gain-like revenues can be considered fictitious in the sense that their
magnitude can change suddenly for reasons unrelated to the process of production, from
the perspective of their macroeconomic sources, far from being illusory, these profits
involve a real wealth transfer. By identifying a structural problem with extraction of some
forms of financial profit, this study suggests that addressing the issues of accounting
practices and excessive risk taking is not sufficient to eliminate the capital gain-like
revenues.

7.4. Significance of the Capital Gain-Like Revenues for the US Bank Holding
Companies in 2001-2010
A theoretical framework developed in the present study is used to empirically
examine the transformation of banking in the US. An empirical analysis of the sources of
revenue of the US bank holding companies in 1986-2010 shows the capital gain-like
revenues have indeed been a significant part of bank income (chapter 6). In 2001-2010,
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almost a half of the non-interest income of the US bank holding companies came from
activities generating capital gain-like revenues, with the share of this income in 20092010 exceeding its pre-crisis level. These revenues are highly concentrated in a small
number of the largest banks. In 2009-2010, the largest seven banks received 80 percent,
and largest twenty banks – 90 percent of the total capital gain-like revenues accruing to
the bank holding companies sector as a whole.
Neoliberalism has enabled and sustained a rise in the household financial assets as
a multiple of their disposable income through slashing state social programs, including
privatization of pensions, and keeping the real wages stagnant. Household net wealth
(financial assets net of liabilities) as a multiple of their income has increased by 35
percent between 1973-1979 and 1995-2011 – from the average 2.46 to 3.32. This rise was
reinforced by a changing composition of the household financial assets. Household nondeposit financial assets (including money market mutual fund shares) have increased
from the average 76 percent of the household total financial assets in 1973-84 to 87
percent in 2000-11. These two developments indicate a rise in the pool of assets available
for redivision in the form of capital gain-like revenues, and suggest households have
become increasingly vulnerable to wealth transfers associated with extraction of the
capital gain-like revenues. Financial assets represent a larger multiple of the household
disposable income than a comparable indicator for the US economy as a whole (1.15 in
1973-1979 and 2.37 in 1995-2011) revealing a greater exposure of households to wealth
transfers than other sectors. This high exposure is reinforced by households being less
likely to avoid the ultimate wealth transfers through defaults, rolling over debt, or bailouts by the government or other institutions.
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In the context of rising household exposure to wealth transfers, a rise in the
capital gain-like revenues of the bank holding companies signifies a reinstatement of
predatory aspects of finance in contemporary capitalism.
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